Negotiating With the Bogey Man: Perceptions of European-Southeast Asian Relations in Lore and Tradition

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Introduction
The legacy of colonialism in the minds of those subjected to it is as diverse as the forms of colonial expansion over the centuries. Generally, more emphasis has been given to the dark and exploitative sides in recent decades, especially with the rise of Postcolonial and Decolonial studies (Grecco & Schuster 2020). Events such as the Rwanda Genocide and the Israel-Hamas War are often explained as being ultimately the result of Western discrimination and exploitation, with repercussions long after formal decolonization. Demands for reparations and apologies are increasingly launched by the ex-colonies (Weiss 2016: 16). Such images of past injustices are largely shaped by modern media, politics, opinion leaders, and feelings of social dispossession. But it also worth looking at how culturally embedded images of foreign domination have lived on in non-Western societies, in other words, how Occidentalism, stylized images of the West, has operated. In many local milieus, the collective memory has transmitted stories that attribute the European invasions with unusual and supernatural elements, thus epitomizing the social experience of colonialism (Reid 1994). These elements can be termed fantastic since they are set in an essentially dehistoricized past where power and moralism follow their own logic, often divinely mediated. While they are much less studied than national, widely disseminated narratives of the colonial past, such stories are highly interesting since they give local and regional perspectives of political and social processes conveyed by colonial rule. Since they are not bound by conventional historiographic norms and are usually recorded long after the event, the accounts may incorporate legendary and mythical elements in their understanding of foreign impact. This in turn provides mental traces of the colonial experience that may not be found in other, more conventional sources.

The “fantastic” stories of colonialism are therefore valuable from historical, sociological, and literary angles, and in the present study, I will focus on a region with a great variety of narrative traditions and an extended history of Western imperialism – in fact about as long as the colonial history of the Americas. This is Southeast Asia with many hundreds of historical cultures and persistent traditions of narrating the past. Southeast Asia is a sub-region of Asia that covers some four and a half million square kilometres. Because it is the home of five world religions and many hundreds of
languages and ethnic groups, one may ask whether it is actually defendable to discuss it under one heading. This is a problem that innumerable historians, social scientists, and geographers have battled over the years, but to make a long story short there are actually some features that make Southeast Asia analytically interesting as a category. While geographically a part of Asia with influences from the Chinese, Indian, and Muslim worlds, it differs from other sub-regions on account of its mostly tropical climate on both sides of the Equator. Rice cultivation in plains and river valleys has a fundamental economic role along with an assortment of other crops. The tropical climate has also favoured certain commercial crops and products of nature that have attracted merchants from outside since pre-historic times (Reid 1988-1993; Lieberman 2003-2009). It has furthermore been the unfortunate object of colonial intrusion – for many years it was entirely subordinated to Western nations with the exception of Siam (Thailand) (Osborne 1997: 61-80).

The world of Southeast Asia harbours a set of highly literate traditions. The history of Burma, Siam, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Malay world, and Java, can be traced in some detail via chronicles, inscriptions, religious tracts, and belle-lettres. It is also true, however, that large parts were basically non-literate until modern times but had a rich and varied heritage of orally transmitted narrations. Moreover, even written historical texts tended to incorporate mythical and folkloristic elements. It has been said that much Southeast Asian historiography was concerned with origins of the present order, and saw events as “fated”, while the accurate chronology of events was of secondary significance (Vickers 1990). The distinction between orality and literacy in stories of the past is therefore moot. In terms of factual credibility, the regional genres vary greatly; while, for example, Vietnamese and Burmese historical writings are considered relatively accurate, Javanese and Balinese historiography contain elements of literary magic and supernatural features (Reid & Marr 1979).

Indigenous stories that detail the origin of a political order are sometimes discussed by anthropologists to elucidate how local Southeast Asian societies perceive their own position in this world, and their sense of temporality (Geertz 1980: 11-19). Historians have been less interested in oral tradition for the simple reason that its value in clarifying historical events and processes is so controversial and cumbersome. The aim of this study is to look into orally or textually transmitted stories of the Southeast Asian past that relate the coming of Europeans to the area and purport to explain how the white strangers subordinated the local populations. In other words, I am interested in the way that colonial diplomacy and expansion programs left an imprint on the collective memory and were frequently epitomised in fantastic narrative elements, here identified as elements that significantly transgress perceived social or physical boundaries. In order to explain how relations with the foreigners were created in a remote past, the narrative often resorts to magic or outrageous elements that highlight their disturbing of the social and
cosmological order. All this gives indications of how the foreignness of the Europeans was taxed, and the threatening and calamitous (or, less commonly, beneficial) aspects of their presence (Barnes 2008). The method applied here is to scrutinize accounts of the legendary or mythical past from various parts of Southeast Asia, recorded since the early modern era, which entail elements of Occidentalism. Modern studies of oral tradition have emphasized the importance to scrutinize both the performer and performance (Vansina 1985).

In other words, who is entitled to relate a story of the past, and under what circumstances can it be narrated? Such analysis can help us understand the variety of forms that Occidentalism may take in the collective memory. Considering the vast geographical extension of Southeast Asia, the sample is mainly guided by the availability in printed sources. Due to the pattern of European penetration, most narratives pertain to insular Southeast Asia. At least, the endeavour demonstrates the breadth of how cultural encounters were mentally processed via folkloristic and fantasy devices.

A history of crises and misunderstandings, at worst bloody wars, apparently left its mark on the way that Westerners were portrayed. Their foreignness would have been strengthened by the physical and cultural differences, such as impetuous and loud-voiced behaviour, breaking of sexual norms, etc. Such miscommunication underpinned Occidentalism as a counterpart of the Orientalism that has been thoroughly researched by Edward Said and a number of postcolonial scholars (Said 1978; Hamidi 2013). Occidentalism as a concept emerged in the late twentieth century and is variously defined. It may signify the study of the West by the non-West (especially the Muslim and Asian worlds). It can also be a reflection of hostility towards the West. Or, more positively, it can strive to answer the question how Western values and innovations may be developed and adapted (Metin 2020: 184).

In the context of the present study, Occidentalism is briefly defined as a set of stylized images of the West, or a community of Westerners. As such it occurs both in Western and non-Western contexts. For Westerners themselves, Occidentalism is the purported standards of normality and civilization by which they define themselves in contrast to non-Western cultures. Non-Westerners, on the other hand, may essentialize the West despite its sprawling and many-faceted aspects, constructing an image of white people as opposed to their own norms (Carrier 1995). The Orientalism that Edward Said described was a discursive formation based on the elliptic power relations between the West and the “Orient”, in other words the positional superiority of the whites. Occidentalism, on the other hand, does not always mirror this, since African and Asian groups have frequently been disempowered for hundreds of years. A valid question to ask the stories of the past is, therefore, if they can serve as culturally mediated rebuttals of colonial claims to dominance.

Occidentalism, as a problem of apprehending European ascension, ties in with the so-called stranger kings syndrome. As studied in detail by scholars
such as Marshall Sahlins (1985), David Henley (2002), James J. Fox (2008), Robert Barnes (2008) and Elizabeth G. Traube (2011), many communities, especially Austronesian groups that encompass much of maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific world, have developed a paradigm of linking political order to a semi-mythical encounter between an indigenous presence and newcomers from the outside. In these stories, the stranger king appropriates political authority while often maintaining the indigenous lord as having ritual authority over the land. This epistemology of origin makes a diarchic distinction between “inside” and “outside” in terms of status distinction (Traube 2011: 117). In many cases, as we shall see, Europeans are inserted into this epistemology in the local mind.

**Intrusion and diplomacy in history and legend**

Then, how did Europeans bond the Southeast Asian kingdoms and chiefdoms and subject them to colonial governance? Historically, the process started in 1511 (Melaka in present-day Malaysia) and accelerated later in the same century when the Spanish conquered the Philippines. The Dutch East India Company gained leverage during the seventeenth century when most of the important polities of the island world (present-day Indonesia and Malaysia) had to acknowledge Dutch suzerainty. A new and more thorough colonialism evolved in the nineteenth century as the mainland states (Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam) finally fell to the European arms or diplomatic pressure. While independent, Siam had to adjust to European demands in various ways. It was a process that was only broken with the events during and after World War II.

In the first centuries of colonial presence, the innumerable treaties and agreements that Europeans concluded with large and small Southeast Asian polities, were not so different from the ones that Europeans concluded with each other at the other end of the Eurasian landmass (Pitts 2018: 19-22). It is however obvious that treaty making was part of European strategies to construct commercial and political realms in Asia. Although the early-modern players, especially the Dutch, made treaties with Asian polities that did not (necessarily) infringe on their sovereign rights, the treaties were in fact geared towards European commercial control. Moreover, treaty-writing was not an alternative to warfare but very frequently combined with warmongering. From the beginning of European contacts with Southeast Asian polities, thousands of contracts and agreements are preserved in the archives, which tend to be increasingly intrusive over time (Van Ittersum 2018). For larger and smaller kingdoms and chiefdoms in the sub-region, the foreign writ was something the inhabitants simply had to relate to.

How would they have perceived the agreements that were concluded under duress or free will? Naturally, Southeast Asians had their own traditions of diplomacy. Treaties could be made orally, through ritual oath-making, or through written agreements. Sometimes they were based on traditions of
shared origins, sometimes on political hierarchy, sometimes on rational observations of geographical features (mountains, forests, river systems) (Korn 1932: 440; Stuart-Fox 1998: 91). However, European legal concepts were not easily translated to local languages. For example, the Malay word *janji* was not merely a treaty but had much wider meanings of pledges and promises. There would also have been a problem of time perspective. European powers regarded the written treaties as perpetual, until renovated by a new treaty. Also, they would have signed in the name of their country or commercial company, whereas the Southeast Asian part signed it in the capacity of a particular ruler. The Southeast Asian state, on its part, might not have seen the treaty as perpetual, but only as valid as long as the ruler was alive. Muslim legal notions, moreover, were averse to treaties with non-Muslims that lasted more than ten years (Borschberg 2021). Thus, there were many opportunities for differing interpretations, and the disagreement might very well result in a war or punitive expedition.

To illustrate how early diplomatic contact may be framed in the collective memory that mixes genuine reminiscences with narrative tropes, we can pick a case from Timor, a sizeable island in eastern maritime Southeast Asia where different colonial powers were competing for power and local products since the seventeenth century. Let us listen to the Na’i Bot or Great Lord of the small former kingdom of Fatumean, interviewed by an Australian scholar in the 1990s. Oral tradition still has an important role in the region, and the story refers to an unspecified time long ago when the Portuguese began to subordinate parts of Timor through warfare and diplomacy.

The commander of the Portuguese used Fatumean as his base. He asked to exchange wives with Na’i Fatumean, but the Na’i [Lord] put clothes on a slave and gave her to the Portuguese as wife. Later he found out and was ashamed and so commenced hostilities between the Portuguese and Fatumean.

This led to the war of ‘Uma Tolu’, the war of the three houses, Fatumean, Lookeu and Dakolo. They fought at Fatumean and won, driving out the Portuguese.

Later Fatumean, Wehali and Gowa [the Makassar people of Sulawesi] attacked the Portuguese at Fohoren and defeated them. The Asuain cut off the heads of the Portuguese, leaving their bodies at Fohoren. Their heads were taken back to Fatumean and were placed on the *Sadan*, the ring of stones, the amphitheatre, for all to see and dance around. (Spillett 1999: 201)

In the collective memory epitomized by the local elite, the image of European colonizers is dark but also somewhat disdainful. As implied by the Na’i Bot, Timor has had a troubled colonial and postcolonial history where Dutch and Portuguese interests competed for hundreds of years to exploit resources of sandalwood, beeswax, and coffee. The narrator employs a trickster tale of a type often found in Southeast Asian lore to explain a historical event. The first
contact is sealed by wife-swapping diplomacy. However, the Portuguese leader is tricked to marry a slave woman, with blood-curling consequences. The local Timorese warriors ally with Gowa, a Muslim kingdom in faraway Sulawesi, and with Wehali, a prestigious kingdom in south-central Timor, and carry the day. Their headhunting customs show off as the heads of the hapless Europeans are placed in a megalithic ritual site.

There is no European source that confirms the story, which elides the fact that Western colonialism eventually did subjugate Fatumean, which was part of a five-kingdom federation that was split up between the Portuguese and Dutch. The scene of a Catholic colonial officer swapping wives with a local chief is not plausible, although the grisly headhunting scene makes sense in the light of the widespread custom (McWilliam 1996). What is known from Western archival sources is that the Makassarese of South Sulawesi tried to bond some Timorese realms in the seventeenth century, including the ritually exalted Wehali Kingdom that is mentioned in the story, although they were ousted in the end. It is also known from a Dutch source that the kingdoms of the south coast defeated the Portuguese intruders sometime around the 1640s (Hägerdal 2012: 83-91). Historical particles mix with lore and legend to produce a story where the beginnings of European expansion are portrayed in a fantastic and far from flattering light.

The story of Fatumean is retold through numerous oral performances over some 350 years. But textual sources likewise offer intriguing perspectives on colonial encounters. The Javanese royal chronicles were generally written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and extolled the Mataram Dynasty that dominated Java since c. 1600. The steady entanglement between the Dutch and Javanese ensured a set of stories of diplomatic and warlike interactions. At the origin of this entanglement lies the sieges of Dutch Batavia (Jakarta) at the hands of Sultan Agung, ruler of Mataram (1628, 1629). The sieges both ended in failure for the Javanese troops, meaning that the Dutch could not be dislodged from the island. This is represented by a long account in the late chronicles where the two sieges are telescoped into one. The Dutch are portrayed in less than glorious light. For want of ammunition, they shoot dung at the Javanese soldiers, forcing them to cleanse themselves properly. A prince among the besiegers makes a large hole in the city wall by supernatural means, and the Dutch shiver from fear after losing many men. Then, suddenly, the siege is lifted since “the Dutch have only come here to trade.” Moreover, the ruler prophesies that the Dutch, in the future, will assist one of his descendants. Thus, the Dutch should henceforth be friends and allies and protect the court (De Graaf 1958: 152-5). In fact, this is exactly what happens much later, when the Dutch East India Company (VOC) saves the skin of Sultan Agung’s grandson around 1680 and increases its influence in Java. A detailed comparison between Javanese and Dutch sources shows how “historical” chronicles work partly similar to oral tradition, entailing a moral turning of the tables: far from the victors of the
contemporary colonial accounts, the fearful and somewhat despicable Europeans of the chronicles are only saved by the prophetic wisdom and tolerance of Sultan Agung. This inaugurates a centuries-long history of colonial diplomacy at the Javanese courts. From both oral and textual sources, we encounter an Occidentalism that rearranges historical events to suit a Southeast Asian image of power relations and moral authority.

The stranger as deceiver
Occidentalism entails a moral categorization of the European Other, as a way of mentally handling a history of physical subordination. One category of stories about the coming of the Europeans emphasize their cunning and treacherous behaviour to gain the upper hand over local rulers and lands. This can be seen as local attempts to provide a rationale for colonial domination: it is not a question of the superior moral or material qualities of the white strangers, but rather their unscrupulous behaviour that allow them to break resistance against their governance. An example is a late oral retelling of an actual event that took place in 1752 in the colonial port Kupang in Timor, where the Dutch East India Company (VOC) confronted the prestigious ruler of the Sonbai Kingdom:

A ruler called Bau Sonbai stayed there; he stood up and went to Kupang and stayed at Kiu Tuta (Bakunase). He searched for lands to make him equal with the [Dutch] Company. When he stayed there, Bau Sonbai sired three children, two daughters and a boy called Tafin Sonbai; the two girls were Bi Sul Sonbai and Au Lais Sonbai. Now, the lands of Bau Sonbai were enormous. The Company called him to Kupang. Now he [the Dutch leader] took a blowpipe and handed it over and said: “If you are a ruler, then crawl through this blowpipe and come out at the other end as Sonbai”. Then Sonbai said to the Company: “Good, I will crawl in there first, and then you do it after me”. Then Sonbai made his trick, I do not know how, and became a snake, and crawled into the hole and came out in the other end. Then he handed the blowpipe to the Company and said: “Crawl in there.” But the gentleman could not do it. Then they made ten wax candles; the Company made them. And then they lit them in one end so they burnt like a lamp. Then it was said: “Take the candles between your teeth, then insert the candle in your mouth if you are really a ruler, and let the candle burn until it has is entirely molten in your mouth. Handing other candles to the gentlemen of the Company, Bau Sonbai said: “That you must also do.” Bau Sonbai opened his mouth; there was no candle to be seen, the candle was molten. He gave them to the gentleman so that he would burn the candles as he, but the gentleman could not do it.

[…]

Then Sonbai said and commanded: “Make a ball of earth and weigh me with it. If I weigh as much as the earth, then it is my land, then I am the ruler, and the earth is equal with me. Now, the Company said: “Sonbai has many places, his tricks
are superior to mine. We shall exile him to another land.” (Middelkoop 1938: 441-2)

The background to this fantastic story is that the ruler of the large inland realm Sonbai, Bau Sonbai, fled from the attacks of the Portuguese in 1748 and migrated to Dutch-dominated Kupang with thousands of followers. He made a pledge of allegiance to the VOC and stayed close to the port town but was soon suspected of colluding with his Portuguese former enemies. The Dutch took the precaution to arrest him and send him in exile to Cape Town where the fallen ruler succumbed under murky circumstances (Hägerdal 2009; Matos 2015: 168-9). The rather detailed Dutch documents do not, of course, tell of a competition in magic, but rather stress that Bau Sonbai had broken his pledge and was a traitor. For the locals, however, the treason was on the part of the VOC. Although Bau Sonbai had won the contests in magic and proved his status as the true ruler, the anxious whites acted in a base way to arrest and exile him. The story is widespread and told in slightly different variants in West Timor; its performance is thus an epitome of colonial coercion and injustice.

A related theme that recurs in several geographical contexts tells how European tricksters fool local rulers into ceding territory where they subsequently build colonial strongholds. As pointed out by Anthony Reid, who has studied early Southeast Asian images of Europeans, a fantastic story of an ox hide is found in as different places as Batavia (Jakarta), Melaka, and the Burmese port Syriam (Reid 1994: 292-3). The gist of the story is that the first Westerners ask the local lord to have as much land as they can cover with an ox hide. Unsuspecting, the ruler gladly agrees to this. The whites then cut the hide into narrow stripes and are thus able to enclose a substantial area. After that point, they can no more be dislodged. As clearly seen, this is a tale that has circulated round the world since Antiquity when it was told about Queen Dido and the founding of Carthage. It was later associated with the Viking leader Ívarr hinn Beinlausi and the founding of York (Tunstall 2005). How the story reached various places in Southeast Asia is less than clear, but it is anyway a standard trope that overlays basic historical events and again puts the foreigners in a dubious light: they may only gain ascendancy through vile tricks, which are calamitously underestimated by local elites.

The stranger as a friend

Occidentalism was thus mediated through the collective memory of intrusive and norm-breaking behaviour. Anthony Reid (1994) has pointed out that we mostly look in vain for positive assessments of Europeans in early texts of Southeast Asia. The tone is neutral or negative, with the negative images becoming dominant over time. Some of this is no doubt attributable to the perception of white people as essential outsiders, whether Spaniards, Portuguese, or Dutch. Their religion differed from the mostly Buddhist and
Muslim populations, and they were slow to learn and respect local rules of conduct. With their large ocean-going ships, they came from lands so far away as to seem mythical. Their use of firearms was more efficient, and they were able to defend their military posts with utmost tenacity against larger Southeast Asian armies – feats that were sometimes mythologized (Ras 1987: 140-3). Their never-ending attempts to force commercial monopolies on local societies in a way that had hardly been applied by local rulers, affirmed the negative image.

Still, colonialism was a many-faceted phenomenon. Historical data point at numerous cases when the Europeans were actively approached or invited, often by weak groups in search of security (Henley 2002). Interestingly, the strangers are not only ominous and frightening in the stories. In fact, legends from especially the eastern part of the Archipelagic world tell of lasting bonds between foreigners and locals which were initiated in a distant past. A nineteenth-century chronicle from the Moluccan island Ternate provides a wealth of details about the legendary and historical past of the volcanic island that was the centre of an extensive kingdom founded on the spice trade. The Muslim author of the chronicle, Naïdah, lived close to a court that was heavily dependent on the Dutch colonial overlords, and probably had to be careful when depicting the white strangers. Even so, the role he reserves for the Dutch is remarkable.

Then a Dutch ship was visible in the sea. It blew hard and the waves went high. The travellers did not know how to help themselves and cried. Among them was an Arab. He told them not to cry and to go towards the land, of which they could already see the mountain. Coming to the mountain, they called it Ternyata, upon which the Dutch returned.

At that time, Jafar Sadek, father of [the first Ternate king] Masahurmalamo, had sired seven children in Java and then came to Ternate. (Naïdah 1878: 437)

In this version, the Dutch seafarers actually give Ternate its name, Ternyata being the Malay word for “obvious”, “proven”. In fact, this is a folk etymology since the name of the island likely has a local origin. At the same time, the Dutch are saved by an Arab, a man from the revered homeland of Islam. Furthermore, the ancestor of the royal line appears to arrive to Ternate only after the Dutch “discovery”. Clearly, this is a fantastic realignment of the time line. Jafar Sadek and Masahurmalamo supposedly flourished many generations before the historical arrival of the Portuguese in 1512 – and the Dutch only turned up in 1599, when they started to ally with the Sultan of Ternate against his Spanish and Portuguese enemies (Schulte Nordholt 2016: 93-4; Song 2020). The historical diplomatic bonding is supplanted by Naïdah with an origin story where the Dutch have a precedence of sorts. This is in line with colonial diplomatic etiquette that named the Sultan of Ternate as the “child” of the Dutch authorities (Andaya 1993: 177).
An even more pointed example is a set of legends that flourish in the eastern section of Flores Island and the Oecussi enclave in Timor-Leste. The majority of the population here is Catholic and still often have Portuguese-sounding names. From the primary sources it is known that Portuguese seafarers and missionaries were present in the region since the sixteenth century and established a number of strongholds. The Portuguese settlers on Flores and adjacent islands were soon mixed with the local populations via intermarriage, resulting in an ethnically mixed community often known as the Black Portuguese.

Early Portuguese diplomacy on Flores and Timor has been distilled to a few significant “culture heroes” in accounts known since at least the nineteenth century (Heynen 1876). As the story goes, the Raja of Melaka had two sons called Djogo Warilla (Diogo Varela) and Augustinho da Gama. The brothers had a quarrel over a cockfight, and Djogo Warilla eventually left his homeland in company with his son Da Costa and nephew Hornay. He and his seaborne followers eventually came to eastern Flores where they helped a local raja to defeat the mountaineers of the interior. Since the raja was unable to pay Djogo as promised, he received a piece of land instead, which became the stronghold Konga. At a later time he met the adolescent chief of the mountain Ilimandiri in easternmost Flores and arranged that he would come to Konga to be educated in the Catholic religion and the Malay language. He later became the ancestor of the Catholic kings of Larantuka. Meanwhile, Djogo’s son and nephew went to Oecussi in Timor where they were involved in a fight with the local Timorese. Da Costa was wounded and taken by the enemy, but a peace deal was soon arranged between the Melaka people and the Timorese. Da Costa married the daughter of the ruler of Ambeno near Oecussi and his and Hornay’s descendants governed the place in turns. After some time Djogo Warilla’s junior brother Augustinho da Gama went out from Melaka with a seaborne expedition to look for his brother. At the south coast of Flores, he encountered a son of the chief of Nata Gahar who expressed his will to follow the foreigners back to Melaka. This was done and the boy was subsequently baptized under the name Alesu da Silva, later the first Raja of Sikka (Kleian 1891: 514-22).

Here, Melaka or Malacca on the Malay Peninsula, Portuguese since 1511, is at the origins of religion and ordered governance. The beginnings of Portuguese dominance in the Flores-Timor region is traced back to the acts of a prominent family and their princely apprentices. In fact, the process was much more outdrawn and complicated: the Portuguese settled in Larantuka in 1613, the first members of the Da Costa and Hornay families died in 1672 and 1693, respectively, and the genealogies of the Larantuka and Sikka rulers do not quite fit with early primary sources (De Roever 2002: 129-30; Hägerdal 2012: 145, 174-5). A Catholic Raja of Melaka is unknown to history. This, however, is less relevant for the purpose of the stories which is to legitimate
the early superimposition of a foreign religion and culture on indigenous socio-political structures (Lewis 2010).

Even the Dutch foreigners are incorporated in positively laden origin stories. A story recorded by a missionary in 1847 outlines the origins of the VOC settlement in Kupang:

On a certain day, two Solorese fishers, going far out in the sea, harpooned an unusually large shark. As they had not wounded it mortally but held fast to it, it dragged their canoe all the way to the Bay of Kupang, by the island Semau where the regent now and then stayed at Oasa. On his friendly invitation, the Solorese stayed with him for a few days and related that the Dutch, whom they called the “Company”, had expelled the Portuguese and treated their people very good. On the question whether the Company also claimed rights on the foodstuff that the Solorese used on a daily basis, they answered in the negative. The regent then spoke, “it is otherwise here with us; we can hardly put anything in the mouth without having to pay something to the Portuguese. The same thing goes for [the island] Rote. Especially, this is the case with the rice that they force us to sell to very low prices, so they can bring it to Macau...” (Heijmering 1847: 46-7)

Now the Timorese regent proposed that he might invite the Dutch to come to Kupang and expel them. The two Solorese promised to assist in this and indeed an alliance came into being. Even before the VOC had acted, the local Timorese attacked the Portuguese fort and massacred most of the garrison and traders, and their Sumbanese slaves. Thus began the governance of the Company. Interesting with this account is the Timorese agency. They, and not the Europeans, take the initiative to foment an alliance, and they actually defeat the Portuguese fortification on their own, before the Dutch men-of-war have even seen action. By implication, the colonial establishment is at least as much an indigenous as a Dutch creation. The alliance is moreover fated by the forces of “nature”, since the big shark drags the fishermen to Kupang.

The contemporary Dutch and Portuguese documents clearly show that some historical events have been preserved by the collective memory over the centuries, but that the timeline and causality has been altered. The Dutch were established on the strategically situated Solor Island, adjacent to Flores, in 1646 and began to expand their diplomatic net to gain control of the lucrative sandalwood trade of Timor (thus, there was no need for shark catching adventures). Kupang is situated at a bay that offered some shelter for the merchant vessels, and the Dutch started to build a fort in 1653 with the consent of the local king of the Helong tribe (Roever 2002). There is no mention of a Timorese attack on the previous Portuguese fort. This was followed by a contract with two leading kingdoms of West Timor, Sonbai and Amabi, in 1655, concluded through the mixing of blood and the presentation of two severed Portuguese heads. This is unlike oral tradition that mentions these kingdoms as present in the diplomatic overtures with the Dutch from the start. The system of a Dutch settlement surrounded by three (later five) loyal kingdoms would survive until 1917, and the longevity of the arrangement
induced locals to construe an origin story that justified the power division (Hägerdal 2012: 111-2, 407).

Apart from Ternate, these somewhat positive stories of the coming of the Europeans are told in areas that were neither Buddhist nor Muslim, so that their creed was not seen as offensive. In the case of Ternate, moreover, the Dutch were usually careful not to interfere in the Islamic practices of the locals. Furthermore, there is always a non-European agency in the stories. The “discovery” of Ternate is secured by an intrepid Arab, the seafarers from Melaka seem to be as Malay as European, and the Dutch presence on Timor owes more to the Timorese than themselves. While this may not sit well with some students of coloniality/decoloniality, the narratives suggest that certain Southeast Asian groups saw the foreigners as functional as “stranger kings” in the socio-political order. As discussed earlier, the theme of a foreigner establishing a primeval order is found in many places in Southeast Asia, and was easily applied to Europeans, whose foreignness seemed to warrant a degree of disinterested adjudication (Henley 2002). It was a matter of installing an outsider inside, a process where the local community had considerable agency (Fox 2008).

Placating the stranger
Once the foreigners were in place, local societies were faced with the task of handling them to avert disaster and if possibly gain something. In societies where Europeans gained early influence, the degree of control shifted much. In the early modern era, up to approximately the first half of the nineteenth century, the only large territories that were included in a European administrative structure were the Philippines and certain sections of Java (Schulte Nordholt 2016: 152). For the rest, only port cities and their hinterland were directly ruled. It was only in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that this changed as the mainland kingdoms minus Siam were invaded and the maritime lands were forced into closer subordination. The common pattern for polities of present-day Malaysia, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste, was to enter into treaties and pledges with the Dutch, English, Portuguese, or Spanish, that left them internally autonomous. While there were some political and economic regulations in the treaty texts, the local rajas, sultans, and chiefs were rarely disturbed in their governing tasks: adjudication, tribute collection, slaving, warring recalcitrant subjects, and so on (Resink 1968). Still, the white stranger was a fearsome figure who had to be handled through supple and crafty means. Extreme violence was common in colonial-indigenous affairs, pointing at the potentially dire consequences of a breakdown of relations.

But there were also opportunities. For minor polities whose existence depended on their relations with the white foreigners, several stories explain how two princes compete for the throne and one cleverly uses the Europeans to gain the upper hand. On Savu Island in eastern Indonesia, one of the local
kingdoms was Dimu (Timu) which had a vague precedence position among the five small polities. At a time, corresponding to the eighteenth century, the polity was ruled by Kore Rohi. During his reign, the Dutch first arrived to Savu and brought his nephew Hili Haba to the colonial hub Batavia where he received education. Later on, Hili Haba returned to Dimu, and Kore Rohi asked his nephew about the Dutch food preferences in case they would visit Savu again in the future. Hili Haba told his uncle that the Dutch had taste for dog meat, the animal being served without its head or legs. After some time the Dutch representatives actually arrived in Dimu. The unsuspecting raja told the cooks who prepared the meal to put the head and legs of the dog in a separate basket, and to cook and serve the body to the guests. When the Dutch were about to return from Dimu, Hili Haba asked what they had eaten. They replied that they had no clue to the ingredients. Now Hili Haba disclosed that his moron uncle had actually served them the meat of a dog. The Dutch, predictably, were infuriated at the disrespect that Kore Rohi had shown them. They then promptly handed over kingship to Hili Haba, while his outwitted uncle Kore Rohi was forced to step down (Duggan & Hägerdal 2018: 183).

Hili Haba is a well-attested character who ruled Dimu in 1731-1798, and he indeed became raja after outsmarting a relative with the help of the Dutch East India Company. Unfortunately for the legend, we possess a detailed Dutch account of the event that relates the diplomatic parleys at some length but does not mention a meal of dog meat. Above all, the Company had been present in Savu waters since the 1640s (Duggan & Hägerdal 2018: 152-7). The story serves to explain the long and relatively successful cooperation between the long-lived and cunning Hili Haba and the Europeans. The latter are essential outsiders: they have peculiar tastes, are easily provoked, and let their bad temper influence their political decision-making. While the story does not question the overwhelming might and authority of the Europeans, it also portrays them as frightening and unpredictable.

Another and even less tasty version of the contested succession theme is found in Termanu on Rote Island, also in eastern Indonesia. It was told to the anthropologist James Fox during fieldwork:

I tell of the time when Sadu Kiu and Pello Kila went to seek the staff of office. They went to the very centre of the Portuguese domain. They went to the Portuguese and the Portuguese tested their shit: they tested their shit to see whose shit smelled sweet and whose shit smelled foul.

Sadu Kiu prepared food and drink but only Pello Kila ate it; Sadu Kiu ate nothing. Instead, he went out to look for dilak fruit to eat. When the time came to inspect the shit, the result was clear: Pello Kila had eaten only delicious food, but his shit smelled foul; whereas Sadu Kiu had eaten only dilak fruit, but his shit smelled sweet. Therefore, they took the staff with the gold top and gave it to Sadu Kiu and they took the staff with the silver top and gave it to Pello Kila.
They then returned from the Portuguese domain to the island of Roti. But as the saying goes: ‘Cleverness conquers stupidity’. Thus, when a group of Europeans came to Ba’a, Sadu Kiu could not meet them because he did not know Malay. The only one who knew Malay was Pello Kila.

One time after another, a delegation came; foreigners came. Pello Kila went to meet them, but Sadu Kiu did not, for Sadu Kiu was illiterate whereas Pello Kila knew how to speak Malay and knew how to write.

After a while Pello Kila said to Sadu Kiu: “Nah! You’re like a little girl. When Europeans come, I go to meet them; but you don’t go to meet them. I act like a real man [tou mane] because I go to meet them, but you act like a little girl [feto ana] because you don’t go to meet the Europeans face to face. Therefore, let us exchange staffs, for you deserve the silver-topped staff and I deserve the gold-topped staff.” So, the two exchanged staffs of office.¹

Again, the protagonists are genuine historical figures since Pello Kila reigned over Termanu in 1679-1698 under Dutch rather than Portuguese suzerainty (Hägerdal 2023 II: 139). However, his rival Sadu Kiu served as a regent during his minority, while the Dutch suzerains would have liked to see him as the actual raja. The faeces-smelling contest puts the Europeans in an absurd light, but it explains the historical fact that Sadu Kiu governed for some years before having to accept his kinsman Pello Kila as upper ruler (owner of the golden staff). The importance of knowing Malay is less surprising; this was the normal means of communication in much of the Southeast Asian Archipelago, and a prince who mastered the language was useful to the Europeans. In sum, the Occidentalism of these narratives point at the craft and canniness that local men of prowess had to apply to inveigle the dangerous and somewhat unpredictable strangers. In a way this also speaks to the aforementioned stranger kings syndrome: the strangers held a socio-political order together, and their presence was not necessarily questioned (Lewis 2010).

The essential outsider

Next, we ask how culturally laden features among Western groups created a distinct Occidentalism that mediated a sense of incompatibility. Several narratives referred in this article depict the Westerners as something out of the ordinary. Southeast Asia has been a crossroads since old, and Arabs, Persians, Indians, and Chinese have visited the region as labourers, traders, missionaries, and occasionally invaders. Literary and (semi-)historical accounts of these foreigners are often respectful. In Muslim areas, Arabs and Persians may gain prestige since they come from the central lands of Islam, often combining the pursuits of traders and missionaries. Even some royal dynasties of Southeast Asia have alleged Arab or Persian origins, such as

Laikang, Pontianak, Brunei, Perlis, Singora, and Aceh for periods (Hägerdal 2023 I: 6, 144, II: 62). Chinese traders and settlers are seldom enemies in local lore and tradition, which is understandable since they very seldom constituted a political threat. Above all, Asian and Middle eastern immigrants tended to integrate in the Southeast Asian communities through intermarriage and acculturation to a much higher degree than Europeans.

The essential foreignness of the whites is illustrated by a passage from a history of the kings who ruled in Pegu in Burma up 1763. The chronicle is hardly at all concerned with Westerners, which in itself is interesting considering the long-term commercial relations. However, it devotes a few sentences to Filipe de Brito, a Portuguese adventurer who made himself the ruler of the port city Syriam (Thanlyin) in 1599-1613:

The ship commander, the foreigner, Capitão Geral, was King again in Syriam. Because he was of Devadatta’s company, a heretic, he had no opportunity of enshrining at the relic chamber of the pagoda […] The foreigner, Capitão Geral, was king in Syriam twelve years. His Majesty Nan Thaw of Ava was lord of the jewelled umbrella. In the year 974 (1612/13), on Wednesday the eight of the light half of the month Caitra, His Majesty Nan Thaw of Ava marching down with an army, besieged Syriam, and having overcome the foreigner, took the city. The King gave four hundred and twenty-eight men to keep the hair relics. He had them cast a bronze bell and offer it to the Buddha relics. (Halliday 2000: 106)

The events are more or less in accordance with other known sources, but the foreigner king is associated with Devadatta. This was a cousin of Buddha who opposed some of his teachings and made repeated attempts to assassinate him (Powers 2000: 64-5). The historical Capitão Geral (Captain-General) Filipe de Brito, as a staunch Catholic, had likely little or no knowledge of Devadatta but is still counted in his division, since he made himself notorious for destroying Buddhist shrines and objects. When the King of Ava in Upper Burma conquers Syriam and puts De Brito to a grisly death (not specified in this text), he is praised in the chronicle as a supporter of Buddhism.

In the world of Islam, the religion of much of maritime Southeast Asia, we might expect even more pronounced denunciations in texts and traditions from the islands. After all, Christianity and Islam had a long history of rivalry that spilled over to Southeast Asia after 1509. Sometimes, this is indeed the case. A chronicle from Ambon in the Moluccas, Hikayat Tanah Hitu, written by an imam in the mid-seventeenth century, gives a telling example:

One day, a perahu [boat] went from Saki of Besi Nusatelo to the waters of Pulau Tiga to catch fish. He [the captain] brought the perdana [chief] Jamilu news as follows: “We encountered a perahu in the waters of Pulau Tiga. Never in our lives have we see people with such appearances. Their skin is white, and they have eyes like cats. We asked questions but they did not know our language, nor did we know the language of that people.” Perdana Jamilu said: “Go and bring them here.”
They returned and brought them to the negeri [settlement], to perdana Jamilu. Then he asked them: “From where do you come and what is the name of your land?” They replied: “We come from Portugal and we want to make trade. The reason that we came here is that we diverted from our course and do not know the route. We landed in the neighbouring land and our ship was lost on a reef in the waters of Pulau Burung. We thus left our ship and entered a sloop to go back to Portugal. But the pilot was not knowledgeable and so we arrived here. We cannot help it, we are safely here.” Then a piece of land was given to them to build a house where they could stay.

After a while they suggested that some of them should stay in the house and others give report to their superiors. After that they let their ships coming annually at the arrival of the westerly monsoon, without interruption. The trading port of Hitu was busy and the entire land of Ambon became famous.

At that time, perdana Jamilu was entrusted the title Kapitan Hitu, and an agreement was now concluded, that Kapitan Hitu should have a gift of textiles when the ships arrived. Each year, the established custom was followed. In that time there was thus nothing to complain about them, and Kapitan Hitu enjoyed fame from Ambon to Portugal. The ruler of Portugal bestowed two titles of honour on him; first, Kapitan Hitu, and second, the title Dom Jamilu.

After some time, in accordance with God’s will, the friendship that the blissful Lord had rewarded them, gave place for misbehaviour. It once happened that they became drunk and the plundered and rioted at the market. This was reported to the magistrate and the religious headman, and the last-mentioned said: “The transgression of these people can only be punished by death”. The four perdanas said: “The magistrate and the religious headman are correct, but forgive them in the first place, since it is widely known that we treat them good. What will it do to our reputation if it becomes known that we do them harm? It is best that the remove them to another place, so they are not with us in one negeri.” (Ridjali 2004: 109-11)

The historical background is the establishment of the Portuguese on the partly Muslim island Ambon, important for the spice trade, in the first half of the sixteenth century. But while the European arrival appear to be “fated” as they lose their direction and accidentally arrive to Ambon, their actual establishment was part of a commercial strategy. Apparent in the story is, first, the perception of the strange appearance of the newcomers and, second, their atrocious behaviour as they repay the patience and benevolence of the Ambonese Muslims with vile acts. In the coming passages of the chronicle, the situation quickly deteriorates into a holy war that rages until the Portuguese are finally defeated with the help of the Dutch in 1605.

Since the Dutch merchants and empire-builders were important in maritime Southeast Asia from 1596 to 1949, it is natural that they have a role in chronicles and other narratives. However, this role is less than might be expected, since their presence was mostly irrelevant for the succession of local dynastic rulers, or internal cultural and social conditions. There are
nevertheless a few cases where their foreignness is mythologized to offer an explanation of the European paramount influence in the region. Pseudo-historical traditions from Java tell of an ancient Hindu kingdom in the western part of the island, Pajajaran, which possessed great spiritual power. Pajajaran fell to a Muslim conqueror from Banten in 1579, but a princess with a flaming womb survived the catastrophe. Although she was an attractive woman, her flaming genitals made it impossible for any man to have sex with her and in the end, she was banished to an island off the northern coast of Java, in the vicinity of modern Jakarta. At a later time, the Dutch turned up in the Java Sea, and a certain Dutch captain bought her from her Javanese keepers for three magic cannons. The Dutchman was apparently endowed with qualities of another kind than the Javanese men, since he was able to have sexual intercourse with her. The interethic marriage was fruitful and in time brought forth the Dutch colonial rulers, who are thus thought of as a kind of dynasty. Due to the powers inherited from Pajajaran, the Europeans could establish their implicitly legitimate power in West Java (Batavia, Jakarta). Later on, they allied with and eventually subordinated the kings of Java (Reid 1994: 292). A variant of this story is found in the fantastic romance of Baron Sakender, where the son of the Pajajaran princess and the Dutchman is the remarkable personality Jangkung. Behind this name hides the historical empire builder Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587-1629). Through his heavy-handed efforts to expand Dutch power in the island world, he ultimately avenges his insulted mother and the Muslim conquest of Pajajaran (Reid 1994: 293-4). As in several other narratives referred in this article, the authors have used certain stock data, which in themselves are ultimately historical, and rearranged them in a new chain of causality which offers the reader a rationale for colonial rule.

Triumphing over the white foreigner
In hindsight, the teller of tales living in the colonial era knew how things ended: with the white foreigner as the master. The forms of colonial rule shifted, from direct to indirect control, from relatively light to outright oppressive methods, from somewhat tolerant to blatantly racist attitudes. However, the Westerners could not be dislodged until the coming of the Japanese in 1940-1945. Tax rebellions, millenarian movements, holy wars, minority uprisings, all failed in the end due to the technological and logistic advantage of the foreigners. In chronicles and traditions, as we have seen, this translated into various explanations and examples of dealing with the dangerous overlord.

But there are also narratives that depict indigenous figures as triumphant in the confrontation with the Westerners. To these belong, of course, accounts of historical battles where the locals were temporarily able to halt the Europeans. Here, particular leaders might be endowed with supernatural powers that enable them to withstand the enemy. In the chronicle Tuhfat al-
Nafis (1860s), the author Raja Ali Haji relates an incident in 1759 where the local Sultan Mahmud of Siak on Sumatra approached a Dutch stronghold on Gontong Island, in the Siak River. Mahmud had accepted the aid of the Dutch East India Company and had to agree that they set up a post in his realm. However, incidents soon occurred, and the infuriated sultan sailed to Gontong with ship and men.

The Dutch agent was taken by surprise and went out of the jetty to ask whose perahu it was. When Sultan Mahmud heard the agent approaching, he sprang out of his perahu onto the jetty with the swiftness of a tiger, and took the agent’s arm. The agent said, “Why have you come without telling us?” Sultan Mahmud replied, “Why should I tell you? It is my state.” The agent said, “What do you want? Tell me here.” Sultan Mahmud replied, “How can I talk with everyone else here? I am frightened this platform will collapse,” The agent laughed and said, “Two thousand people could not destroy it”.

Then Sultan Mahmud pressed down one leg, and the bridge creaked beneath his weight as if it would collapse. Taking the agent by the arm, he led him inside the fort. [...] His Majesty gave orders for Sheikh Salim to be summoned, and he arrived with about forty men, each entering through the cannon embrasures. The Dutch soldiers were on the alert, and the agent was about to speak when His Majesty gave a signal to his son-in-law, Sayid Umar, who then stabbed the agent with his kris called “Jambuan”, and the agent died. The Dutch guard showered bullets on the king, who put his son Tengku Ismail behind him, and braced his chest against the bullets which fell like rain. Those which struck him were like emping wafers and did not penetrate his body, so great were his powers of invulnerability. His Majesty’s attendants all fought savagely and massacred the soldiers on Gontong Island. The Dutch patrol vessel escaped back to Malacca and Sultan Mahmud was once again in possession of Siak. (Ali Haji 1982: 96-7)

It is common in Malay historiography that a charismatic ruler can possess a concentration of macrocosmic power (kesaktian) that enables him to perform astonishing feats. Sultan Mahmud of Siak (1746-1760) is able to break a solid bridge with his foot and is impenetrable to bullets. Although he died shortly after the bloody incident, he is remembered in the chronicle as a rash and upright figure who halted the onslaught of colonial forces – a consolation at a later time when the British and Dutch divided up the islands between them (Reid 2005: 11-4). A modern reader might possibly find his actions treacherous and cruel, but this is irrelevant for the perception of his ability to stand up against the overbearing Europeans.

A somewhat similar case is the complex of texts that celebrate Surapati (died 1706), a Balinese ex-slave who defeated a Dutch force on Java in 1686 and created a realm of his own in Pasuruan in East Java. The background to the incident is the diplomatic position that the Dutch enjoyed after helping the Javanese king to victory against rebels in 1677-80. The Javanese ruler Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703) found his situation increasingly difficult due to the Dutch demands, and he clandestinely supported Surapati and his followers
when they attacked the European soldiers on a diplomatic mission in the capital Kartasura. Around this historical kernel, a plethora of legends has evolved, where the adventurous spirit, strength, and supernatural activities of the Balinese hero are accentuated. Despite Java being a very hierarchical society, the slave origins of the hero do not detract from his status as an indomitable warrior and eventually ruler (Kumar 1976). Although Surapati was killed in battle against the Dutch and their allies in 1706, his ability to defeat and outsmart the non-Muslim foreigners caught the imagination of the collective memory. A third example is strictly not “colonial” at all. Siam was never formally subordinated, and the royal Thai chronicles (generally written after 1767) contain stories that highlight the supernatural supremacy of the kingdom. One section tells of a diplomatic exchange with France under king Narai (1657-1688). The Thai embassy is received in the land of Farangset (“Franks”) and the European ruler (by implication Louis XIV) is bewildered by the Thai ambassador’s assertion that the king’s musketeers do not have an advantage over the Thai soldiers. The ambassador invites the king to a demonstration where the French musketeers are to try their weapons on the armed retinue of the embassy. As the French trigger their muskets, the flintlocks first turn inefficient. When the bullets finally go off, they fail to hit any of the Thais. The French king, when hearing that the retinue are not even elite soldiers, turns “exceptionally fearful of the skill of Thai soldiers” (Cushman 2000: 272-5). Although the meeting ends in a friendly fashion, the story accentuates the supernatural qualities of the Thai monarch and, by extension, his retainers, against which European technology falls flat. The embassy to France is a historical event that took place in 1684-86, spurred by King Narai’s Greek minister Constantine Phaulkon, and a comparison between Thai and European texts again shows how fantastic details were embedded in a historical setting to make the point. Even a distant European king would tremble for “the Supreme Holy Buddha Lord Omnipotent”, as the Thai king is called. Taken together, the three cases demonstrate a historiographical vindication of indigenous royal power which is connected to a supernatural macrocosm that allows the protagonist to humiliate the powerful Europeans.

Conclusions

The examples referred in the article derive from various places and times but show some common characteristics, thus a regional discourse of Occidentalism. The stories of the establishment of the Europeans, and the diplomacy, conflicts, and incidents that come out of this, ultimately derive from historical events. These referential particles have subsequently been embedded into fantastic tropes, including supernatural transformations, unusual feats of strength, outlandish sexuality, intricate tricks, fiendish associations, and the telescoping of complex historical processes into single events. Whether the stories were intended to be taken seriously or were
literary castigations (and occasionally celebrations) of the European impact, is hard to say and would have depended on the circumstances. The Javanese Baron Sakender text was a romance and existed concurrently with chronicles and annals with (slightly) more historical content, while the Tuhfat al-Nafis was a serious representation of the history of the Malay World. Often, the distinction would have made little sense since local perceptions of the past followed other principles than the chronological and factual frame familiar to modern society.

Most of the stories represent Europeans in relatively dark colours. Their aggressive and unreliable behaviour is stressed once and again, features that tend to be more consistent and negative than depictions of other foreign groups, such as Arabs, Indians, and Chinese. This is sometimes entwined with reminiscences of economic exploitation, although economic factors are relatively low-key in the stories. The seaborne character of the Westerners was not so different from other outsiders, but in contrast with these, they did not adapt seamlessly to local Southeast Asian society (although Eurasian communities evolved over time) and seldom let themselves be governed by local rulers. Their diplomatic forays combined with excessive doses of violence and enforced treaties which were usually to the disadvantage of the locals. Religious differences and their own ideas of cultural superiority may have confined the white strangers to the role of essential outsiders in the view of most Southeast Asians (cf. Schulte Nordholt 2016: 95). The problems of diplomacy and mutual understanding in European-Southeast Asian relations is a very common theme in the referred stories. As certain accounts testify, this is nevertheless not the entire picture. In places where Europeans had a long and lasting impact and even converted populations to Christianity, they could be seen as protective “stranger kings” and even bringers of culture (Lewis 2010). It must however be mentioned that such places were relatively small-scale and vulnerable and dependent on cooperation with a mightier counterpart.

By representing the coming of the Europeans as tinged by fantastic and supernatural occurrences, the peoples of Southeast Asia tried to relate to a colonial world in the making, a world that entailed monopolies, deliverances, taxes, political reordering, racial divisions, and heavy-handed subordination in general. They thus construed a set of Occidentalist stereotypes which where culturally meaningful in an era preceding ideological anticolonialism. The stories of mythical princesses, shapeshifters, invulnerable champions, weird cultural clashes, and fated journeys, provide an explanation to the changes that the whites brought about, or even a psychological relief for the trauma of eventual defeat.
References


