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Editor's foreword

The present issue of *HumaNetten*, the oldest existing net journal in Sweden, is a landmark in the sense that it is the first time that the great majority of the contributions are written in English. This is characteristic of the present trend of scholarly internationalization at Linnaeus University, where networks across the world are becoming increasingly important. More specifically, this is a thematic issue which contains articles originating from the EuroSEAS (European Association of Southeast Asian Studies) conference in Vienna in August 2015. Four contributions are published here under the title "The development of states and polities in Southeast Asia: Innovative connections and comparisons". The well-known Burma (Myanmar) specialist Professor Michael Charney from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, contributes with a comparative study of the infrastructure of two precolonial regions, namely Burma in Southeast Asia and Ashanti in West Africa: "Before and after the wheel: Precolonial and colonial states and transportation in West Africa and mainland Southeast Asia". Tuong Vu, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oregon, U.S., studies Vietnam's imperial features and ambitions in a long-term perspective, "State formation on China's southern frontier: Vietnam as a shadow empire and hegemon". Hans Hägerdal, Associate Professor in History at Linnaeus University, looks at state formation in insular Southeast Asia in "Trajectories of the early-modern kingdoms in eastern Indonesia: Comparative perspectives". Finally, Claire Sutherland, Lecturer in Politics at Durham University, U.K., scrutinizes and criticizes national models for the study of power relations in her study "A postmodern mandala? Methodological nationalism and the Vietnamese nation-state". The contributions will be fuller presented in the introduction by Tuong Vu.

Of other studies in this issue, Anders Lind, Creative Director at Umeå University, contributes with a study of a musical project, "Large-scale music compositions and novel technology innovations – Summarizing the process of Voices of Umeå, an artistic research project". Here, Lind explains how the project aims to explore new artistic possibilities for composition and performance practices in the field of contemporary art music. Finally, Niklas Ammert, Professor in History at Linnaeus University, has written a survey of research about textbooks in history, "Historieläromedel – en forskningsöversikt".

At the end of the present issue is a survey of recent PhD theses and other news related to the Faculty of Arts and Humanities since the fall of 2015. The next issue of *HumaNetten* is scheduled to appear in June 2017 and will be yet a thematic issue, this time with a gendered aspect.

Hans Hägerdal
Editor in chief

The development of states and polities in Southeast Asia: Innovative connections and comparisons

Introduction to a thematic issue

Tuong Vu

The present special issue of *HumaNetten* includes four essays about the historical development of the state and polity in Burma, Vietnam, and the archipelagic area east of Java.[1] All four articles examine the historical development of Southeast Asian states in original ways. Specifically, we are interested not in studying these polities in the conventional approach, either in isolation or restricted to a particular period. Building on comparative and regional studies by scholars such as Anthony Reid and Victor Lieberman, our articles focus on historical developments in Southeast Asia while seeking to make fresh and innovative connections and comparisons across periods or across regions.

These connections and comparisons illuminate important aspects of Southeast Asian history that have been obscured in much existing scholarship. For example, Michael Charney ventures beyond the Southeast Asian region to compare the systems of transport in premodern and colonial Ghana to those in Burma of similar periods. In his paper, Hans Hägerdal contrasts the development of the small-sized kingdoms and principalities east of Java with that of larger states on mainland Southeast Asia. His focus is on the early modern period but he is able to draw implications for later periods. Tuong Vu's article borrows concepts from studies of central Asia and uses the contrast between China's northern and southern frontiers to explore the synergies between China and Vietnam over the length of their histories. He offers premodern, early modern, and modern examples of Vietnamese imperialism in the paper. Claire Sutherland calls on scholars of contemporary Southeast Asia to transcend the nation-state as an analytical framework. She proposes the concept of "postmodern mandala" as an alternative way to theorize about contemporary Southeast Asian politics, with Vietnam as a test case.

While our articles do not cover every polity or every period in Southeast Asia, we believe the papers together make two important contributions to broad scholarship across the region and beyond. First, the papers enhance our knowledge about the differentiated process of integration and consolidation in Southeast Asia. Hägerdal's article shows that the process was disrupted in the archipelagic area east of Java because of European penetration in the

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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Unlike the ongoing consolidation into larger polities on mainland Southeast Asia at the same time, the small kingdoms in this area were able to preserve their autonomy well into the nineteenth century. Charney argues that Burma's precolonial road system has been neglected in the literature. His paper shows that in this case the expansion of the Konbaung Empire in the early modern period did not lead to significant development of the road system even while the state strived to control mobility throughout its territory. In comparison to a more developed road transport system in Ghana, a legacy of underdevelopment in the Konbaung and colonial periods can be found in the relative durability of the Burma military dictatorship today. In the Vietnamese case, Vu shows interesting parallels between patterns of imperial development throughout the history of this country. The process was shaped by threats from other frontier states, elite fighting, and ambitions of particular leaders.

Our second contribution involves historiography. Vu's article offers a sustained critique of the nationalist historiography that was developed in the colonial period and that remains influential today. According to him, this historiography misunderstands the sources of the negative synergies between "China" and "Vietnam" in the first millennium A.D. when the Red River was under northern rule. In contrast, Sino-Vietnamese relations in the subsequent period when Dai Viet was an independent kingdom were characterized mostly by positive synergies, unlike what nationalist historiography claims. Thanks in part to China, Vu argues, the Vietnamese in early modern and modern periods were able to expand their realm and become an empire that dominated the entire Indochinese peninsular. Sutherland also focuses on the historiography of Vietnam, but her target of criticism is broader, namely the conceptual framework of the Westphalian nation-state with fixed territorial borders separating the domestic from the international realm. As she argues, this state-centric framework obscures connections and networks that overlap and crosscut polities and communities. By investigating the historiography of Vietnam, Sutherland captures the recent shift in scholarly thinking from such a state-centric perspective and suggests a "postmodern mandala" as a metaphor for contemporary polities.

Authors and Abstracts

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Title: *Before and after the wheel: Precolonial and colonial states and transportation in West Africa and mainland Southeast Asia*

Scholarship on Southeast Asia has generally ignored the role of precolonial transportation in religious, political, and even economic life (in contrast to rather more on the colonial period), while historical research on precolonial West Africa has directed great attention to road building, such as that by the Ashanti Kingdom. In both cases, however, the development of colonial transportation infrastructure that came later is depicted as an entirely European and

foreign political, economic, and even cultural intervention that helped to ensure colonial domination that was both a break with the past as well as the foundation for the kinds of states that emerged after independence. Precolonial transportation and everyday movement and administrative approaches to them are seen as irrelevant to the phenomenon and a standard assertion in the historiography of at least some Southeast Asian countries is that they had no roads at all before British rule. The present article argues instead that certain governmentalities regarding movement and transportation had an important influence on emerging colonial transportation networks and administrative approaches to everyday mobility. The article also suggests that the partial, long-term, and indirect impact of this influence has been the durability or failure thereof of authoritarian regimes in both areas. The article looks primarily at the case studies of Myanmar (British Burma) and Ghana (the colonial Gold Coast), although examples from others countries are used as well.

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Title: *State formation on China's southern frontier: Vietnam as a shadow empire and hegemon*

State formation in Vietnam followed an imperial pattern, namely, a process of conquests and annexations typical of an empire. At its peak in the early nineteenth century, the frontier of the Vietnamese empire encompassed much of today's Cambodia and Laos. This imperial pattern was the basis on which the French built their Indochinese colony and the Vietnamese communist state built its modern hegemony. By re-examining Vietnamese history as that of an empire and hegemon, this paper challenges the nationalist historiography's assumption about Vietnam's need for survival from China as the driving force of Vietnamese history. In contrast, I argue that the threat to Vietnamese survival has come less from China than from other states on China's southern frontier. Vietnam has in fact benefited from a positive synergy with China in much of its premodern and modern history. By situating Vietnamese state formation in the context of mainland Southeast Asia, I hope to correct the tendency in many studies that focus exclusively on Sino-Vietnamese dyadic interactions and that posit the two as opposites. Treating Vietnam as an empire or hegemon over a large area of mainland Southeast Asia also is essential to understand why Vietnamese sometimes did not automatically accept Chinese superiority despite the obvious "asymmetry" between them.

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Title: *Trajectories of the early-modern kingdoms in eastern Indonesia; comparative perspectives*

As well known, a considerable development of statecraft in Southeast Asia took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, what Victor Lieberman has termed post-charter states (i.e., replacing older, culturally defining realms). Historical research has so far focused on the principal mainland kingdoms, and the newly Islamized maritime and insular polities. The present paper compares the larger Southeast Asian kingdoms (ca fifteenth-seventeenth centuries) with polities that arose in eastern Indonesia, east of Java. Four regions of political development are defined. These include the indianized kingdoms of Bali and Lombok, the Muslim kingdoms of Sumbawa, the Islamic spice sultanates of North Maluku, and the loosely structured polities of the Timor region. These areas are compared from a set of variables, and the paper asks what parallels may be discerned between local polity-forming processes and the dynamics of the mainland kingdoms and Java. Eastern Indonesian realms were all fairly decentralized though sometimes containing symbolisms and organizational features that were miniature versions of the larger realms. They had strong links to long-distance trade, thus connected to the Age of Commerce spoken of by Anthony Reid. State-building was however complicated by the very fragmented ethnic-linguistic picture. It is argued that maritime Southeast Asia's transition to a "vulnerable zone" after the arrival of the European powers (post-1511) had important repercussions for the maintenance of the smaller realms of eastern Indonesia and set the maritime world apart from the mainland. A trajectory of state integration in maritime Southeast Asia was underway, where new Muslim kingdoms were in the process of threatening or subjugating the smaller realms east of Java. This process was halted by European sea power that weakened the major archipelagic realms and provided chances for the smaller polities of survival under modest and sometimes subdued conditions. The minor principalities of eastern Indonesia were thus able to survive as archaic entities until the twentieth century.

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Title: *A postmodern mandala? Moving beyond methodological nationalism*

The colonial translation of the "nation-state logic" to Southeast Asia is commonly understood to have superseded what O.W. Wolters called the pre-colonial mandala model, in which power was exerted by a sort of central "sun king" whose gravitational pull weakened with

distance and was overlapped by other spheres of power in a complex system of tributary relationships. The historian David Biggs has argued that, in accepting the undeniable importance of national sovereignty in contemporary political analyses of Southeast Asia, there has been too definitive a break with pre-existing understandings of power relations, which may prove useful to explaining the particularities of politics today. In political science, the translation of nationalism and sovereignty to Southeast Asia is reflected in an entrenched "methodological nationalism," whereby the nation-state is frequently taken for granted as the central unit of analysis. Paying attention to the "margins" of society still implicitly assumes a national centre, for example. Historians of Vietnam, including Keith Taylor and Li Tana, have made significant advances in loosening the "stranglehold" of nationalist historiography. Anthropologists and geographers of cosmopolitanism and migration have also long questioned the analytical usefulness of bordered nation-states. Building on these insights, the article calls for a paradigm shift in political enquiry and playfully proposes the "post-modern mandala" as an alternative to methodological nationalism applied to Southeast Asia.

Before and after the wheel: Pre-colonial and colonial states and transportation in mainland Southeast Asia and West Africa

Michael W. Charney[1]

Introduction

The resurrection of the abandoned relics of colonial railways currently holds the promise of a revolution in transportation in Southeast Asia and Africa alike, as something good that can come out of the era of European exploitation of the region and the continent, respectively[2]. After all, geared as these transportation systems were to European commercial, political, or military purpose, rather than responding to organic necessity, they collapsed very quickly after colonial rule was over. There, the permanent way remained, scarring the countryside, rusting away as monuments to an era when indigenous political power had been eclipsed. Certainly, the development of colonial transportation infrastructure in West Africa and Southeast Asia is conventionally depicted as an entirely European political, economic, and even cultural intervention that helped to ensure colonial domination that was both a break with the past as well as the foundation for the kinds of states that emerged after independence. The major metropolitan magazines of the high colonial period paraded images of rail lines being cut through African lands in particular with captions that portrayed these as the main conduits of a civilizing imperial power. Little effort, with some notable exceptions,[3] has been expended on locating within colonial-era transportation networks, the continuity of pre-colonial administrative approaches relative to everyday life in non-western societies. Whether good or bad, or even where they were both, colonial railways, roads, and waterways were viewed as something new and they replaced, or displaced, rather than absorbed, what had existed before, however short-lived they or European rule generally proved to be.

   The notion that European rule and influence was brief, shallow, and territorially circumspect has pervaded more recent approaches to the state in both West African and Southeast Asian studies. This is so much the case that scholars have argued, often usefully, against using states as units of analysis or as the best way to frame socio-economic relations. Often the solution is to look at such developments and their historical backgrounds within the

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2 For Southeast Asia, I am making this point on the basis of personal observation during fieldwork in Burma (as well as in Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia). For Africa, see Sturgis (2015).

3 See, for example, the assertion made by Ravi Ahuja that the railways in India were superimposed upon rather than displacing altogether earlier patterns of land transport (Ahuja 2009).

context of particular ethnic groups. Such "anarchist histories" in consciously dispossessing the state to get at historical truth,[4] run the risk of minimizing longer term, yet less visible aspects of the pre-colonial state that were absorbed into and maintained by, in regurgitated or hybridized form, the colonial administrative system.[5] In doing so, they compromise contemporary understanding of rural economic development, whether by under-estimating the longer historical experience of state influence on mobility, or over-stating isolation from lowland economies. Consider the claim that rural Southeast Asia's emergence out of isolation was due to the mushrooming of road construction since World War II, what Jonathan Rigg calls "a road-building half-century" (2002: 621), or F. Colombijn's observation that "[i]n the past, roads did not play a prominent role in Southeast Asia."[6] These claims provide good examples of where the historical understanding of transportation, movement, and mobility is in need of reconsideration. Despite such claims, roads did in fact play a prominent role in pre-colonial in Africa and Asia, whose populations, even those living in villages far in the interior, were far from being isolated.

The present article seeks to demonstrate the important influence pre-colonial roads and overland transportation had on the emergence of modern transportation systems in modern Africa and Southeast Asia. To do so, it examines the pre-colonial and colonial transition and the relationship of the court and colonial administration respectively to changing transportation technologies and geographies of movement. It argues that certain pre-colonial attitudes regarding movement, transportation, and traffic had an important influence on emerging colonial transportation networks. The article examines central political attention to mobility, transport, and traffic (or not) and attention to the thinking about the act of governing them (or not) to reveal continuities attitudes that are invisible when looked at through the lens of technological and regime change alone. It is also suggested that these continuities provide one of a number of the inside stories of state formation and change from the pre-colonial to colonial eras in examples drawn from West Africa and Southeast Asia (including Sri Lanka) for the purpose of this paper. Ultimately, these continuities may help to partially explain other aspects of the directions these two examples took after independence.

Rather than the colonial conquest being either a watershed moment or a temporary interruption there was instead a rough continuity in both the state's relationship with and orientation towards mobility, transport, and traffic. Different colonial administrations either encouraged or discouraged movement and transportation, but whichever approach they followed, this was consistent with the pre-colonial practices that had existed before and we can trace the same ways of governing (or not) transportation, roads, and people during the pre-colonial, the colonial, and then the post-colonial periods. In other words, successive polities, whether patrimonial kingdoms, colonial administrations, or modern states, have in

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4 One of the most influential of the works of this approach is Scott (2009).

5 We might be reminded here of the assertion of the editors of one recent volume on the anthropology of state formation that in order to grasp anthropologically the "reality of the state" we need to consider both the state in the form of its imaginary and the state "in the concreteness of practices that have a state relation or reference" (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad 2005). Arguably, few practices have more of a state reference than the building, repair, and operation of road and the control of their traffic.

6 Colombijn suggests that the relative unimportance of roads was due to the obstruction to road construction of the region's "predominant vegetation type", tropical rains, and the major river systems offering alternative routes of travel (Colombijn 2002). These are certainly valid points.

particular geographical areas revealed the influence of a particular governmentality (Foucault 1991) towards this particular sphere of human activity that was different than might be found in another geographic, cultural, and environmental space.

Such disjunctures relative to transportation have remained largely invisible because of the limitations of James Scott's concept of *state-space*, or geographical areas that are topographically and climatologically easily governable, in whose domain transportation infrastructure is conventionally assumed to rest, on the one hand, and the assumption that all rulers wish to do the same kinds of things, namely exert control over geographic areas and people and make then legible to administrative apparatuses, on the other (Scott 1998; Rigg 2002: 619-20). Twenty years ago, John Agnew referred to this theoretical *cul-de-sac* as the "territorial trap" and identified its responsibility for the framing of the understanding of administrative reach and socio-economic activities as co-terminous with claimed political boundaries (Agnew 1994). Considering transportation infrastructure, in this view, is not necessarily the same as studying transportation within a particular polity or even within the context of *state-space* at all. More importantly for our purposes here, As Agnew argued, the territorial trap obstructed perceptions of the necessity of understanding the emergence of *state-space* as a dynamic and historically determined process (ibid).

It the position of the present article that rather than being irrelevant to governmentality regarding transportation and mobility, rulers have since the late early modern period given meaning to such governmentality. They have done so both consciously and unconsciously. Further, depending upon the orientation of this governmentality, this process of giving meaning has occurred when a government either asserts control over various aspects of movement and transportation or when it chooses not to do so.

The research supporting this argument relies upon two main case studies, what are today Ghana (the colonial Gold Coast) and Myanmar (Burma). The Ashanti Empire and the Burma kingdom share many features that make them comparable. The British conquered in the nineteenth century over the course of three wars, starting with territorial loss along the coast in the south. By the mid-nineteenth century, both were of roughly similar size, the Kingdom of Burma being about 190,000 square miles after the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-1853) and Ashanti including roughly 150,000 square miles at about the same time (Murphy 1972; Esler 1996; Keane 2006). In the early nineteenth century, the Ashanti Empire had a population of three million people and just a few years before, at the end of the eighteenth century, Michael Symes estimated the population of the Kingdom of Burma to be three million people as well (Edgerton 2010; Burney 1842). Both of these areas suffered from rainy seasons and endemic insect-borne disease, in the forms of sleeping sickness and malaria in Ashanti and malaria and other diseases in Burma. Politically, both were ruled before the colonial period by kings at the top of imperial systems that ran martial or conquest states dependent on the building of large armies, territorial expansion, and the acquisition of captives. Both societies also viewed their polity in terms of what in Asia would be called a *mandala* with a center of power at the royal capital surrounded by concentric rings of diminishing central authority, a symbolic representation that was not coterminous with on-the-ground administrative arrangements (Wilks 1976; Wolters 1982).

Pre-colonial Communications

Despite the surprising similarities between these two case studies, there were important dissimilarities that had a significant impact on the trajectory of the court or colonial state's developing relationship with people and mobility. For our purposes here, the most important difference was the approach to roads, traffic and movement and this was a result of the different productive basis of each polity.

The pre-colonial history of Burma's road system is neglected because of an early emphasis on the importance of maritime trade in Burma as well as on the sources provided by early Europeans who invariably came on boat and not overland. G. E. Harvey remarked of classical Burma (Pagan) that Burma even had no roads at all (Harvey 1983). Similarly, Maung Shein, whose Transport and Foreign Trade (1885-1814) remains the standard history of transportation in colonial Burma, comments that for the centuries prior to colonial rule, "the natural waterways of Burma, especially that of the Irrawaddy, were the only effective main channels of transport by which goods and people travelled" (Maung Shein 1964: 29). Moreover, Shein asserts,

> [r]oads were not very necessary for the traditional self-sufficient subsistence society of Burma. During the dry season bullock-carts could make their way across the country over paddy fields in any direction, making tracks for themselves that could be used until the ground was ploughed up again at the next rains (Maung Shein 1964: 38).

Similarly, in Upper Burma, aside from cart tracks, Maung Shein continued, "from the point of view of trade, it can be said that no roads of importance existed under the Burmese kings" (Maung Shein 1964: 39).

In this view, the British found no real roads in Lower Burma when they arrived and modern overland transportation and government attitudes towards it begin with the British arrival (Ibid). This assumption pervaded the work of J.S. Furnivall and his effort to present the case of unbridled state formation during the colonial period in Burma. For example, Furnivall claimed that Dalhousie

> …stressed the importance of [British] road-making and … ambitious schemes were projected. One road was to be built from Rangoon to Prome ... Prome [was to be linked up] with India by a great highway through Chittagong to Calcutta ... The road from Chittagong to Akyab was reported almost finished within six months of its commencement and by 1854 the section from Arakan to Prome 'was traversible by a horseman at full gallop' (Furnivall 1948: 47-8).

Yet, if we look back at Francis Buchanan's unpublished "Burma Journal" from 1795, written a century and a half before Furnivall (and not having been subject to the same high colonial-era notions of colonial economic development), we find that essentially the same road had existed prior to the British arrival in Burma:

> [the Myowoon says that] there is a good road by land all the way from Rangoon to Pyee Myoo or Prone. And a road for horses & elephants from Pyee myoo to Yakhain or

> Arakan in 12 days and from Arakan to Chittagong (I suppose he means the frontier) in 3 days.[7]

Colonial attitudes towards indigenous roads showed considerable difference across the empire, even within the Indian Ocean. The contrast between Konbaung Burma, where the existence of roads has been more completely forgotten, and Sri Lanka where the old roads were seen as relics of a declining civilization that needed to be revived, is quite clear. However, in both cases, colonial engineers made use of indigenous road building, extant paths, and absorbed indigenous knowledge into what became "the bridges and roads that constituted the new colonial infrastructure" (Sivasundaram 2013: 238).

Nevertheless, later historians of pre-colonial Burmese history, by contrast to their counterparts focusing on colonial and post-colonial infrastructural developments, have had a better awareness of the existence of a Konbaung Dynasty-era road network. William Koenig in his landmark study of the Konbaung period remarked that the frequent references to roads in Burmese land inquests and European traveller accounts from the period suggests the existence of a very important system of cart tracks and high roads interconnecting major towns and the royal capital (Koenig 1990: 56). Certainly, our growing interest in pre-colonial Burma's overland trade connections has also underscored if not drawn more attention to the importance of Burma's pre-British road network. A re-reading of at least one royal edict by the present author has revealed statements in the edict not to be merely references to pre-modern border markers but instead to mark the points at which overland roads reached royal toll stations, where access to this network began or where it intersected with other routes.[8]

One might also argue that portable, universal salvation religions, such as Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity offered to travellers in Southeast Asia (Reid 1993b: 151-79), the kind of protection against local spirits that travel shrines offered in Ashanti. Certainly, this has been argued of Pentecostalism in contemporary Ghana (Bruijn, Dijk, & Dijk 2001: 75-84), and we might find a similar role in the increased lay Buddhist associations and the provision of Buddhist charms in colonial Burma (Turner 2014).

The existence of roads per se, however, was not the same as an open attitude to popular movement. Attention to the kinds of roads and tracks indicates this in the case of pre-colonial Burma. One kind of road was the royal or military roads. Like Ashanti, Konbaung Burma was a conquest state and had large armies that waged war fairly regularly against their neighbors for territorial gain, captives, and control of trade. The movement of armies was often preceded by both supply men who ensured that supplies of fodder and food would be waiting along the path of the army so that the army would not have to slow down to find them. Of course, there were also woodsmen who cut down trees, built temporary bridges, and generally cleared routes. Campaigns that repeated themselves might follow the same path at least part of the way and as a result, a military road would emerge and would open up a new route for travel for other interests. In Burma, there were several great military roads, such as the royal road in the north, that were designed to carry the great armies of the king on a campaign against an enemy who had been especially troublesome in the past and would thus

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7 Francis Buchanan, "Burma Journal", 1795, MSS Eur C. 12, f. 45, British Library Asia and Africa Collection, London.

8 Royal Order, 27 April 1637 (Tun 1984-1990: 1.265).

likely be so again in the future. A related example might be the An Pass that was cut across the Arakan Yoma mountain range for the Konbaung Army to bring booty back from Arakan in 1785.[9]

Alongside roads, the Konbaung Army, like its predecessors, also built bridges in the field. Again, bridge building was restricted in both the Ashanti Empire and Konbaung Burma by the nature of the environment, not any technological limitations. Clearly, both could build temporary bridges. There are examples going back to the sixteenth century, of Burmese building pontoon bridges, such as that between Martaban and Moulmein in 1547 that could be taken by a horseman at a gallop.[10] The case of military roads in Mataram on Java and in Siam would seem to bear out the Burmese example. Such military roads and bridges might then take on a life of their own, as local traders and others found them useful and contributed to the maintenance, repair, or even expansion of such roads without court support. This occurred with the great road through the Arakan Yoma just mentioned. About 1802, it was "improved at the expense of individuals" (i.e. without the support of the throne) so that it could handle loaded carts and thus became a permanent route through the mountains (Symes 1955: 217; Than Tun 1983: 234-41). Additionally, the court or rich donors had a motive to build some bridges and stretches of road on occasion and even to repair them as a meritorious act within the moral economy of Theravada Buddhism in Burma, but these acts were limited in their effects in both geographic reach and regularization of repair (Ba Thann Win 1976: 23).

The Konbaung court disliked the autonomous movement of people on the roads, especially when it meant economically and militarily valuable subjects pulling up stakes and leaving for somewhere else permanently. One of the continual goals of Burma's chronic campaigns against its neighbors was to acquire captive manpower to settle and work agricultural areas and provide royal service. In districts where royal demands became too intense, villagers moved if they could beyond the reach of the court, as was the case with the Mons who left Burma for Ayudhya (today, Thailand) and other areas at the end of the sixteenth century. Trade autonomous of the court also circumvented royal monopolies and taxes and hence was not good for the resources of the court. If the court could have afforded it, it probably would have tried to exert direct monitoring of and control over the roads, but the nature of the Burmese environment would have prevented this anyway. Much of the Burmese heartland was flat and dry and easily traversable on buffalo carts, even off of the tracks and roads. In wetter areas of the kingdom, such as the Lower Burma delta, the overgrowth was not nearly as impenetrable as the West African jungle and any road controls in the former would have been easily circumvented. Instead, the Konbaung court focused on the only feasible, cost-effective means of controlling, monitoring, and taxing movement, by controlling access points to external trade, both overland and at sea, at the ports or major land crossings, or where land routes linked up with river ports. Thus, the autonomous myriad of local roads remained outside of their reach in a practical sense even if the political centre's desire to control it continued. There is thus little evidence of roads being cut by the Konbaung court

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9 In 1784/5, the westernmost Southeast Asian kingdom of Arakan (Rakhine) was conquered by Konbaung
Burma's armies and incorporated into the Irrawaddy-valley based kingdom.

10 "Nidana Ramadhipati-katha". Translated by H. L. Shorto. TMs [photocopy], private collection, Dr.
Victor B. Lieberman, Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (n.d.): f. 47.

for the explicit purpose of encouraging or controlling trade (rather than for military or political purposes). These emerged independently of the government, on the logic of trade exchanges and were usually more worn between large population centres than between small ones (ibid). These were sometimes only paths that emerged cross-country, forged organically by the movement of traders who had no immediate access to the river. In Burma, there were also highlanders who came down to the lowlands and from the eastern hills to feed markets at the river ports where they would then enter a system of circulation run by the lowlanders themselves. All of these popular movements converged in a way that made the flow of traffic almost like a river, as described by Nisbet at the end of the nineteenth century about the earlier, pre-colonial era:

> [I]n former times, before the era of road-making, the country carts had to be so constructed as to be capable of traveling over very rough ground. The cart- tracks began in the fields whence the grain was brought on sledges or carts to the hamlets and villages, and gradually those single threads converged to form the main lines of communication, as small tributary streams are gathered together in the main watercourse (Nisbet 1901: 1.376-377).

With the exception of special cases, such as the construction of a military road as mentioned above, the Konbaung Kingdom, by contrast to the Ashanti Empire was not a road- building project. Very clearly, in this case, roads followed the empire and not the reverse.

One consequence of the pathways and roads in Burma not being government roads was that they, like much of overland travel in mainland Southeast Asia, suffered from the depredations of highwaymen. Robbery was a significant problem for overland travellers in early modern Southeast Asia (Nisbet 1901; Reid 1993a: 54, 57-8). Indicating the absence of government protection and the reliance on locals to help, robbery was more common in "thinly populated regions of the country" than in better-populated areas (Anuman 1987: 173). The chief strategy to fend off highwaymen was for travellers to move about in cart caravans (Anuman 1987: 173; Reid 1993a: 58). The customs posts that stood at control points in some parts of Southeast Asia as in Java (Ibid; Reid 1993a: pp. 53-4, 58), were not maintained as thoroughly in Burma. This was because, as I will mention again below, it was easier to collect revenues and fees further down the transportation chain on the river than on land, given the numerous opportunities overland travellers had to circumvent any such customs posts on flat country.

Moreover, the Konbaung Kingdom developed no central infrastructure for road repair. Burmese accounts and traveller accounts alike speak of Burmese military roads as not being maintained by the court. A good example is that of the Ba Daung Taung Goke Road examined by Than Tun. Than Tun notes that although it was the historic conduit for intercourse between the Irrawaddy Valley and Arakan, was, at least until 1783, in poor shape. It remained a difficult track, unsuitable for carts, and lacking supplies of water along the course of travel, making the use of baggage animals difficult. Certainly, road maintenance here was much more neglected than the road's counterparts in Ashanti. Here, there was nobody keeping up the road (Than Tun 1983: 239-240).

One reason for the apparent neglect of the roads by the Konbaung Kingdom was the existence of the great Irrawaddy River. Admittedly, the Konbaung Kingdom lacked the

technology to conduct major river works, but the scale and capacity of the river did not demand it anyway. It was easy to rely upon the river for maritime trade but also to control trade that might feed the overland trade with China once it got there. By contrast, the onerous task shouldered by the Ashanti Empire to maintain the roads, the river made traffic management much easier for the Konbaung Kingdom. The idea that Konbaung Burma would have to invest in general travel outside of its own direct needs does not seem to have emerged. The shallow entrances to the Irrawaddy River meant that heavy draft European ships had to be piloted in carefully and the Konbaung Kingdom, which garrisoned Syriam and Bassein, was able to control access to the river system, the enforce rules that required Europeans to leave their guns and masts at Syriam before entering the river (Charney 1997: 61). Like Ashanti, Konbaung Burma had a customs administration and a military force that controlled the interface between the domestic communications system and the outside world. Most customs outposts or *kin* were located on the international frontiers or on the access points to rivers, but not on domestic overland routes. There were also checkpoints on passes going up into the hills for overland travel that worked in a similar way. But, in both cases in Burma, river and overland travel, the court did not invest in the actual transportation infrastructure.

Another reason for the Konbaung neglect of roads was that much of the economy was based on sedentary wet-rice agriculture and rather than capture people to sell abroad, Burma needed its war captives to open up rice fields and engage in other economic tasks. These resettled communities would play an important role in influencing Burmese culture and society, but also circulating technology, as historians like Bryce Beemer have recently shown (Beemer 2004). Rather than encourage mobility and movement as Ashanti did, Burma fits more closely the idea James Scott seems to have had in mind when he asserted that grain-producing states do not like mobility. Instead, they prefer a fixed, sedentary population, not just one that remained within the royal domain, but one that remained tied to the locality, mobility being used, in Scott's view, by nomadic peoples as a tool to evade the central control (Scott 2009: 184-5). In Konbaung Burma, there was no effort to encourage overland or riverine movement per se, nothing to expand flow, enhance capacity, or speed up everyday popular traffic. In other words, there was no elaborate logistical theory or methodology.

Nevertheless, there were a myriad of controls on movement and mobility and no resources put to their disposal. These controls have been extensively researched elsewhere for pre-colonial Burmese history and do not need to be discussed at length here. What is found in the Burmese and English language sources is a range of the aforementioned social controls that provided a proto-administrative or political obstacle to movement rather than an economic one. This oversight prevented previous scholars from identifying in pre-colonial rule in Burma a pre-existing administrative desire to limit mobility prior to the introduction of the British colonial state.

The most important pre-colonial Ghanaian polity, the Ashanti Empire, could not have had a more different attitude to non-state mobility and transportation. The Ashanti focused not on sedentary agriculture, like many of the more popular examples used as case studies of state formation in the non-western world, but on commercial traffic that ran through the kingdom, the gathering of surface deposits of gold for export, and the capture and sale of slaves, at least until the mid- nineteenth century. The great road system built by the Ashanti has been

covered extensively in the historical literature, in particular by Ivor Wilks (1975). From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Ashanti Empire had rapidly expanded on the basis of a particular take on the West African imperial model. This take involved developing roads that emanated out of the royal centre at Kumasi and either negotiating with local chiefs or conquering them when negotiations failed to construct further extensions of these roads until they could reach a point at which they interconnected with existing trade networks (a good example would be pushing a plug until it reached a mains). The empire's boundaries became coterminous with the furthest extensions of these "great-roads." The growth of Ashanti was directed at this kind of road building.

Quite literally, the Ashanti Empire grew as a road-building project, empire following the road, rather than road following the frontiers of the empire. The reason for this phenomenon was that the Ashanti sought to benefit from the movement of trade through the empire and thus pushed out politically to link up with trade routes whenever new ones emerged or old ones shifted. Administration was introduced as a result of this expansion as the cutting of roads required political negotiations. This produced a model of imperial growth in which opposition to that growth was manifested in opposition to road-building projects. As Wilks has commented,

> A full history of the great-roads of Asante remains to be written. But it will be apparent that the development of the system was a critical aspects of the incorporative process. Indeed, opposition to the central government's road building programme was one of the principal features of the syndrome of resistance to its imperial expansion, just as the closure of existing roads became one of the earliest indications of rebellion (Wilks 1975: 25).

As described by Wilks, the great-roads of Ashanti were the "conduits of authority" beginning at the capital and ending at the frontier. Importantly, how the Ashanti imagined the boundaries of the empire was not coterminous with its exact delineation on a map built around western cartographical principles. The mental map of the Ashanti kingdom, the positioning of territory, was a series of concentric circles emanating from the center on the basis of how much territory a man could cover in forty days, a homologue to use Wilks' phraseology of the Ashanti month of forty-two days. Nevertheless, this indigenous imaginary did not reflect western cartographical representations in the south. Instead, the mental map fairly approximated the interior land frontiers of Ashanti. This was

> … a rational recognition of reality: that without any major change in the speed of communications, no lands more distant than a month from Kumasi, in and out, could effectively be administered even though they might be subdued for the duration of a campaign (Wilks 1992: 182-4).

Thus, the regular reach of the court was more circumspect than the temporary and potential reach of the military. Arguably, the fiction produced by relating Ashanti *state-space* was a western map as a large circle shaded in equally across its diameter would have been no less accurate than colonial entities delineated on maps of Africa after the Congress of Berlin. In both cases, *state-space* hugged the main arteries of communication, an observation in keeping with the argument of this article.

Before Ashanti's great-roads were built, travel had to be along streams as the bush was said to be impenetrable (Wilks 1975: 29). Ashanti's "great roads" were built from the early eighteenth century to make cross-country travel less arduous and time consuming. An artistic representation of one of these roads can be seen in Figure 1. Political obstacles lay in the way whose resolution contributed to Ashanti state formation. When the Ashanti attempted to open a road in the second decade of the 18th century, from Kumasi to Elmina and the western coast, for example, they found the project compromised by shifting alliances with the chiefdoms through which the road passed. The Ashanti thus proceeded to conquer such chiefdoms and force their leaders to submit to Ashanti overlord-ship in a series of wars between 1715 and 1721. The Ashanti followed this in the 1740s by conquering Akyem in order to open a great road through Accra and to the eastern coast (Wilks 1975: 24).

Figure 1: Illustration of Road Travel in Ashanti published in the 'Illustrated London News', 28 February 1874 (Author's collection)

The Ashanti Empire also maintained sacred roads (and these were not inclusive of the entirety of pilgrimage routes). The distance between boat landings or road heads and sacred temples of the tombs of ancestors received special attention, including a ban on their use independently of their sacred function. A good example of this was the one-mile road between the Ashanti capital of Kumasi and the sacred town of Bantama, which the king visited every forty days in the mid-19th century in order to visit the tombs of his ancestors (Freeman 1844: 57). This was the location of the blackened stools of past Ashanti kings (Perbi 1992: 79). The population was only able to use this road when the king did so (Freeman 1844: 57). Such roads received special attention from the court, often being cleared regularly, leveled, lined with trees to provide shade, and even surfaced with stone.

Aside from the sacred roads and roads in the royal capital, the technology and ability to surface or level roads and to bridge rivers did exist. This engineering capacity was clearly applied on special occasions, but the court could not afford to do so on a regular basis to the

same degree as a modern state. This was due to the environment. Ghana, like Burma, experienced heavy seasonal rains, the washing away of roads and bridges, and the clear if unpronounced logic of any cost benefit analysis made regular royal investments seem unwise. The impact of these rains on the roads outside of the towns, even within some towns outside of the royal capital, and even within the royal capital outside of the city centre is captured in the words of one mid-nineteenth century traveller to Ashanti:

> some of the streets are so full of holes, occasioned by the heavy rains washing the earth out of the fissures of the rocks during the rainy season, that any one attempting to walk through them in the dark, would place his neck in danger (Freeman 1844: 55).

Even where roads were not washed away the rains greatly hindered movement, porters slipping constantly, dropping bags, and being unable to care elite people in the chairs on their shoulders (Freeman 1844: 63). When the rains stopped, vegetation remained a problem. The predominance of jungle and rain forest foliage and the infamous creeping vines made roads often impassable without considerable effort by the traveller.

Road maintenance and clearing outside of the royal capital and sacred roads still remains an underexplored topic in the historiography. According to British military reports in the 1870s, the indigenous population used these roads "as a latrine, and as a convenient place of deposit for all rubbish" (Brackenberry 1874: 1.315). The fairness of this description is questionable. The technologies and scale of labor of the day could only take care of so much and unless a "problem" was relevant to foot travellers, it was not a problem that needed to be handled. It was clear for example, that the Ashanti did take care of the roads. Freeman, for example, in his 1841 journal of his travels between the Gold Coast and Ashanti does not refer to foliage and overgrowth being a problem on the Ashanti side of the Prah River. However, once he crossed to the Fanti side, the road became impassable, Freeman relating that it was "so overgrown with luxuriant vegetation, that I was literally dragged through the bushes, and was soon compelled to walk" (Freemen 1844: 67). On another occasion when approaching the Prah River from the Fanti side again, "The road also was exceedingly bad, being in many places not more than nine inches wide, full of wholes, and roots of trees rising above the ground" (Ibid: p. 16). This difference seems to suggest that the Ashanti Empire was indeed much more active than Fanti in road maintenance.

On one occasion, an Ashanti king cleared a road on behalf of a foreign missionary. In this case, the king dispatched men to clear fallen trees from the road to open the way for the passage of a carriage to Kumasi. Nevertheless, the missionary claimed that the stumps and roots of trees were still a problem on the rest of the road. This is difficult to read precisely, but it probably refers to the more regular condition of the road itself, which, again, historically would have hosted travellers on foot, not on wheels and hence stumps and roots were never an issue until now (Ibid: p. 102). This suggestion is borne out by complaints by British army engineers in the Ashanti War in the 1870s who commented:

> The falling of trees across the road was also a constant difficulty; not one of the least obstacles to progress being the need for cutting through their enormous trunks which lay across the road and barred the path. Some of these trees had trunks of hard wood,

> Mahogany and iron-wood, 4 or 5 feet in diameter; and of course the appliances for cutting them were limited (Brackenberry 1874: 1.315).[11]

One of the most revelatory aspects of Ghanaian and Burmese historical culture, noted in traveller accounts from the pre-colonial period was a more reserved and even hostile attitude to foreigners in Konbaung Burma than comparable travellers found in Ashanti of the same time and this was especially true of the main cultural core of Ashanti. As Iver Wilks has suggested, the "foreigner" as an abstract category was considered with less hostility in the Akan (the base population group of Ashanti) world than might be the case in other societies, such as that of Burma. The Ashanti Empire was built on encouraging mobility and in fact its wellbeing depended upon it. Wilks pioneered the study of the "great-roads of Asante" in his 1975 monograph and related work. It would be useful at this point to summarize Wilks' sketch of the Ashanti administration of transportation and movement in the pre-colonial period. As Wilks shows, an economic motive was not the only factor in influencing Ashanti administrative approaches to their road network. The scope and speed of travel determined the territorial structure of the Ashanti Empire. Wilks, referring to a minimal message-delay, explains that the ability of the king's messengers to reach a certain point after so many days, determined what was centrally ruled (the royal capital to the metropolitan regional boundary six to twelve days). Outside of this circle was an outer concentric ring of inner provinces (one month from the capital), then frontier districts (five to seven weeks). Further out was territory where "the exercise of political control ceased to be realistically attainable" and so outside of these were "adjunct territories" and then foreign polities (Wilks 1975: 61). An elaborate administrative apparatus was developed to maintain traffic and royal revenues on the great-roads rather than regulating domestic access to the roads or domestic movement. The *akwanmofo* managed traffic facility – it repaired roads, mobilizing villagers, using free and paid labor, in the vicinity to do the work, and generally sought to remove obstacles to free movement on the Great Roads. Another administrative unit, the *nkwansrafo* (the king's path-keepers or highway police), garrisoned control points on the routes close to the frontiers of the kingdom to monitor the flow of commodities and extract customs duties, being quite literally a force that enforced the control point as customs house. The actual garrisoning of the road was only done at control points where the great-roads intersected with on-going maritime or overland routes (Wilks 1992: 175; Wilks 1975: 17, 49, 55). Importantly, the Ashanti Empire did not attempt to restrict travel on the roads beyond extracting customs or preventing entrance by hostile forces.

   The Ashanti Empire instead ensured that materially and spiritually travellers were protected from the environment, the gods, and other bad-meaning people. The court also established a number of halting points explicitly for the purpose of providing shelter and sustenance for travellers on the way to and from Kumasi. Complementing the court's patronage is this regard was the more autonomous erection of travel shrines. There was the danger for travellers that they would anger the High God of Ashanti or local family gods. In Ashanti this was resolved by circumscribing a special space for foreign travellers that meant

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11 Claims that the indigenous population pulled such trees down over the road on purpose appear to be misinformed.

they would not anger these gods and travel shrines were erected that protected the travellers along the great- road they were on (Wilks 1975: 25).

Thus, comparing pre-colonial movement on Burma and Ashanti provides us with very great contrasts regarding movement and mobility. Scott suggests for the comparativist "a gradient of mobility, from a relative frictionless ability to relocate to a relative immobility" (Scott 2009: 184). We might find Ashanti sitting somewhere very close to the frictionless end and Konbaung Burma much closer to the mobility side of the scale.

The Intermediary Period of Multiple *State-spaces*

In the intermediary period between pre-colonial kingdoms and colonial states, new means of transportation entered the indigenous mind-set and foster new thinking about motive power, movement, and speed. From West Africa to the Java, a swathe of pre-colonial kingdoms was being cut up an annexed in pieces as part of a gradual process of European conquest. The slow progressive nature of this process meant that for decades various societies in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia had a mixed period in which such areas had both a pre-colonial kingdom and a colonial state with pretensions to the other.

This period was important as a learning phase for both indigenous courts and societies and European administrators. Intellectually, the period saw the inroads of European ideas about transportation and related technology. New means of transportation were very vigorously promoted not so much by one government to the other but largely by other agents who did so for different reasons. These included locomotive manufacturers who sent samples, missionaries who were proffering progress and "civilization", and even rival governments that sought to obstruct expanding British influence in both cases. As one such agent recorded, "Our [c]arriage [a gift to the king from the Wesleyan Missionary Society] is the cause of a better road being made through this part of Ashanti, than has ever been seen before... good roads greatly promote civilization" (Freeman 1844: 119).

Before the extension of colonial rule, stories of new forms of transportation reached the ears of the kings of Burma and Ashanti from merchants and missionaries. In both cases, special examples of the new kinds of transportation were provided to these kings, which aroused awareness in him that their incorporation would require infrastructural change. The King of Ashanti was reportedly "very much interested and astonished" in 1841 when informed of the rapidity of travel permitted by railroads and steam-packets (Freeman 1844: 132). Further, when the same king received a gift of a carriage, the first in the royal capital, he found he had to undertake works within the confines of the royal capital to make use of the gift. The streets in Kumasi had to be widened and cleaned and new streets even had to be built. A letter of gratitude to the missionary society reported the king's happiness that he would no longer have to burden his countrymen with the onerous activity of carrying him around on a chair (Freeman1844: 86). New technologies of transportation also seeped into the Burmese kingdom from the colonial areas as well. These had the effect that like the carriage in Ashanti, the locomotive in Burma was also influencing indigenous people about the new possibilities of transportation even before they arrived. This is evidenced in painting murals

on the southern approach to the Mahamuni Shrine in Mandalay, which can be seen in Figure 2, and the inclusion of steamships in Jataka Story murals produced during the period.[12]

Figure 2: Mural of Train in Upper Gallery of South Entrance of Mahamuni Shrine at Mandalay (Photograph by author)

Local road building during this period was also a learning experience for Europeans across Africa and the Indian Ocean in the early 19th century. Herman Willem Daendels, the Governor-General of Java (1808-1811) is of course famous for the Great Post Road he built across Java (Doormont 2001: 15). Daendels' effort was commercial, to link up interior products with Batavia, but it was political as well for where the road went, Dutch administrative and military control was strengthened. Like the road in Java, the great military road from Colombo to Kandy in Sri Lanka was a political contest, as Sujit Sivasundaram explains, to assure British authority and it consumed a decade's worth of Governor Edward Barnes' efforts to bring the road up the hills to the mountain city. As Sivasundaram shows, the British road-building project was built in communication with indigenous approaches to the roads both real and imagined. On the one hand, for example, the British made use of the *rajakariya*, the indigenous forced labor system, to build the road, and, on the other, undertook some initiatives, such as digging a particular tunnel (at Kurunegala) because this act would satisfy an indigenous legend that their political authority would only be assured when the tunnel had been made (Sivasundaram 2014: 227-231). In other words, it was not only the indigenous society that had to adapt to western innovation, but the westerners who had to listen to what indigenous societies thought was important about transportation.

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12 These comments are based on personal observations the author made of the murals during fieldwork in Mandalay in June, 2014.

Even so, Europeans were credited with all road building by several generations of scholars working on the colonial period The aforementioned Daendels, who later found himself as Governor-General of the Dutch Gold Coast (1816-1818) and died there of fever in 1818, is a good example of this faulty attribution. Daendels had planned to build another such road connecting Elmina and Kumasi, but this was not begun before his death (Doormont 2001: 15). The implication is that Daendels was introducing something new, but from the Ghanaian literature and the preceding history of road building it is pretty clear that he was going to add his road to an indigenous network already in place over the course of the preceding century. The Ashanti War almost gave Ghana what would later become its first railway in the early 1870s.[13] The Commander of the campaign, however, reported back that there was no time to lay a railway and so the material sent remained offshore and was never landed and the orders for more materials were countermanded. This made the completion of a road more important than it might otherwise have been (Brackenberry 1874: 1.309). But it also meant that the introduction of the railways would come during the phase of full colonial rule. Hostility at the frontier of Ashanti and the Gold Coast after the war of 1873 eradicated their interface at the frontier as a node in commerce with serious implications for trade in the southern portion of the king and thus the viability of the road network in this area. The commerce that formerly flowed down via the Great North Road through Ashanti to the Cape Coast ceased as the Ashanti Kingdom broke up and smaller, hostile chiefdoms emerged on the political terrain forming together an "impassable barrier" (Freeman 1898: 485-6).

Trade now diverted away, from the north of Ashanti to the French Protectorate and down to the Coast of Assini and the Great North Road "rapidly degenerated into a bush-track" (Freeman 1898: 485-6). Roads within the Cape Coast in the early years of British rule fell into what was viewed by British engineers as serious disrepair. Rains had washed out parts of some roads, others were overgrown with vegetation, and some stretches were merely lengths of the beach. The main element that defined much of these roads as indeed being roads was that trees had been cleared up to fifteen feet across. Early recommendations were to construct drains along the roads.[14] The British must have brought the condition of the roads under control for Wilks explains that when political opinion in Ashanti divided over whether it was worth holding onto resistant southern provinces, the majority went with the policy of surrendering their control to the British, because they now kept the roads open and in repair to the benefit of the entire Ashanti road system (Wilks 1975: 29).

British efforts to build bridges fared just as poorly in Ashanti and Burma as other road-building efforts fared in Sri Lanka when countered by the adverse environment, particularly the monsoonal rains. The Kandy Road in the latter case washed out twice a year, metalling the road was not even attempted until 1841, and the tunnel collapsed in 1849, forcing the road engineers to add another two miles of road skirting the mountain instead of going through it. Sivasundaram's observation that Europeans of the period were having difficulty "apply[ing]

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[13] In expected support of the military campaign, the War Office had dispatched a complete tramway, including a traction engine, 6.25 miles of track, and some trucks on transports and orders had been put in for more material as well (Brackenberry 1874: 1.309).

14 R. Lonsdale, "Memorandum of Prince Buaki's Journey from Elina to Accra, with Notes on the Condition of the Roads, etc, 13th to 22nd September 1881", in House of Commons Command Paper 3386, "Further Correspondence on the Affairs of the Gold Coast", p. 4.

their science to the tropical environment" (Sivasundaram 2014: 228-229), holds equally true for this intermediary period in the case of West Africa (Ghana) and Burma. As all travel in Ashanti was on foot and bridges were expensive to build and difficult to maintain for environmental reasons, any cost- benefit analysis would have cast doubt on the viability of extensive bridgeworks as opposed to the use of ferry canoes across rivers and streams. The court also did not normally invest in bridgeworks. In part this was likely because as all travel was on foot, bridge works would not have mattered significantly anyway given the availability of ferry canoes for river crossings (Freeman 1844: 17). Further, during the rains, rivers expanded dramatically and in delta areas even changed course from year to year (Brackenberry 1874: 2.237. 245). In such conditions, bridges could only be temporary, built for purpose, and of quickly gathered materials that were relinquished to nature afterwards or otherwise removed. In 1841, Freeman observed the building of temporary bridges on the order of the king for the passage of the gift carriage (Freeman 1844: 118). These bridges were, he explained,

> the...first attempts at making bridges I have seen in the interior. They are constructed in the following manner: some stout, forked sticks or posts are driven in the centre of the stream, at convenient distances across which are placed some strong beams, fastened to the posts with withes, from the numerous climbing plants on every hand. On these bearers are placed long stout poles, which are covered with earth, from four to six inches thick; and this completes the bridge. ... (Freeman 1844: 118).

The cultural legacy of this was that the "bridge" in the indigenous view was not a permanent structure and its materials were free for re-use after its immediate purpose was over. This led to situations that horrified British army engineers in the Ashanti War as their indigenous allies ripped apart the bridges they had just built. As one engineers recalled: "I find ... that much injury is done to the road, bridges and fascines over swamps by the native allies, who tear up the bridges for firewood, and pull out the fascines for the same purpose" (Brackenberry 1874: 1.315). This thus hindered the influence of bridgeworks for some time. In support of the "strategic road" constructed into Ashanti by Royal Engineers during the Ashanti War 237 bridges were built (Brackenberry 1874: 1.316). The British destroyed at least some of these bridges themselves, including the bridge over the Prah River, when they withdrew at the conclusion of the Ashanti War (Brackenberry 1874: 2.276). The other bridges left intact fared poorly over the following decade and a half, most being in an "advanced state of decay" or disappearing altogether and some replaced merely by a log thrown over the stream (Freeman 1898: 25).

It took until the Campaign of 1873 for the British to be able to demonstrate that they knew how to build a road just as well as could the Ashanti. In preparation for the march of the British Army into Ashanti, British military engineers went to work putting the roads into a condition that would permit the advance of a European army in stages in reaction to changing events. Prior to the arrival of the commander, Lieutenant Gordon had made road up to Yancoomassie Fanti but only so far as clearing a path of a width sufficient for movement – the road surface was not yet suitable for the march of soldiers and artillery. To achieve the latter, Major Home and the Royal Engineers were tasked with widening the road to twelve feet, clearing all stubs and roots, draining the swamps or building causeways through them,

building culverts, and erecting bridges over all streams (Brackenberry 1874: 1.310). The "strategic road" thus built remained in good condition fifteen years later when another British expedition passed over it in 1888 (Freeman 1898: 25).

Attention to this intermediary period is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that European technology was not a 'shock' package that was introduced by colonial armies on the completion of conquest. Rather, European transportation technologies were well-known and often rejected long before colonial rule was cemented, at least completely, after a period when indigenous courts and societies weighed and rejected or neglected what was on offer. Second, such failures often meant that while Europeans awaited advances in technology that would be better suited to West Africa and mainland Southeast Asia, they had to engage with what transportation networks were already in existence.

The slowness of change impacted both the political centre's approach to movement and the relationship of users, the people, to movement in several ways. Religious pilgrimage, an exception to royal restrictions on movement in Burma, saw the introduction of religious amulets, some of them being miniature replicas of the Mahabodhi Temple and Buddhism, as a universal salvation religion offered protection beyond the locale as mentioned earlier. Regarding road travel, however, the erection of nat-shrines, to propitiate local spirits, may have been more important. In pre-colonial Ghana, this protection had come from the king, but the slow introduction of colonial rule and separate spiritual fields in the north and the south during the intermediary period allowed for the religious accommodation of mobility in Ghana. Protection of travellers would come from spirit-cults introduced by northern migrants into Ghana, often focused on "anti-witchcraft shrines" built alongside the roads (Klaeger 2009: 227), in a manner similar to nat shrines. These spirit cults were then copied by southerners that were then established in the north as well, providing protection for both mobile populations (Bruijn, Dijk, & Dijk 2001: 79-80). As Klaeger (2009: 231) and Ntewusu (2014: 15-7) have shown for contemporary Ghana, this kind of spiritual protection over Ghanaian travel has permeated the road system itself, so that not only are road accidents seen as the result of negative spiritual activity, but the act of road-building requires ritual and ritual specialists to investigate and undertake the work.

The slowness of the introduction of European transportation also meant that the evolving colonial states were influenced at least indirectly by the existing condition of transportation in Ghana and Burma and with this influence, it is suggested, came certain orientations towards the management of popular movement and travel. It is also possible that the same constraints and opportunities that shaped pre-colonial attitudes towards free or control movement would have similarly influenced the colonial state to adopt the same perspectives. In either case, there was good reason for continuity in governmentality towards transportation and movement. This continuity will be explored in the following section.

The Colonial Period

A good deal of the literature has viewed the colonial state as an external imposition that differed from the patrimonial kingdoms and chiefdoms they encountered and conquered in both Africa and Asia. Some literature has seen the colonial state as an interregnum and have viewed the military regimes that began to sweep Asia and Africa from the 1950s, all

succeeding earlier, failed civil democratic experiments, as representing a return to the pre-colonial African and Asian ruling elites' reliance on military force for the extraction of resources.[15] Some scholars have seen continuity through the entire era of the colonial experience. Although regime change indeed took place, it is observed, colonial states commonly introduced mixed administrative systems in which traditional institutions were curtailed but maintained alongside "modern" governance systems as part of divide and rule policies. Other scholarship on Africa has gone further and argued that European role was so short-lived and so negligible in its penetration into the interior that the colonial period left weak national institutional structures and a poor network infrastructure. This mixture of authority often survived independence, contributing to the stability of central rule in some former colonies and to political instability in others, Myanmar and Nigeria being two major examples where this legacy has resulted in major civil wars (Michalopolous & Papaioannou 2011: 1, 5).

However much colonial states ensconced themselves in the vocabulary of modernity when they put their faith in the importance of new steam and then gasoline technologies, they were still strongly influenced and shaped by the pre-existing court approaches to transportation and the transportation networks. Rather than writing new transport networks on a blank sheet, these colonial states in both Ghana and Burma were slow introductions that gradually absorbed what was already in place. New colonial transport systems in these cases were actually hybrid systems that grew in a conversation with pre-existing road and river networks and with the cultures of royal control over traffic that long predated the arrival of Europeans. Local European traders, administrators, and engineers found they would have to deal with these constraints and opportunities if they were going to make significant headway. The colonial state's approach to transportation in both Ghana and Burma was realized through a pre-existing indigenous framework.

More generally, in both Ghana and Burma, the existing roads did not disappear as routes. In Ghana, the old great-roads of Ashanti were to become the foundation of new motor roads that were built over them. In the early twentieth century, the great-roads were no longer functioning as great-roads, but they were still there physically and the system of travel they sustained would largely continue on to the present; two-thirds of the great-road system becoming motor roads (Wilks 1975: 13). As motor roads, the old great-roads interconnected with paths and side roads that generally kept the Ashanti transportation networks intact. The railways of the Gold Coast focused on the maritime port trade and especially that which served the gold mining operations and not the general economy. In Ghana, alternative options of travel meant that Ghanaian autonomy of movement and with it political autonomy, saw continuity, while simultaneously, European dependence on the railway for mining and other forms of resource extraction meant that West African colonial states became increasingly vulnerable to African economic and political empowerment movements partly derived and supported by the organizational power of the railway's labor union as well as those in other strategic industries, demonstrated in the form of railway strikes early in the postwar period, first in Nigeria in 1945 and then in Ghana in 1947 (Jeffries 1978; Cooper 1992: 21).

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15 The intellectual heritage for these views lay in African historiography (Aungwom 2001: 93).

Although railway extensions would be built from the 1920s these never really escaped competition from the roads. The first permanent road bridges and better roads built in Ashanti and the Gold Coast were for bicycles. Some District Commissioners there were doing anywhere from 32 to 45 miles in a day on their bicycles on their rounds and the bridges and roads made these journeys much less onerous and faster than they might otherwise be. From 1915, such work began to be conducted on motorcars, especially on the Ford Model T, making bridges or at least heavier duty river ferries indispensable (Williamson 2000: 9).

When the British entered their last stage of expansion in Burma in the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885) and the subsequent pacification campaign, roads were essential for establishing their control and assuring tight administration. As the Burmese royal roads, the kingdom's military roads had been arranged with military reach in mind, they were well suited to adaptation to British needs. In 1886, in the Mandalay area alone, the British reformed (rather than construct afresh) fifteen miles of road, metaled them, and rebuilt the existing bridges. Outside of these roads, the British also turned partially to finishing some two hundred miles of country roads. Where other routes of passage were necessary, such as between military outposts, the soldiers themselves cleared jungle and forest to form temporary forest tracks of about one hundred feet in width (Croswaite 1912: 67).

Like the pre-colonial Burmese kingdom, the colonial government saw the Irrawaddy river network as western Burma's transportation artery, a main thoroughfare of great capacity, access to which in an out could be controlled by the military and monitored and taxed by the customs administration. For the landlocked eastern part of the country, the British saw the railway as best alternative to the Irrawaddy and the IFC. In building the railways, though, the new railway lines were laid on top of the old road beds (the first being the roads from Rangoon to Prome and from Rangoon to Toungoo) and as these roads always had in the past, the railways now built on top of them linked up with the river and a number of different points (in particular at Mandalay, Prome, Bassein, and Rangoon). To take one example, one hundred miles of the Rangoon to Prome Railway line that were opened on 2 May 1877 consisted of the old Rangoon-Prome Road, which had been given to the railway construction engineers for this purpose. The bridges that had existed on the road, being made of wood, were now replaced with iron bridges that could support rail traffic. This last effort led the construction engineer to argue that building railway lines over normal provincial roads was an exercise in doubtful economy. Although a road bed built for cart traffic might support rail traffic, gradients, curves, and banks had to be remade to conform with requirements.[16]

As was true of the pre-colonial kingdom, a certain governmentality regarding popular movement influenced policies towards the railways and the feeder roads that serviced them. Certain acts of legislation, such as the Village Act that tied down the Burmese to their local village circle under the watchful eye of the village headman, get a great deal of attention, but scholars have paid little attention to the government road construction that appears to have been designed to discourage free movement of Burmese if not general mobility altogether.

In Burma, the British turned the roads into what some scholars have called "technologies of standardization and control" in which certain roads became the single "institutionalized route through the landscape" in order to focus all economic activity on the export economy

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16 IOR P 2884 Railway Reports, p. 17.

(Harvey 2006: 131, citing Wilson 204, n.p.). Colonial engineering and equipment was put to work to ensure that when Burmese moved they did so only when, how, and by what routes the government wished. Through the army and then through the Public Works Department, the colonial government physically reconstructed the Burmese landscape, both in building the railways and in ruining alternative forms of transport, sometimes by design but also by accident as well. Before motor vehicles, for example, most potential road traffic was viewed as being within indigenous hands and it was best to redirect this traffic to feed the railway, which by 1902 had become a private company, but one upon which the colonial state was heavily dependent. Roads built in the west were thus built to feed the river traffic and roads built in the east were merely feeder roads of short length that forced people to take their goods to the railway stations (Maung Shein 1964: 38). While that effort was purposeful, there are also examples of where the British ruined alternative transportation accidentally as well. British water engineering works, for example, which had been intended to aid irrigation in the eastern part of the colony, made local rivers un-navigable, ruining port towns along the way. By the time this work was over, Curzon's vision had become a reality – Burma really did only have two great transportation avenues, the Irrawaddy River in the west and the railway in the east.

We have a fairly good understanding of the transportation history of Ghana since World War I because of the substantial secondary literature devoted to it by contemporary historians.[17] Ghana saw the introduction of new motor vehicles that increased popular mobility, employment as locomotive drivers and later as motor vehicle entrepreneurs.[18] Much of this colonial era of mobility opportunity was due to the nature of the Ghanaian economy. Cocoa farmers used the profits from their sales to buy lorries that could take the cocoa to buying agents. Some of these lorries and their Ghanaian owner-drivers can be seen in Figure 3. At first this meant going to the railways, but soon motor vehicles were taking this directly to the port. This process, in which Africans operated motor vehicles independently and developed a culture of mobility around it, has been called "African automobility" (Hart 2015).

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17 The deadline for the submission of present article, prevented prior access to Jennefer Hart;s forthcoming book on Ghanaian mobility (Hart 2016).

18 While this has conferred prestige in Ghanaian society, something that has persisted into the present, this status is somewhat ambiguous (Klaeger 2009: 226).

Figure 3: Photograph of cocoa lorries waiting to load in the mid-1920s (reproduced from Government of the Gold Coast 1925, p. 124).

It would be an overstatement not to admit that there were no colonial laws or officials who sought to control how Africans used transport, for there were and they did (Hart 2015). Often this was over safety concerns or because it challenged European notions of how a vehicle should be used. What was apparently not curtailed by government intervention, however, was autonomous indigenous mobility per se. Admittedly, the colonial government in Ghana was mainly concerned at first with railway development as this was essential for the gold mines, but they still encouraged road building (although indigenous people would have to do the work on their own). In the colonial period, these feeder and connecting roads were built on the basis of local knowledge, with an eye to their being suitable for human porterage and they relied upon local resources for materials. Just as many of these colonial-era roads were not suitable to motor traffic at all, many of the roads constructed today between communities remain un-motorable to modern buses (Ntewusu & Nanbigne 2015: 197).

Although motorized transport, as mentioned above, became available from the 1920s, this mode of transport predominated in the south while the north, because of the topography and the fact that there was greater poverty in the north, the cheaper bicycle predominated in the north (Ntewusu & Nanbigne 2015: 201). As with the colonial state, the modern Ghanaian government has actively promoted mobility and popular access to transport. Samuel Ntewusu has pioneered scholarship on transportation in subnational areas of Ghana with work mainly examining districts in Northern Ghana. Ntewusu and Edward Nanbigne have shed light on the Ghanaian government's role in making cheaper forms of transport available to larger numbers of people in the country. This began in the early 1960s with the government's encouragement to Yugoslavia to open a motorcycle plant in the northern town of Tamale; although it did not materialize the socialist nation did open up shops in northern Ghana to sell cheap motorcycles. More recently, in the   last ten years, the government has developed a programme to promote the use of motor tricycles. This was begun in December 2012 with the Community Motor Tricycle Project to train 120,000 local youth how to use a special kind of

motor tricycle, known as the motor king, and the following year began distributing tricycles as well (Ntewusu & Nanbigne 2015: 201).

By contrast, the Burmese saw from the beginning of the colonial-era restrictions on the use of the vehicles that had historically allowed them the limited mobility they had exercised because of the equally limited oversight of the state on travel within the country. Colonial laws in Burma completed the work begun by the Public Works Department in eradicating the autonomy of traditional, indigenous means of on-and-off-the-road cross-country transport. One was the requirement that indigenous carts that wished to access the new government feeder roads wrap their wheels with a three- inch wide iron rim, known as the tyre (Scott 1924: 317). Indigenous cartwheels were until this time slab wheels, solidly built, not hollowed out and rimmed or spoked. An example of one type of slab wheel (Burmese, *kya-bi*, literally, slab + wheel) can be viewed in Figure 4. Such a wheel either solid or was constructed out of several pieces of wood fastened together and cut in the shape of a circle. The slab wheel was also convex-sided, being thickest at the centre and then 'tapered' out to the thinner edges of the wheel. For this reason, the slab wheel was superior to the spoked wheel during rainy and muddy conditions, especially when roads were in actually muddy wheel-tracks. Since the wheel was thinner around the edges and there were no crevices, as a spoked wheel would provide, such wheels moved through mud much more easily than would spoked wheels (Nisbet 1901: 1.377-378; Shway Yoe 1997: 81; Ferrars & Ferrars 1900: 138; Scott 1924: 317; Williams 1922: 136).


Figure 4: Pre-colonial Burmese cart with one type of slab-wheel, published in the 'Illustrated London News', 22 June 1889 (Author's private collection)

Slab wheels were very much disliked by colonial authorities because they were heavy and jagged and thus did damage to the new metaled roads the British had built. These roads were

sometimes glazed over with stone (including the green stone sometimes used as ballast by ships originating in Europe), but "mostly with balls of burned brick apt to be easily pulverized during the hot season" (Nisbet 1901: 1.376-377). As one observer described them, "the tendency of cart bullocks to follow in a worn track causes the road surface to be worn in two deep furrows, while the metaled surface in the middle remains intact" (Scott 1924: 316). The addition of metal tyres it was argued would prevent this damage. Indigenous people had a choice of either not adding the tyres, which meant they could not bring goods or foodstuffs to the railways, which were now the only show in town, or adding the tyres and getting access to trade at railheads, but abandoning autonomous travel on muddy rural paths. Most chose the former and indigenous carts' solid wheels gave way to spoked wheels, which were no longer a problem for the feeder roads, but were problematic on pathways (Nisbet 1901: 1.376-377).

As we have seen already with engineering, the colonial state excelled at realizing desires it and pre-colonial ruling elites had always had to exert oversight and control on popular mobility. Administrative mechanisms lent data gathering and registration tools to aid the process of immobilizing indigenous transportation that was autonomous of colonial oversight. First, carts and wagons were enumerated. Second, with the colonial erection of municipalities, carts which were available for "hire in urban districts" had to be licensed. Third, with enumeration and licensing, it became possible to force traditional Burmese cart owners and operators to undertake the required changes to their vehicles for otherwise they would be denied access to the road. According to Nisbet, the changes to the road system saw an "enormous" increase in the production and use of indigenous carts (Nisbet 1901: 1.379).

But this was not the case. The "indigenous carts" referred to after licensing were in fact a new kind of cart, rebuilt to European-imposed specifications. They were not the old versions that now rapidly disappeared in all but the most out of the way places (Shway Yoe 1927: 81). Unfortunately, unlike the latter that were very well suited for all-terrain use, the new wheels were not. As a result, there were more indigenous carts now, but their use was limited to the semi-paved and metaled roadways that fed the railways. Commercial traffic and even human movement lost its autonomy and now was directed almost entirely in the direction of easily monitored government or government-aligned transportation networks, the Irrawaddy River (dominated by the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company) and the railway network (a Burma Railways monopoly). Broadly, these changes to transportation under colonial rule were consistent with those desired by, but beyond the capacity of, the pre-colonial kingdom in Burma.

These monopolies would be challenged in the late colonial period from many quarters. More economically and politically empowered Burmese tore away at these monopolies from the 1920s. From the 1930s, road competition and the building by the colonial state of new roads also began to take off, but with a carrying capacity nowhere near that which remained in the hands of the IFC and the Burma Railways, the latter becoming again in 1928 a government-owned enterprise. But these roads, building on the laws already in place for application against indigenous carts, were the home of motorcars and not ox-carts. As transportation sped up, reliance on the tediously slow traditional carts was fast becoming

economical anyway.[19] While urban-dwelling Burmese would own and use motorcars themselves, the motor car did not provide the same kind of freedoms that indigenous carts and un-metaled roads had provided because of dependence on fuel, the provision of which could be more easily controlled by the colonial state than the monitoring or the entire transportation network. Control of access to fuel, to the purchase of automobiles, and access to major roads represented one means of controlling mobility that carried into post-colonial Burma. Ultimately, Ne Win would introduce in 1962 more direct and formal restrictions on freedom of movement (Turku 2016: 16) that would severely restrict mobility among Burmese for the next half century.

At the end of the colonial period, Burma had deeply rooted controls over movement beyond locales and Ghana had free, both politically and physically, movement of people. To briefly touch on what are long-term and complicated developments, the first of the two states veered off towards military rule and authoritarianism by the 1960s. The other, after a number of failed efforts at authoritarian and military rule in the 1960s to 1992, became one of West Africa's strongest democracies. In fact, Ghana is regularly referred to as the poster-child for Democracy in West Africa, Africa's "model democracy" and a host of other referents commenting positively on its democratic experience (Boafo-Arthur 2008). To assert that pre-existing, pre-colonial government attitudes to movement and mobility ensured that modern, independent Ghana and Burma would have the contemporary regimes that they have today would be reductionist. To suggest so was not the intention of this article. Instead, it is suggested, there was a continuity in how this governmentality became embedded in evolving attitudes towards what today would fall under the heading of public transportation infrastructure.

Conclusion

The continuity in approaches to movement and transportation between pre-colonial and colonial West Africa and Southeast Asia, as examined in the cases of Ghana and Burma contribute in part to an explanation of the political trajectory of these states after independence. Ghana has seen postcolonial political conditions with weak central control over localities and although from the 1990s it has had a relatively healthy Democracy, the Democratic record has been spotted for a few years at a time by experiments in authoritarian rule and number of military coups and even military rule of no more than a few years in length. It could be said that despite political instability from the 1950s to 1992, authoritarian traditions were very weak and unstable and certainly controls on local movement were even weaker. By contrast, Burma has seen traditions of efforts to assert very tight central control over localities and where it has not had military rule or predominant military control it has seen authoritarianism.

Despite British rule and a similar focus in the economy on the export of primary agricultural produce (cocoa in one and rice in the other) and mineral and precious metal extraction (gold in Ghana and silver, zinc, and bauxite in Burma), the policies of both colonial states towards popular mobility in their respective charges could not have been more

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19 Williams described Burmese ox-carts as "terribly slow conveyances" and estimated their speed at about two miles an hour, with a daily tally of ten miles (Williams 1922: 140).

different. It is unclear whether a great many factors contributed to or were symptomatic of their respective negative (Burma) or positive (Ghana) orientations towards mass mobility. For example, both Burma and Ghana experienced a series of very serious Anglo-indigenous wars but whereas Burma's final conquest led to a counter-insurgency campaign with prolonged and very significant controls on personal freedoms and movement (the Village Act), this did not occur in Ghana. Was this difference due to the particular commanders involved in the war and suppression or was it due to the long-term local context, one in which the British listened to the indigenous elites with whom they collaborated in suppression, men like the famous Kinwun Mingyi who themselves had been administrative officials in control of movement (this official, who became an adviser to the colonial regime, had in earlier days been in charge of a border outpost and later the Chief Minister of the court)? We might also ask if there was a difference in the way the Colonial Office and the Indian Office approached colonial rule and if their influence had some bearing on the colonial forces that suppressed the Ashanti and Burmans respectively.

Certainly one factor was the pre-colonial culture of mobility. The pre-colonial kingdoms, not the colonial states, helped to set the template for government attitudes towards popular mobility for the post-colonial societies that followed. As examined here, Burma is the model of a society that was ruled by royal courts and a colonial state that were mass mobility-averse. The existence of resulting controls on movement, however ineffective regarding domestic roads, may help to explain the significant role of Chinese overland traders to some degree, but more particularly the important role of ethnic minorities like the Shan in managing pre-colonial and colonial trans-border trade. By contrast, the Ashanti Kingdom and the colonial state that followed might be characterized more as mobility-encouraging states. Contemporary Ghana and Burma have certainly inherited these very different approaches to individual freedoms and controls on individual movement, one that was very empowering and the other which was very restrictive and which some very clearly rebelled against. Clearly, the extension of British rule in the Gold Coast over Ashanti was partially welcomed by a least some sections of the indigenous population because it offered through road construction, repair, and maintenance to provide the same kind of service, with an intensification of investment and capacity that the pre-colonial kingdom had provided. In Burma, the same kinds of direct and indirect controls on movement were applied by the colonial state as had been under pre-colonial rule, with the opposite reaction – many did not like it. To oversimplify a complex debate and diverse and rich literature, the question should focus not on *state-space* or *non-state-space*, but on what happens in that space. Another assertion is that we really need to give late early modern states in Africa and Southeast Asia their peculiar due administratively, intellectually, and militarily rather than lump them together as I have done in the present article for coherence and clarity, as part of the pre-colonial kingdom. On-going developments in them set them apart as they do in Europe, both from their classical and even from their early-early modern predecessors.

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State formation on China's southern frontier: Vietnam as a shadow empire and hegemon

Tuong Vu[1]

Introduction

State formation in the territory called "Vietnam" today followed an imperial pattern, namely a process of conquests and annexations typical of an empire. Emerging out of "Chinese" rule in the tenth century, the "Vietnamese" expanded their territory hundreds of miles north and west and a thousand miles south to annex areas populated by Nùng, Thái, Mường, Chàm, Khmer, and others.[2] At its peak in the early nineteenth century, the frontier of the Nguyễn empire encompassed much of today's Cambodia and Laos. This imperial pattern was the basis on which the French built their Indochinese colony and the Vietnamese communist state built its modern hegemony.

An account of Vietnam as an empire and hegemon challenges the nationalist historiography which emerged in colonized Vietnam a century ago and which remains influential today.[3] In this historiography, Vietnam is essentialized as home to an ancient and unified nation with an indomitable spirit, while China is imagined as a big bully bent on but never successful in subjugating that spirit. Not too long ago, many prominent scholars were still preoccupied with the question of how the Vietnamese were able to maintain their identity and independence throughout their 2000-year recorded history in the shadow of its giant northern neighbor.[4] The threat of assimilation and annexation by "China" is often portrayed as the paramount existential problem confronting all "Vietnamese" throughout their history who have yearned to preserve their independence even while adapting to "Chinese" culture and worldview.

Nationalist historiography ignores the inconvenient fact that for much of "Chinese" and "Vietnamese" history, there have been centuries-long periods when more than one "China"

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2 For the most parts I try to avoid the modern terms "China," "Chinese," "Vietnam," and "Vietnamese" when referring to premodern polities and peoples. If unavoidable, efforts are made to convey their modern origins. For premodern China, "the Middle Kingdom" [Zhongguo] or "the northern empire" (north viewed from the Red River Delta) are used. For premodern Vietnam, An Nam and Đại Việt are used interchangeably. The former term ("peaceful South") was given to Jiaozhou (the northern and north-central part of today's Vietnam) in 679 while it was under Tang rule. The name Đại Việt was first used by a Lý monarch in mid-eleventh century (Taylor 2013: 38-9, 72). An Nam has tended to be avoided in the nationalist historiography for its association with Chinese domination despite the fact that it was widely used in premodern Vietnam, and (as referring to central Vietnam) during the French colonial period. In fact, "An Nam" was used more commonly than Đại Việt in premodern Vietnam, and used not only in official communication between Vietnam and China but also in personal communication between Vietnamese envoys and those from other kingdoms when they met in the Chinese capital (Kelley 2005: 25).

3 For a critique of nationalist historiography, see Tran and Reid 2005.

4 Notable examples are Marr 1971 and Taylor 1983.

and one "Vietnam" existed. Even if limited to those times when a single "Vietnam" confronted a single "China," the nationalist narrative is seriously misleading. While some ambitious rulers from the north have sought to dominate the people of historical Vietnam, the Chinese empire did not endanger the survival of their country as much as other groups on China's southern frontier. Tang rulers gave the frontier Jiao province (today's northern and north-central Vietnam) the name "An Nam," meaning the "Peaceful South," yet the name perhaps reflected their wish rather than the reality (Woodside 2007: 16). The "Violent South" would have more accurately captured the reality of China's southern frontier. As I argue, the Middle Kingdom directly or indirectly aided Annamese in their quest to expand power along that frontier.

This positive synergy is often neglected in studies that focus exclusively on Sino-Vietnamese dyadic interactions.[5] While insightful, works along this line have tended to posit the two as opposites, whether their relationship was placed on an asymmetric or more equal basis.[6] By situating Vietnamese state formation in the context of China's southern frontier,[7] I hope to present the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in a different light, one that has more often contained a positive rather than negative synergy. Treating Vietnam as an empire or hegemon on a large area of mainland Southeast Asia is also essential to understand why the Vietnamese sometimes did not automatically accept Chinese superiority despite the obvious "asymmetry" between them. In fact, we will see that ambitious Vietnamese leaders have at times imagined or claimed superiority over their northern neighbor, for better or worse.

This essay includes four sections. First, I will briefly discuss the four concepts of periphery, frontier, empire, and hegemon. These are well-known concepts in history and the social sciences, and my goal is not to tackle the complex debates about them, but rather to offer some definitions and note how they may contribute to our understanding of Vietnam as a shadow empire and hegemon. The term "shadow empire" used here is borrowed from scholars studying state formation on the steppe along the northern border of the Chinese empire. That term applies only in the premodern period, and I have coined the term "shadow hegemon" for the modern period. "Shadow" here means not only that small-sized Vietnam was overshadowed by giant China, but also that at least a certain positive synergy existed between them in both premodern and modern time.

The second part of the essay contrasts the northern and southern frontiers of the Chinese empire to tease out distinctive economic, political, and historical conditions of the southern frontier that have shaped its relationship with China. This comparison of the two frontiers suggests that for much of premodern history northern rulers had no compelling rationale to seek direct control over their "Peaceful South." Imperial rulers were certainly concerned

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5 For example, see Womack 2006. A recent exception is Anderson and Whitmore 2015: 1-58.

6 While Brantly Womack emphasizes asymmetry, James Anderson divides the history of Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations into three basic situations characterized by the relative *domestic* strength of each country's rulers (strong China/weak Vietnam; strong China/strong Vietnam; weak China/strong Vietnam) (Womack 2006; Anderson 2013: 259-280).

7 For a recent study that treats the residents of the Red River Delta as sharing the Yue/Việt identity of people who lived in the entire Hua-xia region, which was early China's southern frontier, see Brindley 2015.

about all the borderlands that encircled the empire,[8] but the nature of the threat posed to their security by the northern and southern frontiers was totally different. The third part will attempt to explain how premodern Đại Việt [Great Việt] emerged and became a shadow empire, and the fourth section examines modern (communist) Vietnam as a shadow hegemon. In the conclusion, I will briefly speculate on the implications for the current tensions between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea.

A final note should be included about methodology and sources. This essay employs the comparative historical method more commonly used in sociology and political science than in history. This method involves tracing and comparing major political and social developments of human communities over long periods.[9] The *longue durée* helps identify major patterns of change and continuity, while (implicit or explicit) comparisons relativize the particular experiences of every community. In terms of sources, this essay draws from various secondary sources that are insightful but have not been brought to bear on the imperial character of Vietnamese state formation in the premodern period. The goal is not to present new findings but rather to build a historiographical case against the erroneous but popular nationalist narrative. In contrast, the arguments for the modern period are drawn from a book in press that relies on primary Vietnamese materials and archival research (Vu 2017). From the available evidence an interesting parallel between the premodern and modern pattern can be observed.

Periphery, Frontier, Empire, and Hegemon

In its most basic meaning, periphery is simply "a line that forms the boundary of an area" or "an outermost part or region within a precise boundary." (The American heritage 1993) Similarly, frontier's essential meaning is "an international border" or the area along that border (the American heritage 1993: 547). Periphery is similar to frontier if seen from the perspective of the state. Both denote zones where state power is perhaps weakest (The American Heritage 1993: 547). Beyond their literal meanings, periphery and frontier carry connotations that make them contentious in many scholarly debates.

Periphery suggests a marginal and dependent status when it is paired with "core" or "center." To be on the periphery or to be peripheral means to have less importance or significance. Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory, for example, divides the world into three zones: the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery (Wallerstein 1974). In this framework, the periphery is more dependent on the core than vice versa, and is subject to exploitation and oppression by the core.

While periphery conveys a negative connotation, frontier has a positive meaning. Drawn from its original meaning, frontier refers to an outermost region where people of a country have recently settled, as in the Western United States in the nineteenth century (Kellerman 2007: 230-4). The implication is that a wild, unknown, and uncivilized world exists beyond the frontier. In a related sense, frontier also means the boundary of knowledge in a field of

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8 For center-frontier relations in China, see Lary (2007); for post-Qing period, see Cochran and Pickowicz (2010); for China's relations with nomadic states and peoples on the northern frontier, see Di Cosmo 2002 and Barfield 1992); for frontier conquests and colonization under the Han Dynasty, see Chang (2007).

9 For a bold statement about this method from a prominent sociologist, see Tilly 1989.

study. To be on the frontier does not mean to be marginal or insignificant as to be on the periphery does. Rather, it suggests a vanguard status and a sense of excitement for being on the "cutting edge" of knowledge or for being the agents of civilization, however understood (Kleinfeld 2012: ix). It is this sense of frontier that explains why many premodern Vietnamese elites felt proud of being part of the Sinicized world and sought to impose Sinic institutions and cultures on neighboring Cambodia when they had the opportunity in the nineteenth century.[10]

Both frontier and periphery imply distance from the core/center, but frontier is implicitly "closer" to the center than periphery. Frontier represents the farthest reach of the center's cultural, economic, and political influence, whereas periphery merely indicates a hierarchical relationship with the center. A strong and expanding frontier is indicative of a powerful center, whereas a strong and expanding periphery may imply a threat to the center's domination.

The contradicting connotations of periphery and frontier suggest that one should be careful in assessing their perspective toward the center. Even though a frontier community is literally one on the periphery of a country, members of the community do not necessarily feel dependent on and marginalized by the center, but may proudly imagine themselves being the vanguards. We will see below how Vietnamese Communist leaders imagined themselves being the vanguards of world revolution even though they were in every other sense peripheral to the communist bloc.

Empire is the most controversial concept among our four concepts. In the standard definition, "empire" is a form of political organization created by military conquests which often encompasses a broad territory inhabited by people of different cultures. Empires are typically characterized by authoritarian rule with the center enjoying political domination throughout the realm. Hierarchy and diversity are thus the hallmarks of empire, as egalitarianism and unity are for the nation.[11] Unlike in the past when it generated awe and respect, the word "empire" today carries a negative connotation. Yet traditional empires were extremely complex organizations, given their vast territories and great diversity. Although empires were built by conquests and annexations, stable and successful imperial rule involved much more than the use of coercion. Ruling elites of an empire often granted substantial autonomy to local elites in the periphery in return for their support. Imperial rule often relied as much on ideological persuasion as on coercion.

A major debate on empires involves the question whether they still exist today. Many historians of the Cold War consider the Soviet-led and American-led camps as "informal empires" even though the two superpowers did not dominate their client states to the same degree found in traditional empires (Lundestad 2012; Westad 2005). Other scholars distinguish between empire and dependence, arguing that formal or informal empires necessarily involve effective imperial control of sovereignty, whereas dependence means simply unequal influence (Doyle 1986: 40-3). In this view, the American and Soviet

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10 See Woodside 1971, esp. 253; also Kelley 2005.
11 This discussion of the concept is based on Maier 2006: 24-66.

"empires" represented merely dependent but not imperial relationships. They should be called "hegemons," not "empires."[12]

In the literature of international relations, hegemons are defined as states that predominate over others, through either mere material dominance or in combination with legitimacy.[13] Neo-Gramscian authors stress the importance of cultural and ideological hegemony rather than mere military and economic hegemony. Although a case can be made that Vietnamese communists earned some legitimacy from many of their Laotian and Cambodian comrades for providing effective leadership of the movement over the entire Indochina, it should not be controversial, as I do in this essay, to view modern Vietnamese hegemony over Indochina in the material sense.

The four concepts of periphery, frontier, empire, and hegemon are useful as theoretical tools to guide our thinking of Vietnam. The existence of premodern Vietnam in the shadow of the Chinese civilization, or the dependency of modern communist Vietnam on the Soviet Union and China did not automatically mean Vietnam itself could not be an empire or hegemon. As an empire, Vietnam was certainly not in the same league with the giant Chinese or Ottoman empires. Yet Vietnam can be called a "shadow empire," a term coined by Thomas Barfield who uses it to refer to the nomad states on the steppe along the northern border of the Chinese Empire (Barfield 2001: 10-41). These shadow empires of nomad tribes such as the Xiongnu and the Mongols conquered vast territories and created stable rule over them, even though they were much less centralized and sophisticated than "primary empires" such as the Chinese or Ottoman empires. Like those tribes on the steppe, Vietnam has existed in the shadow of China since its birth in the Red River Delta. Nevertheless, its people managed to conquer large territories from other groups on the frontier and have dominated the Indochinese peninsular for several centuries.

The southern versus northern frontier of China

Scholars of premodern Vietnam have tended to limit the scope of their inquiry to Sino-Vietnamese relations, but a comparison between China's southern and northern frontiers can illuminate neglected but fundamental aspects of Sino-Vietnamese interaction. A key difference between the two frontiers was the much greater distance from the southern frontier to the "Central Plain" [*zhongyuan*], where the center of Chinese civilization and political power was located. Three thousand years ago, that center emerged in the middle-lower basin of the Yellow River in northern China. It later expanded to the middle basin of the Yangzi River during the Qin and Han dynasties about two thousand years ago to form the core of Han Chinese civilization (Hsu 2012: 73-7). All urban centers and capital cities of various "Chinese" polities at the time were located within this area. The trip from the Red River Delta to Loyang, the Western Han capital, covered approximately 1,800 miles and took about six months at the time (Taylor 1983: 57). In contrast, the Central Plain was located right next to the steppe where nomadic tribes roamed. The proximity of the steppe to the heart of the Central Plain meant that the nomads could pose direct security threats to its rulers. From so

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12 For a perceptive distinction between "empire" and "hegemony," see Schroeder 2009: 61-88.

13 For an extensive discussion of the concept of "hegemony" in international relations, see Clark 2011, esp. 18-23. For Gramscian applications in international relations, see Gill 1993.

far away, Southeast Asians could at best create disturbances along the frontier but were never able to threaten the survival of the Chinese empire.

Indeed, nomadic states frequently threatened and twice conquered the entire empire. They could not match China's population, wealth, and technology, but they possessed a key military advantage in horse cavalry. While they were not centralized organizations like the Chinese state, nomad states were not at a disadvantage because they were financed not by taxing their people but by exploiting outside resources. In return for accepting subordinate political position, leaders of member tribes gained access to Chinese luxury goods and trade opportunities. As Barfield observes, those nomad empires enjoyed a *positive synergy* with the Chinese empire:

> The stability [of nomad empires] depended on extorting vast amounts of wealth from China through pillage, tribute payments, border trade, and international reexport of luxury goods—not by taxing steppe nomads. When China was centralized and powerful, so were nomadic empires; when China collapsed into political anarchy and economic depression, so did the unified steppe polities that had prospered by its extortion.[14]

Although the nomads had much to gain by trading with the Chinese empire, the steppe had neither fertile land nor good climate to offer the empire's rice-growing farmers. The expansive and formidable Great Wall that various Central Plain rulers devoted substantial resources to build clearly testified about the enormous threat the nomads posed to them, but it also implied the lack of desire on the part of the Chinese empire to conquer and exploit the steppe.

As communities based on sedentary agriculture and ocean trade, mainland Southeast Asia seemed more attractive for the Chinese empire than the steppe on its northern frontier. The subtropical land and people on mainland Southeast Asia were more exploitable. The trading networks that linked Southeast Asia to South Asia and beyond were similarly desirable. However, the potential exploitability of mainland Southeast Asia for the Chinese empire did not quite measure up against other concerns and opportunities. I have mentioned the long distance from the Red River Delta to the Central Plain, which meant heavy costs for the empire to maintain permanent control over the Red River Delta.[15]

Yet costs were not the whole story; better and closer opportunities than the Red River Delta existed for Chinese expansion. Until the fourth century CE, the entire area of southern China today, from the Yangzi River to the Red River Delta, was still thinly populated.[16] As China evolved, Han people from the Central Plain moved south in great numbers to search for new opportunities or simply to run from wars.[17] Only by the Sui dynasty in the late sixth century did population density in southern China overtake that in the Red River Delta (Taylor 1983: 299-300). The vast area which is today's southern China thus absorbed most of the

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14 Barfield 2001: 10. See a similar point in Holcombe 2001: 39.

15 These costs contributed to the generally hostile attitudes of the imperial elites toward the frontiers in the premodern period. See Woodside 2007: 16-22.

16 Sun Laichen even considers the whole area south of the Yangzi River in China as part of Southeast Asia. See Sun 2010: 44-79.

17 During the Eastern Han, for example, the Han Chinese population of northern China declined greatly due to natural disasters, diseases, and southward migration. Over two centuries as Han people fled to the South, non-Han groups moved in, making "the greatest population movement in [Chinese] history" (Hsu 20122: 189).

expansive impulse of early China.[18] By the late Tang period in the ninth century CE or so, now populous Guangdong could act as the commercial hub linking China with maritime Southeast Asia and beyond. From that point on, access to the Red River Delta became unnecessary for the Chinese empire as far as ocean trade was concerned.

A final difference between mainland Southeast Asia and the steppe along China's northern frontier was the possibility for the creation of a single empire on the steppe, which would be unthinkable for mainland Southeast Asia. Mainland Southeast Asia's population centers were scattered in several river deltas and along the coastal areas crisscrossed by high mountains. In such a difficult topography, the rise of a unified state would be extremely difficult, and indeed never occurred.[19] As tribal societies consolidated into proto-states, mainland Southeast Asia came to be dotted by small and loosely organized polities based on agrarian and trading economies. These states fought each other regularly, and the number of autonomous states diminished over time due to conquests and annexations, but a unified state never emerged for the entire Southeast Asian mainland that could pose a threat to China's security. Together with other reasons, the absence of such a state implied that Chinese rulers had no compelling rationale to seek direct control over this region, especially if their northern frontier was under nomadic threat. In fact, as seen below, Chinese rule over the Red River Delta was first established not by any emperor but by a rebellious local Qin commander based in Guangdong.

Premodern Đại Việt as a shadow empire

By the time the Central Plain was unified under the Qin dynasty, neither bureaucratic states nor large urban centers existed anywhere in Southeast Asia (Hall 1992: 185). When the Han dynasty extended its rule to the Red River Delta about two thousand years ago, most native people believed to be the ancestors of the Vietnamese today still lived in the upland areas, northwest of the Red River delta and about 100 miles from the sea (Taylor 1983: 3; Whitmore 1986: 129). The river basins were still undeveloped.[20] A Qin army first reached the Red River Delta around 214 BCE, but did not establish direct control over the area. When Qin collapsed, Zhao To, a Qin official in Guangdong, declared himself king over the southeastern frontier of the empire. Zhao fought back an invasion ordered by Han empress Lu. He soon acquired control over the Red River Delta and made it part of his newly-proclaimed Nan Yue Kingdom. After another Han army defeated Zhao's successor in 111 B.C.E., effective Chinese rule was established, not only over the Red River delta area (i.e. Jiaozhi/Giao Chỉ), but also over the northern part of central Vietnam today (Jiuzhen/Cửu Chân and Rinan/Nhật Nam).[21]

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18 This is one of Victor Lieberman's main arguments that explain similar state formation patterns in Southeast Asia and Western Europe. See Lieberman (2011: 5-25).

19 Lieberman (2003: 27-28) also makes this point. Scott (2009) argues that this topography makes it difficult for low-land states to control and govern people in the highlands ("zomia"), but my argument here is about the difficulty to form a single state among various polities.

20 Hall 1992:188. For a perceptive examination of the Yue/Việt identity and its representations in early Chinese sources, see Brindley, *Ancient China and the Yue*.

21 For a discussion of the conquest of the Red River Delta in the context of imperial expansion under Qin and Han dynasties, see Chang 2007, v. 1: 52-53. See also Brindley 2015: 92-101.

The imperial government was based in the area around Hanoi today, in the middle of the Red River delta. Over time, Han migrants intermarried with native people and created a distinct Han-Viet group in the delta. This group may have spoken a version of Middle Chinese together with a language called Proto-Viet-Muong that was predominant among native lowland population (Taylor 2013: 5, 25). From this group emerged many powerful families or kin groups which participated in the imperial administration and dominated local governments.

Imperial rule faced many revolts not only in Giao Chỉ, but all over the Southern frontier (Guangxi, Cửu Chân, and Nhật Nam). In the second century CE, a new Indianized kingdom called Lin-yi in Chinese sources was founded in Nhật Nam on the southernmost border of the empire. From then on Lin-yi became "the chronic adversary" for Red River delta inhabitants, probing, plundering, and appropriating territories in the frontier districts of the empire (Taylor 2013: 28). During the sixth and seventh centuries, Lin-yi was absorbed by other Indianized polities further south,[22] but the threat remained. Raids on Giao Chỉ came from as far as the Java-based Sailendra kingdom. The ninth century saw the rise of Nanzhao, a Tai kingdom located in today's Yunnan and a tributary state of the Tibetan empire. Nanzhao posed a major threat to Tang rule throughout Guangxi, Guangdong, and Giao Chỉ (Backus 1981).

Above was the violent context confronting the inhabitants of the Red River Delta under imperial rule. Table 1 below lists the known revolts and conflicts involving Red River Delta and other peripheral polities along the Chinese frontier on mainland Southeast Asia. Many anti-imperial revolts were recorded in the 1,000 years during which Giao Chỉ was under northern rule, but they accounted for only a fraction of the period. At the same time, there were many conflicts between Red River Delta people and other frontier groups. Ever since the rise of Lin-yi in the late second century, and likely even before that, Giao Chỉ people had been exposed to the threat from those groups.

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22 These were called Hwan-wang and Funan in Chinese sources.

Table 1: Patterns of conflict in the Red River Delta under Chinese rule (219 BC-938 AD)

Dynasty or Period	Viet revolts against Chinese rule or war among frontier polities on China's southern frontier	Years of revolts
219 BCE: Giao Chỉ est.		
207-111 BCE: Triệu dynasty 192 CE: Linyi (Lâm Ấp) est.	207-196 BCE, 185-180 BCE, 115?-111 BCE 40-43 CE: Trưng sisters 100: Nhật nam 137: Khu Liên 144 Cửu Chân 157: Chu Đạt 178-182: Lương Long	22 4 1 2 1? 1? 4
	245-248 Lady Triệu 248: Linyi's victory 263-271: Lữ Hưng	4 1 7
Funan (Phù Nam) emerged	344, 347: Linyi's attacks on Giao Chỉ	?
	468: Lý Trường Nhân 542-547: Lý Bí 543: Lý Bí fought Linyi 571?-603: Lý Phật Tử	1 6 32?
	Chenla annexed Funan	
	650?: Linyi (Hoàn vương) annexed by Chenla 685-687: Lý Tử Tiên 722: Mai Thúc Loan 767: Sailendra's raid 791-798?: Phùng Hưng 819-820?: Dương Thanh 862-865: Nanzhao's invasion	 2 ? 1 8? 3 3
	938: Ngô Quyền's victory over Southern Han	1

Sources: Taylor (1983); Lê Mạnh Hùng, 'Nhìn Lại Sử Việt' [Re-examining Vietnamese History], v. 1 (Arlington, VA: Tổ Hợp Xuất Bản Miền Đông Hoa Kỳ, 2012)

Broadly speaking, a *positive synergy* existed between the northern empire and Giao Chỉ. When the empire was strong, Giao Chỉ was at peace. When the empire was weak, broken, or preoccupied by other issues, Giao Chỉ was, following a lag period, frequently in turmoil. Part of the disorder was caused by local efforts to assert autonomy or independence. The revolt by the Trưng sisters took place in the early and chaotic years of the Eastern Han dynasty. The pattern was repeated with Lý Bí in the mid-sixth century, Mai Thúc Loan and Phùng Hưng in the late eighth century, and Ngô Quyền in the tenth century—all periods of great instability in the empire.

Nationalistic historiography has touted these revolts as evidence of the existence of "Vietnamese" people's exceptional passion for independence. Yet there are other more plausible explanations, if one takes into account the fact that the Red River delta people, prior to developing their own ability to self-rule, did not have a single identity nor even spoke a single language (Taylor 2014: 4-5). They often had to choose whether being imperial subjects or being ruled by other polities on the frontier. Revolt against the empire was not an

automatic action in many cases. As Keith Taylor describes the dynamic of center-local interaction under Han dynasty that may well have applied for other periods:

> In spite of the many shortcomings of the Han regime in [Giao Chỉ], it was nonetheless remarkably stable for nearly a century. When Han power began to decline, the first symptom in the south was not rebellion, but rather a deteriorating frontier. A series of invasions and frontier uprisings strained the administration beyond its capacity; this stimulated internal unrest and encouraged a spirit of insubordination (Taylor 1983: 59).

The dynamics of the revolts suggested that the Han-Viet families that ruled Giao Chỉ under the Han dynasty did not rise up to challenge imperial rule because they desired independence. More likely, they were forced to fend for themselves as the empire was descending into chaos after a long period of stability.

Nationalist historiography similarly cannot explain the failure of Giao Chỉ people to cooperate with other frontier groups to challenge northern rule. If these people had been so antagonistic toward the empire, they must have banded together against the big bully to the North. There were in fact attempts at cooperation which ended in failure. One was the revolt led by Mai Thúc Loan in 722 CE under Tang rule. This self-named "Black Emperor" was from Hoan prefecture, which was located on the edge of the imperial frontier adjacent to Lin-yi. Mai Thúc Loan rallied people from "thirty-two provinces" and from as far south as the Mekong delta and took brief control of Giao Chỉ, now called An Nam Protectorate. The revolt was supported by anti-Tang sentiments in the Protectorate but involved significant plundering activities which may have caused it not "to occupy a prominent place in the traditions of the Vietnamese people," in the words of Taylor (Taylor 1983: 192).

A more significant attempt at cooperation emerged during the Nanzhao war, which was one of the most prolonged and devastating wars during northern rule over Giao Chỉ.[23] In this war, anti-Tang groups in Giao Chỉ cooperated with Nanzhao forces to expel the Tang governor from Giao Chỉ. But Nanzhao's brief rule, which was marked by plunder and violence, turned a large number of people into refugees hiding in caves and forests. Many Giao Chỉ people thus welcomed the return of Tang rule under Gao Pian whose army was sent to defeat Nanzhao forces. As Taylor notes, "[such Vietnamese efforts] to join with their neighbors against the Chinese failed in part because the Vietnamese realized that they could tolerate the avarice of their Chinese patrons more easily than they could the violence and unreliability of their non-Chinese allies."[24]

Of course, over time, after each dynastic collapse in the north and each attempt by Giao Chỉ people to defend themselves during the ensuing chaos, they gradually became more confident of their own ability. This confidence accumulated just as imperial rulers became frustrated over time with all the troubles involved in maintaining control over the remote southern frontier. As Charles Holcombe argues, "[by the Tang dynasty], the Empire found it difficult and increasingly not worthwhile to project continuous effective administrative power into this awkward and remote salient" (Holcombe 2001: 162). That was how eventually Giao Chỉ became independent.

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23 Taylor 1983: 239-49. See also Backus 1981: 135-45.

24 Taylor 1983: 194. Despite his perceptive and nuanced view of the relationship between the Han empire and Giao Chỉ as cited above, Taylor's first book published in 1983 still follows broadly the nationalist narrative.

A final piece of evidence against the nationalist narrative is the fact that most revolts against northern rule were led or initiated by Han or Han-Viet imperial officials (Zhao To, Lữ Hưng, Lương Thạc, Lý Bí, and Ngô Quyền), not by ordinary native people with no links to the imperial government. There is no way to ascertain the motivations of those officials in launching such revolts, which certainly included elements of self-confidence as well as the need to defend themselves in times of imperial chaos. At the same time, one may wonder why they worked for the empire when it was strong and stable, but revolted only when it was disintegrating. Their revolts clearly had elements of opportunism (Holcombe 2001: 148-9, 157). Of course, when a new imperial dynasty was established, it would reassert its control, and the usurping officials would be punished. Zhao To's successor, Lữ Hưng, Lương Thạc, and Lý Bí all ended up being chased away or killed by returning northern forces. Ngô Quyền escaped the fate of his predecessors not only because he was militarily more successful, but also because he arose at the time when the decline of the northern empire was not simply a dynastic affair, but a long term trend in which the empire was either divided or fell under one nomadic group after another for hundreds of years.

Vietnam from self-rule to the modern era, 938-1884

Ngô Quyền has been credited in official and nationalist Vietnamese history with ushering in the period of "Vietnamese" independence from "Chinese" rule. Yet the "Chinese" in that account was not the Tang emperor but Liu Yan (or Liu Gong), a regional warlord with royal pretensions who founded his kingdom on the southeastern frontier as the Tang empire collapsed.[25] Viewed from the perspective of the frontier, Ngô Quyền's emergence represented the continuity of a long-established pattern rather than a sharp break with the past as depicted in nationalist accounts. The collapse of the Tang once again forced the Han-Viet elites in An Nam to protect themselves against other groups on the frontier, of whom Liu Yan was not the only one.[26]

The Champa kingdom, a successor state to Lin-yi which emerged around the eighth century, had been a major threat to An Nam while it was still under Tang rule. Champa's regular raids for plunder and labor would continue to threaten An Nam/Đại Việt over the next seven centuries (Hall 1992: 259; Holcombe 2001: 159-60). The Darwinist survival-of-the-fittest rule best described the relationship between Đại Việt and Champa, its archrival on the frontier. The history of this relationship was one of raids and counter-raids. After the fourteenth century Đại Việt emerged as the stronger party and sought to manipulate Champa's court politics. Eventually entire Champa was annexed into Đại Việt by the sixteenth century.

More threats for Đại Việt existed beyond Champa. Around the eleventh century, the powerful Khmer empire that built the Angkor complex emerged in the lower Mekong delta area. By the thirteenth century, the Mongols conquered Dali Kingdom (successor to Nanzhao), pushing many Tai communities further south. These communities soon created scattered Tai polities in the upper Mekong River and around the Chao Phraya River basins such as Lan Xang and Ayutthaya.

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25 This was the "Southern Han" regime based in Guangdong (AD 917-971).
26 For the battle between Ngô Quyền and Southern Han's army, see Taylor 2013: 45-6.

Đại Việt's relationship with the Tai and Khmer kingdoms to its west was less brutal and did not end with complete annexation. Lan Xang (today's Laos) was protected from Đại Việt by natural barriers, and Đại Việt rulers were content with Lan Xang kings paying tributes. Another Tai polity named Bon Man was less fortunate and was annexed into Đại Việt at around the sixteenth century (Li 2010: 83-103). The Khmers did not come to share border with Đại Việt until the sixteenth century. Over the next two centuries, Vietnamese settlers in the eastern part of the Khmer kingdom enabled the Nguyễn lords of Đại Việt to claim sovereignty over that territory. While the Khmer kingdom retained its western part, it was reduced to Đại Việt's protectorate by the early nineteenth century (Chandler 2008: 142-61; Woodside 1971: 246-55).

The frequent conflicts Đại Việt had with other frontier states dwarfed the few wars it had with the Chinese empire, as Table 2 below indicates. To be sure, Ming emperor Yongle occupied Đại Việt for twenty years (1406-1428) with the intention of making it Ming's permanent territory. Viewed in the longer perspective, that seemed to be an isolated case. If the Song, Ming, and Qing had posed a constant threat to their survival, Đại Việt rulers would not have been able to devote that much energy to conquer and dominate other frontier states. In fact, it is possible to argue that an important factor in Đại Việt's successful conquests and annexations was the imperial tributary system that preserved peace and stability on Đại Việt's northern border so that it could turn all its attention southward.[27] Đại Việt was not destined to dominate mainland Southeast Asia though. Li Tana argues that it was not until the fifteenth century when Đại Việt developed effective capacity to defeat Champa and Lan Xang (Li 2010). Sun Laichen believes that Đại Việt rulers were able to do so thanks in part to the military technology they borrowed from the north during the twenty years when Đại Việt was under Ming rule (1406-1428) (Sun 2010).

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27 On Vietnam's tributary relations with China, nationalist historiography has depicted them as a means for Vietnamese to avoid Chinese invasion. Yet a study of envoy poetry by Liam Kelley shows that southern elites were genuinely proud of being part of the Sinic civilization. David Kang similarly argues that the tributary system was instrumental in preserving peace and stability in Chinese relationship with Korea, Japan, and Đại Việt. See Kelley 2005; Kang: 2010.

Table 2: Patterns of conflict involving independent Vietnam (938 AD-present)

Dynasty or Period	Wars against China (A)	Wars among Viets or with frontier entities or outside powers (B)	Rough ratio of A/B
938-944: Ngô Quyền 945-967: warlords 968-979: Đinh Bộ Lĩnh 979-1009: Early Lê dynasty	980: war with Song	982: Lê Hoàn's raid on Champa	1/1 yr
1009-1224: Lý dynasty	1075-77: war with Song over border control	1038-1052: Nùng rebellion 1043-44: Viet's raid on Champa 1069: Viet's raid on Champa	3/16
1225-1399: Trần dynasty 1350s: Lan Xang (Laos) est.	1258, 1285, 1287: wars with Mongols 1282-84: Mongols' invasion of Champa	1292, 1294, 1297, 1334, 1335, 1346: Viet's wars with Bo Man & Lan Xang 1312, 1318, 1326, 1352-53: Viet's raids on Champa 1366-68, 1371, 1377, 1378, 1383, 1389-90: Champa's raids on Viet	4/16
1400-06: Hồ dynasty 1406-28: Ming's occupation of Viet 1428-1526: Lê dynasty 1527-92: Mạc dynasty	1406: Ming's invasion of Viet 1407-13: Later Trần revolt 1418-1428: Lê Lợi's revolt	1400, 1402, 1404: Viet's raids on Champa 1427-32, 1437: Tai rebellions 1479: war with Lan Xang 1441, 1444, 1446, 1469, 1470-71: wars with Champa 1516-21: Trần Cao rebellion 1545-92: Mạc-Trịnh war	17/65
1592-1786: Lê-Trịnh 1558-1777: Nguyễn 1786-1802: Tây Sơn's rule 1802-1945: Nguyễn dynasty	1789: Tây Sơn war with Qing	1627-1672: Trịnh-Nguyễn war (11 yrs) 1653, 1692-4: raids on Champa 1623, 1658, 1674, 1688-90, 1699-1700, 1706, 1717, 1747, 1753, 1755, 1757: wars with Khmer kingdom 1740-51:Large peasant rebellions 1771-1802: Tây Sơn-Trịnh-Nguyễn war 1784: Tây Sơn war with Siam 1858-84: war with France	1/67
1884-1945: French colonial rule 1945-1975: DRV 1949-1975: RVN 1976: SRV	1979-88: war with China	1945-46: Civil war 1959-75: Civil war & DRV's war with Lao royal government 1965-73: DRV's war with the U.S. 1970-75: DRV's war with Lon Nol government 1977-89: war with the Khmer Rouge	9/29
Total			35/194

Sources: Taylor (2013); Lê Mạnh Hùng, 'Nhìn Lại Sử Việt' [Re-examining Vietnamese History], vols. 1, 2 & 3 (Arlington, VA: Tổ Hợp Xuất Bản Miền Đông Hoa Kỳ, 2012)

Table 2 shows that, while the Middle Kingdom remained the hegemon in the region, it was never the only, or even the most frequent, concern for Đại Việt. After Ngô Quyền, every Vietnamese dynasty spent more time attacking or coping with raids from further south and

sometimes west, than dealing with the northern empire. One would miss much of the picture if neglecting the frontier context facing Đại Việt rulers.

Besides aiding Đại Việt indirectly, Chinese regimes also offered direct protection for those Việt elites who sought it to cope with threats *from other Việt elites*. A particular pattern of domestic conflict among the elites in Đại Việt that sometimes involved the Chinese empire was between the elites based in the Red River Delta and those whose base of power was in Thanh Hóa in north central Vietnam or from further south. These rival elites obviously had partisan motivations for requesting Chinese protection and assistance, although their claims were often made on the basis of communal interests or Heaven's mandate.

For example, descendants of Trần kings asked the Ming emperor for help after they were dethroned by Hồ Quý Ly in 1400. Hồ came from Thanh Hóa and it was not a coincidence that he moved the capital there rather than relying on the Red River Delta's elite which was still loyal to the Trần dynasty (Whitmore 1985: 44-5). Nearly two centuries later, in late sixteenth century, the Ming court intervened again to protect the Mạc rulers after they had been defeated and expelled from their power base in the Red River Delta by the Thanh Hóa-based Trịnh lords (Taylor 1998: 957). The pattern was repeated in late eighteenth century when the Tây Sơn warlords from the area which is today's south central Vietnam marched into the Red River Delta and threatened the rule of King Lê Duy Khiêm (a.k.a. Lê Chiêu Thống). The King's mother requested intervention by the Qing Emperor, who sent in an army from Guangdong (Taylor 2013: 378). Lê Duy Khiêm was not a lone monarch representing a hated dynasty but had significant support from the elites in the Red River Delta.

By the seventeenth century, the southern frontier of the Chinese empire had attracted several European powers. The Dutch and the French played not insignificant roles in the civil wars between Trịnh, Nguyễn, and Tây Sơn lords (Taylor 2013: 290-5). In the face of the rising threat from the French in the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese protection was again called for. Nguyễn rulers begged Beijing for help, only to see China humiliated at the hands of the French (Brocheux and Hemery 2009: 43-6). Nationalist historiography in Vietnam today portrays Chinese interventions as "foreign invasions" while ignoring the inconvenient fact that many such invasions came from the requests of a significant component of Vietnamese elites.

The above examples suggested that Đại Việt rulers' behavior toward the North exhibited dependency in times of crisis when their power and privileges were threatened by their domestic enemies. In contrast, at times when their power was rising, some rulers boldly expressed their own imperial ambitions. The Lý's invasion of Nanning in 1075-1077 was such an occasion. At the time, the power of Đại Việt was rising while that of the Song dynasty was ebbing. Song rulers were besieged on three fronts by nomadic empires: the Liao empire of the Khitans, the Hsia empire of the Tanguts in the northwest, and the Jurchen empire of the Jin on the northeast (Rossabi 1983: 1-13). Militarily weak, Song was forced to pay tribute to all three in return for peace. Song did not threaten at all the survival of Đại Việt, but Lý monarchs wanted to expand their control over the northeastern frontier and retake territories from the tribes along the border that had recently switched their loyalty to the Song emperor (Anderson 2007). Nationalist narratives present the Lý's raid on Nanning as a preemptive attack in anticipation of a Chinese invasion, but earlier Đại Việt had in fact sought to challenge Song superiority in the border area. The fact that the attack was launched

deep inside imperial territory suggested the unambiguous ambitions of Lý monarchs as they saw an opportunity to take on the northern giant.

Another example of imperial ambitions involved Nguyễn Ánh, the man who founded the Nguyễn dynasty. By the mid-eighteenth century, Đại Việt had fully annexed Champa and was providing "protection" to Chenla (today's Cambodia) (Taylor 2013: 413-5). Đại Việt's southern border had reached the southern tip of the Indochinese peninsular. After frequent warfare with Lan Xang to the west and Chenla to the southwest, Đại Việt's western frontier had expanded far enough to pose a direct threat to Siam (today's Thailand). Nguyễn Ánh had just defeated the Tây Sơn warlords and established a single government over the now-expanded country for the first time. In 1802, after coming to the throne, Ánh sent an emissary to Beijing asking to acknowledge his new country under the name Nan Yue (Nam Việt).

Ánh's intention in choosing this name was to show that his new realm was different from and much larger than its predecessors. As Liam Kelley argues, "[u]ltimately, the name Việt Nam is related to the Nguyễn clan's southward expansion of the Lê Dynasty realm. What it signifies is that the Nguyễn created and ruled over something bigger than An Nam. It is a recognition of imperial expansion."[28] To the Qing emperor and his advisors, the name recalled Nan Yue (207-111 BCE), the kingdom founded by Zhao To, that included Guangxi and Guangdong. Suspicious of Ánh's motives, they rejected his request. Yet Ánh insisted and threatened to cut off relations if the name was not accepted (Baldanza 2016). Eventually the Qing proposed Yue Nan (Việt Nam), a compromise which Ánh accepted.

Similar to the centuries when Giao Chỉ was under northern rule, as an independent kingdom Đại Việt enjoyed a *positive synergy* with the Chinese empire in the sense that a stable empire in the north allowed Đại Việt to direct all its energies against its frontier rivals. The history of this period shows that the Chinese empire was generally a benevolent big brother of Đại Việt except in two situations: the empire was either too weak or two strong. When it was too weak (late Song), it fell under nomadic rulers (Mongols) who sought to dominate Đại Việt. When the empire was too strong (Ming), Chinese rulers themselves sought to subjugate Đại Việt. These were the only conditions under which "China" may have threatened the survival of "Vietnam."

Modern Vietnam as a shadow hegemon

The international order in East Asia underwent violent ruptures for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. European powers rolled back Chinese hegemony and eventually helped destroy the Chinese empire. European colonialism conquered territories just like traditional empires, but claimed a different kind of civilizing mission based on Judeo-Roman values. These empires, including the Japanese empire, all fell apart at the end of World War II, eventually replaced by nation-states. However, it is not difficult to observe many contemporary parallels of the old imperial order in East Asia.

The widespread acceptance of national self-determination as principles governing international relations has made imperial conquests rarer. Nevertheless, traces of imperial domination persist. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States backed rival

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28 Personal communication. See also Kelley 2005: 114-6.

ideological regimes in the region. The civilizing mission for the communist camp was the spread of Marxist-Leninist proletarian class struggle; that for the U.S.-led camp was Western capitalism and democracy.[29] Communist China was at first a secondary power to the Soviet Union, but rose to challenge it in the 1960s (Chen 2001; Radchenko 2009). Since then, China has reemerged as a regional hegemon, battling Soviet and American influences in the region through its own client communist regimes or factions within ruling parties.[30]

Granted, new states from Indonesia to China are more centralized regimes than the traditional empires that preceded them. However, imperial patterns of behavior were apparent in the process by which they were formed. The reunification of China was quite similar to the traditional process of imperial making: the Republican and later communist armies established their rule through step-by-step military conquests of territories controlled by their rivals. Taking advantage of faltering colonial empires, Indonesia attempted to annex Malaysia in 1963 (unsuccessfully) and East Timor in 1975 (successfully for two decades). Similarly, communist parties in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia successfully expanded their control through military conquests. In the process North Vietnam not only annexed South Vietnam but also gained great influence over Laos and Cambodia. For decades, a sizable Vietnamese force was stationed in Laos, and for a decade in the 1980s, Vietnam was the behind-the-scene ruler of Cambodia.[31] Thus, the evolution of the regional order in East Asia has not completely departed from the era of traditional empires and shadow empires. Indeed, the boundaries of most new states have not changed much from the early modern imperial era. Even though empires no longer exist, they appear to have morphed into hegemons and shadow hegemons.

Below I will take a closer look at the evolution of modern Vietnam as a shadow hegemon.[32] In the modern period, China played an important role in Vietnam, but other states along the violent frontier were just as important. Except for the decade of the 1980s, China was in fact the protector, not the bully, of Vietnam. China's assistance was crucial for Vietnam to achieve its hegemony over Indochina and beyond. As in the case with premodern Đại Việt, not just survival needs but the ambitions of some Vietnamese leaders were a key factor that drove the modern hegemonic project.

The nationalist movement emerged in Vietnam at the turn of the century, aiming to gain independence from French rule. To Vietnamese nationalists, France was the threat to Vietnam's survival as a nation, while other countries, including China, Japan, and the United States, were allies.[33] Among anticolonial groups, Vietnamese communists came late on the scene but embraced a distinctively radical vision. In their thought, Vietnam and all other colonized and semi-colonized countries shared the threat of imperialism (Huynh 1982; Vu 2017, chapter 1). French colonialism was merely a component of global imperialism, and the fate of Vietnam was to be decided in part in the proletariat's global struggle against

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29 See Westad 2010.

30 On Sino-Soviet relations in the 1970s and 1980s, see Chen 2001; Whiting 1984: 142-55. For more recent situation, see Sutter 2005; Shambaugh 2005; and Storey 2011.

31 For a similar view of Indonesia and Vietnam as regional hegemons, see Emmer 2005: 645-66. On Vietnam's occupation and hegemony over Cambodia in the 1980s, see Clayton 1999: 341-63; Clayton 2000: 109-24.

32 I acknowledge the French contribution to the hegemonic position of Vietnam in Indochina today but do not dwell on colonial legacies due to space constraint. For the seminal work on this topic, see Goscha 2012.

33 A standard survey of this period is Marr 1981.

capitalism and imperialism. In that struggle, Vietnam had to confront not just foreign imperialist powers but also domestic reactionary classes. These classes posed as much a threat to Vietnam's road to socialism as did their foreign backers.

The communists embraced both national and class identities (Huynh 1982). To them, the bonds among peasants and workers across national borders were just as salient as the distinctions between Chinese, Khmers, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Thais. It was thus appropriate that the Comintern agent Lý Thụy (a.k.a. Hồ Chí Minh) participated in the social revolution in southern China, organized ethnic Vietnamese in northeastern Siam, and assisted in the founding of the Siamese and Malay communist parties (Quinn-Judge 2002, esp. 86-9; Goscha 1999). By the late 1940s, when Hồ Chí Minh led the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in a war against France, the secret Indochinese Communist Party had many Laotian and Cambodian members besides Vietnamese ones (Englebert and Goscha 1995).

France was the main threat to Vietnam then, and China played little role in the struggle (except for a brief period during 1945-1946 when Nationalist China stationed troops in North Vietnam to disarm Japanese forces).[34] This soon changed. After Chinese communists took control of mainland China in 1949, the DRV quickly turned to them for protection and assistance.[35] Vietnamese communists enthusiastically accepted the ideological and policy guidance from Soviet and Chinese communists, enshrining Stalin and Mao Zedong Thought in the party constitution. Hundreds of children of top government leaders were sent to China and later to the Soviet Union for education (Hồ 2004). At the same time, Chinese advisors labored to reorganize the Vietnamese communist party along class line and to launch a radical land reform (Qiang 2000, chapter 1). In the imagination of Vietnamese communist leaders, Vietnam had become the "outpost" of the socialist bloc centered in Moscow. This bloc acting through China offered great assistance to communist Vietnam in the anti-French war as well as protected it from possible American intervention.

At Geneva in 1954, the DRV accepted a temporary border on the 17th parallel in return for French withdrawal from Vietnam.[36] This line of demarcation would soon become a fortified border dividing North Vietnam from the South where an anticommunist regime was established in Saigon with the backing of the U.S. and its Southeast Asian allies. The Geneva Agreements also committed the DRV to suspending their support for communist revolutions in Laos and Cambodia and to acknowledging the independence of royal governments there (Asselin 2007: 95-126).

After deciding in 1959 to launch the war against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in South Vietnam to gain control of the entire country, the DRV resumed support for Lao communists, paving the way for a client communist state there (Goscha 2004: 141-85). In Cambodia, the DRV tried throughout the 1960s to maintain good relations with the Sihanouk regime while offering some support to Cambodian communists (Englebert and Goscha 2004: 101-70; Morris 1999, chapter 1). When Lon Nol overthrew King Sihanouk in 1970, the DRV gave Cambodian communists all the support it could muster. They now shared the same goal of overthrowing "imperialist" rule in Phnom Penh and Saigon, which they achieved in April 1975.

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34 See Tønnesson 2010).

35 Qiang 2000: 10-20. See also Goscha 2000: 987-1018; and Nguyễn 2013: 53-5.

36 The best account of this event is Asselin 2013.

Throughout the period above, some tension existed between the DRV and its Chinese protector, but China was never a threat. Rather, the primary threat was the U.S. and its Asian allies, including the Saigon regime. By 1975, communist Vietnam dominated Indochina (Chanda 1986). Lao leaders appeared content, but top Cambodian communists like Pol Pot who had long resented Vietnamese domination were about to challenge Vietnamese hegemony. Vietnam may have permitted Cambodia to go its own way if it did not threaten Vietnam. When Pol Pot and his Cambodian comrades did so with the support of a hostile China, Vietnam responded with an invasion of Cambodia.[37]

Initially the invasion appeared to have been the last resort by Vietnam to cope with a serious Cambodian and Chinese threat. With the success of the invasion, Hanoi then took the opportunity to occupy Cambodia for a decade (Chanda 1986). During 1978-1988, as Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia continued, China was an enemy and threat to Vietnam—*for the first time in the modern era*. Vietnam's hegemonic ambitions were challenged not only by China and Cambodia, but also by nearly all Southeast Asian states along the southern frontier of China. These states collaborated through the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to support the deposed Khmer Rouge in their protracted fight against Vietnam's domination (Ciorciari 2010: 72-83).

As in the premodern period, modern Sino-Vietnamese conflict turned out to be relatively brief compared to the periods of peace and collaboration between the two communist states. By the late 1980s, as the Soviet bloc collapsed, Vietnam suddenly found itself threatened by imperialism. While Vietnamese leaders admitted that Beijing was chauvinist, it was nonetheless a socialist regime that Hanoi could count on as one of a few communist allies left on earth.[38] That was how Beijing became Hanoi's comrade again, for the following two decades. Not until in the last few years did Sino-Vietnamese relations take a bad turn and became tense (Vu 2014: 33-66). Many Hanoi leaders still feel the need for Chinese protection against imperialist plots to subvert the regime. Of course, they claim that Vietnam has no future but socialism, and for that to happen, comradeship with socialist China is not only rational but also necessary.[39] Nevertheless, it is clear that regime survival, not national survival, is at stake.

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37 For a recent study, see Westad and Quinn-Judge (eds) 2006.

38 Trần Quang Cơ, "Hồi Ức và Suy Nghĩ" [Memories and Thoughts] (July 2005). Trần Quang Cơ was a deputy foreign minister in the late 1980s. In explaining Vietnam's move to restore a closer relationship with China, David Elliott considers security as the primary factor, arguing that, "without the Soviet Union as a counterbalancing superpower patron Vietnam could not afford to persist in its open defiance of its giant neighbor, China. In addition, … Vietnam [needed] to preserve some elements of the old "fraternal friendship" among socialist countries [especially with an important country like China] in order to validate its own continued adherence to Marxism-Leninism as the central organizing principle of its political regime" (Elliott 2012: 88). However, the fact is that Vietnam had already wanted to restore relations with China since late 1986 after Le Duan's death when the Soviet Union was still around. Furthermore, restoring relations was totally different from proposing to form an anti-imperialist alliance with China, which suggested that ideology rather than security was the primary factor. Vu 2017, esp. 249, 252.

39 On Hanoi leaders' pledge to be loyal to socialism, see the Vietnamese Communist Party's latest program: "Cuong linh xay dung dat nuoc trong thoi ky qua do len Chu nghia xa hoi" [Program to build the country in transition to socialism] (March 2011). Available at http://123.30.190.43:8080/tiengviet/tulieuvankien/vankiendang/details.asp?topic=191&subtopic=8&leader_topic=989&id=BT531160562. On the general attitude of a top Vietnamese leader toward China, see Minister of Defense Gen. Phùng Quang Thanh's uncanny comment on December 29, 2015 that "the inclination to hate

Since the 1990s, Vietnam has turned inward to revive its economy and society exhausted after decades of war and mistaken socialist policies. Vietnam's hegemony over Indochina has weakened significantly and may end in the future. Despite that uncertainty, it should be clear by now the parallels between modern Vietnam as a shadow hegemon and the premodern Đại Việt empire. During the process by which the Vietnamese hegemon emerged, China played a prominent role as a protector, not a nemesis. Under China's protective umbrella even more than in the premodern past, Vietnamese communists turned south to expand their power, first all over Vietnam, then all over Indochina. To them, China was the guarantor of Vietnam's survival needs, and other states on the frontier were threats.

There is yet another interesting parallel between premodern Đại Việt and modern Vietnam: the imperial or hegemonic ambitions of some Vietnamese leaders. During the Vietnam War, as the American global hegemon fought with the Chinese regional hegemon, it appeared that Vietnam became the victim for being caught in the periphery between the two blocks. This is in fact the central theme of much nationalist historiography. Recently declassified archival documents show that it was not that simple. As seen below, Vietnamese communism depended heavily on Moscow and Beijing for support but that did not prevent ambitious Hanoi leaders from imagining themselves as the center of the camp.

In the early days, both Chinese and Vietnamese communists were sincere in their collaboration, which they viewed as a revolutionary brotherhood, not the old imperial or tributary relations. China, and later North Vietnam, also provided assistance to communist "brothers" in Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Lim and Vani 1984). The revolutionary brotherhood was supposedly based on egalitarian and proletarian internationalism, but it did contain an implicit hierarchy even in its early days. The Soviet Union, the birthplace of the first communist and most powerful state, occupied the leadership position. China, with its large territory and population, was second. Communist North Vietnamese ranked third for at least having control of a small state. Below these three were communist parties and movements elsewhere in the region which were still struggling to seize state power. Despite the implicit hierarchy, the brotherhood seemed to mark a fundamental departure from the old imperial days. Following Stalin's death, Khrushchev's controversial policies created schisms throughout the entire communist movement worldwide in the 1960s (Brzezinski 1967). In East Asia, China openly challenged Soviet leadership, forcing all peripheral communist parties to choose between the "Eldest Brother" and "Second Brother."[40] Mao's quarrel with Khrushchev and his leadership over the chaotic and violent Cultural Revolution dimmed his own prestige in Hanoi (Path 2011). Beijing attempted to create a new communist camp under its leadership but Hanoi refused to go along while continuing to receive material support from both China and the Soviet Union.[41]

As early as 1963, some Vietnamese leaders, most prominently Lê Duẩn, had displayed in private their contempt for Mao. In his meeting with Mao in mid-1963 in Beijing, Duẩn was said to have been offended when Mao declared his willingness to take his army south to help

China is dangerous for the [Vietnamese] nation." See http://www.hoangsa.org/f/threads/xu-th-ghet-trung-quc-nguy-him-cho-dan-tc.1556/ [original article on official website *thanhtra.gov.vn* has been removed].

40 For a recent account of the topic, see Luthi 2008.

41 See Trần Quỳnh, "Mấy kỷ niệm về Lê Duẩn" [Memories about Lê Duẩn]. Trần Quỳnh was Chief of Staff of the Central Party Office and a confidante of Le Duan.

liberate Southeast Asia.[42] Duẩn's sentiment can be interpreted not only as reflecting Vietnamese ancient fears of Chinese domination, but also as a sign of rivalry between the two leaders. On the same occasion, Duẩn was reportedly scornful of Mao's claim that the landlords were back in power in China by marrying off their daughters to village cadres.[43] Duẩn also expressed contempt for Chinese communists' theoretical ability and revolutionary experience on other occasions. He repeatedly, if obliquely, belittled Chinese revolutionary experiences in his political reports. He ridiculed the legendary Chinese Long March by calling it the strategy of "running around" [*trường chinh chạy quanh*] instead of confronting the enemy.[44] He dismissed Mao's theory of three stages in guerrilla warfare as irrelevant and inferior to his own strategy of "three kinds of forces."[45] On the eve of the Tet Offensive in 1968, Duẩn told the Central Committee that,

> Had we just copied [foreign models] we would not have won the war [thus far] against half a million American troops. [Our strategy] is different from and even contrary to Chinese and Soviet [models]….Recently I talked to some Chinese comrades that our units in the delta were no larger than two combined battalions but were able to destroy one whole American battalion. In one case four of our soldiers attacked nine American warships armed with 100 big guns. Those [Chinese] comrades had no clue…Four soldiers did the job of a division and suffered no casualties—how strange [it was to them]![46]

With the daring communist attacks in the Tết Offensive in South Vietnam, the international prestige of Vietnamese communism soared at the same time as world opinion turned dramatically against the U.S.[47] Earlier Vietnamese leaders had thought of themselves as merely occupying an outpost of the socialist bloc. Now they began to imagine themselves as being on the frontier and the vanguard of world revolution. On the Anniversary of Karl Marx's 100th birthday in May 1968, Trường Chinh wrote that "Vietnam is proud of leading the [global] offensive against imperialism. Because the U.S. is using Vietnam as a laboratory for all of its war strategies and modern weapons, the world's people have much to learn from Vietnam how to defeat those strategies and weapons." [48]

   After the Paris Agreements, Hanoi became overwhelmed with pride. Lê Duẩn went so far as dismissing China as a hegemon in a speech to high-ranking cadres in 1974: "The Chinese revolution was a big event because it brought a quarter of mankind into socialism, but essentially it was a civil war to solve internal antagonisms in Chinese society. Vietnam is a

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42 Ibid. Also, "Le Duan and the Break with China" 2001: 281.

43 Landlord status is theoretically defined by ownership of land and the hiring of labor, not by marital relationship.

44 See "Bai noi cua dong chi Le Duan … tai Hoi nghi lan thu 12 cua Trung uong" [Comrade Le Duan's speech at the 12th Central Committee Plenum], December 1965. Dang Cong San Viet Nam, *Van Kien Dang Toan Tap* (hereafter *VKDTT*), v. 26 (Hanoi, Chinh tri Quoc gia, 2002), 597.

45 This referred to the organization of revolutionary forces in three different terrains: division-level main forces for the mountainous regions, battalion-level forces for the delta, and militias for urban centers.

46 "Bai noi cua dong chi Le Duan tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 14" [Comrade Le Duan's speech at the 14th Central Committee Plenum], January 1968. *VKDTT* v. 29, 19.

47 See Turley 2009: 137-58.

48 Truong 1968: September 1968, 1-12 and October 1968, 10-27, 45-52.

small country, but in our war against the Americans, our country has become the place that embodies all the fundamental antagonisms of the world."[49]

The victory in 1975 brought to communist Vietnam the greatest admiration from its fans and greatest fear from its foes. Hanoi leaders began to speak in language befitting a hegemon. In his speech at the Party's 25th Central Committee Plenum in late 1976, Lê Duẩn boasted:

> Our victory over imperialist America created conditions for Laotian and Cambodian revolutions to triumph, opening the path to socialism for them. In the history of [world] proletarian revolution, thus far only the Soviet Union could liberate itself and some other countries [in the process]. It is a very special honor for Vietnam today to have performed that deed.[50]

In the fall of 1975, Lê Duẩn led a delegation to visit to Moscow and many Eastern European capitals to thank them for supporting Hanoi during the war and to ask for their continuing assistance. In Moscow, the Vietnamese delegation met with top Soviet leaders, where Duẩn requested a Soviet loan of one billion rubles for many projects. When Soviet leaders expressed their reluctance to fund his grand pet project, a steel plant worth 200 million rubles, Duẩn told them,

> We are poor now, but it'll be different in five or ten years. We won't be this poor in ten years. When we fought the French, we had many difficulties. We never thought we would achieve victory as we have. Now [even] the U.S. has lost [to us]. Previously the Philippines was an American lackey but now its attitude has shifted. The U.S. and Japan [now] want to control [Southeast Asia]. Our country may be small but we will defeat them with Soviet help. In peace we want to make Vietnam into the center of socialism in Southeast Asia. That's the direction of our political and economic policy. Southeast Asia with more than a hundred million people is a large area. In this region, besides Japan, no other country is [as powerful] as Vietnam. I mean socialist Vietnam… We have set the precondition that Thailand and the Philippines must expel the Americans from their countries in order to improve relations with Vietnam…[51]

Duẩn asserted that Vietnam had fought selflessly for world revolution and therefore deserved Soviet help to achieve even more victories for socialism:

> Up to now we have said that we were fighting to defend socialism and world peace and we were willing to shoulder all the losses. Now [the world] has peace, but socialism still needs to be defended. We want to achieve economic victory [besides military victory]. Who knows what will happen in 10, 15, 20 years? Perhaps thanks to our influence Burma and India will also change. Previously India supported the American war on Vietnam. Our Foreign Ministry wanted to sever diplomatic relations with India, but I counseled against that. [I said that,] when we achieved victory, India would

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49 "Bài nói của đồng chí Lê Duẩn tại Hội nghị phổ biến Nghị quyết của Quân ủy Trung ương cho cán bộ cao cấp" [Comrade Le Duan's speech at the Conference to announce the Resolution of the Central Military Committee to high-ranking cadres], April 25, 1974. *VKDTT* v.35, 36.

50 "Phat bieu cua dong chi Le Duan tai Hoi nghi lan thu 25 cua Trung uong" [Comrade Le Duan's speech at the 25th Central Committee Plenum]. The Plenum took place during September 24-October 24, 1976. *VKDTT* v. 37, 344.

51 "Bien ban Hoi dam giua Doan dai bieu Dang va Chinh phu Viet nam dan chu cong hoa va Doan dai bieu Dang va Chinh phu Lien Xo" [Memorandum of the Meeting between the delegation of the Party and government of the DRV and the Party and government of the Soviet Union], October 27-31, 1975, pp. 24-25. File 9735, Phu Thu Tuong, National Archive No. 3, Hanoi.

> change its attitude. After we won the war, India [came around] to help us… India thanked us because we had weakened the Americans.[52]

Duẩn failed to persuade the skeptical Soviets to approve his pet plant, but the statement revealed that his ambition was not only to defeat imperialism at war but also to showcase the economic superiority of socialism that could even convert gigantic India to the cause.

The fact that Vietnam was peripheral to the power centers of the world did not prevent Hanoi leaders to dream big. They eventually woke up to reality in the 1980s when Beijing was able to isolate Vietnam internationally and force Hanoi to pay a high price for that dream. Yet, as we have seen, Lê Duẩn and his comrades were not the first Vietnamese to hold imperial or hegemonic ambitions.

The modern era witnessed a colonized Vietnam rising up to reclaim its premodern status as the most powerful state on Indochina. During this period, China and Vietnam not only interacted with a positive synergy but became close brothers sharing an ideological vision and geopolitical interests for at least two decades (1949-1969). Clearly Vietnamese communists would not have been able to unify the country and dominate Laos and Cambodia without Chinese support. Even brothers sometimes quarrel, and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict during 1979-1988 was caused by a combination of diverging ideological visions, Hanoi's suspicion of and contempt for Beijing, and Chinese effort to expand its frontier into Southeast Asia by seizing the Paracels and by supporting the Khmer Rouge. Despite the conflict, China returned to being a benevolent big brother of Vietnam in the 1990s and 2000s.[53]

Conclusion

This paper examined Vietnam as a shadow empire and hegemon on the southern frontier of China. Nationalist historiography assumes an internally united Vietnam threatened by a united China, reduces complex Sino-Vietnamese relations to one single dimension of domination and resistance, exaggerates the importance of Vietnam to China while ignoring the importance of other frontier states for Vietnam, and overlooks Vietnamese ambitions to dominate China's southern frontier. Despite such serious shortcomings, the nationalist narrative has been wildly popular. Small Vietnam's location on the periphery of the giant Chinese empire gives that narrative an apparent basis in reality, while Vietnam's modern wars against France and the U.S. popularized it. Recent scholarship has challenged this standard historiography but is still preoccupied with dyadic Sino-Vietnamese interactions in which China and Vietnam are taken out of their broader geopolitical contexts and juxtaposed as opposites.

In contrast, I have used a comparative historical approach to show how premodern Đại Việt and modern Vietnam emerged and became a shadow empire and hegemon. As empire and hegemon Đại Việt or Vietnam was not in the same league with great powers such as China. Nevertheless, the process of imperial formation was similar, and the feelings of Vietnamese citizens of Cham and Khmer ethnic backgrounds toward Vietnam are perhaps not different from those Tibetans or Uighurs have toward China. The paper found that the

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52 Ibid.
53 See Vu 2017, chapter 10.

southern frontier was much less important for premodern Chinese rulers than its northern frontier. This affected Chinese relations with states on its southern border, including Vietnam.

Vietnamese conflicts with other frontier peoples were found to be far more frequent than those with China. Survival threats for Vietnamese have emanated more from within the frontier than from China. Throughout history, China has in fact been the patron of Vietnam more than an enemy or a threat. The relationship contained a positive synergy even when northern Vietnam was under Chinese rule, became a conditional positive synergy under Đại Việt, developed into an intimate brotherhood in the middle decades of the twentieth century, and has carried a positive synergy after the end of a conflict in the 1980s.

In light of the findings in this paper, some speculative remarks can be made about the future directions of the contemporary tensions in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam. One may draw a parallel between the Ming Emperor Yongle (1402-1424) and Chinese President Xi Jinping: both are leaders of a strong and ambitious China wishing to expand its frontier further south. A key difference between the Ming era and today is the presence of powerful states, namely India, Japan, and the United States, on China's southern frontier which can counterbalance China. Yet a Sino-Vietnamese war would be unlikely, for Vietnam currently has a weak regime and no ambitious leader like Nguyễn Ánh or Lê Duẩn. Despite rising tensions with China, a major faction within the Vietnamese leadership still look to Beijing for protection against real or imagined domestic and frontier threats, which range from rebellious farmers to brave democracy activists, and from subversive overseas Vietnamese groups to "hostile (Western) forces." The positive synergy that has underlined Sino-Vietnamese relations since the early 1990s is likely to continue, albeit in a more muted form.

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Trajectories of the early-modern kingdoms in eastern Indonesia: Comparative perspectives

Hans Hägerdal

Introduction

> The king grew increasingly powerful. His courage indeed resembled that of a lion. He wisely attracted the hearts of the people. The king was a brave man who was *sakti* and superior in warfare. In fact King Waturenggong was like the god Vishnu, at times having four arms. The arms held the *cakra*, the club, si Nandaka, and si Pañcajania. How should this be understood? The *keris* Ki Lobar and Titinggi were like the club and *cakra* of the king. Ki Tandalanglang and Ki Bangawan Canggu were like Sangka Pañcajania and the *keris* si Nandaka; all were the weapons of the god Vishnu which were very successful in defeating ferocious enemies. The permanent force of the king was called Dulang Mangap and were 1,600 strong. Like Kalantaka it was led by Kriyan Patih Ularan who was like Kalamretiu. It was dispatched to crush Dalem Juru [king of Blambangan] since Dalem Juru did not agree to pass over his daughter Ni Bas […]

> All the lands submitted, no-one was the equal to the king in terms of bravery. They were all ruled by him: Nusa Penida, Sasak, Sumbawa, and especially Bali. Blambangan until Puger had also been subjugated, all was lorded by him. Only Pasuruan and Mataram were not yet [subjugated]. These lands were the enemies (Warna 1986: 78, 84).

Thus did a Balinese chronicler recall the deeds of a sixteenth-century ruler who supposedly built up a mini-empire that stretched from East Java to Sumbawa. Although his warlike exploits are insufficiently documented, European sources from the late sixteenth century do confirm the existence of a Balinese kingdom of some consequence. What strikes the reader of the chronicle – which was authored sometime after the last mentioned events in the 1680s – is the references to Indian models. The sacred daggers of the king are likened to the attributes held by Vishnu. The king himself is portrayed as a world-ruler, a *cakravartin*, with parallels to the contemporary rulers of the Southeast Asian mainland, men such as Bayinnaung, Naresuan, Phothisarat and Ang Chan. While, for example, the Thai kingdom of Ayudhya may have been 40-50 times larger than Bali, the royal imagery of the little island realm reminds us that there were historical processes going on in the insular world east of Java with interesting parallels to the larger Southeast Asian kingdoms.

While the larger pre-modern state structures of Mainland Southeast Asia and Java-Sumatra have long received much scholarly attention by historians and archaeologists, what lay east of Java was uncharted territory until rather recently. These areas have been interesting fields of study for anthropologists, linguists, and students of material culture. Analyses of eastern Indonesian societies have often departed from structural models observed through modern ethnographic data, such as power dualism, quadripartition, systems of marital exchange, and so on. The small scale of traditional polities in the region, and the lack of indigenous writings

in most of them, have not been conducive to the application of historical methods used to study statecraft in Ayudhya, Đai Viêt, Aceh, Mataram, etc. (Hägerdal 2015).

Since about the 1970s, however, much has happened. In recent decades the anatomies of the polities of Bali, the Spice Islands, Sumbawa and Timor have had their fair share of academic scrutiny. The Hindu micro-states of Bali, which flourished up to the early twentieth century, have been an attractive area of research due to the availability of indigenous texts and the enticing anthropological perspectives, where the much-debated thesis of Clifford Geertz about the *negara* state has engendered many new queries (Geertz 1980). How were the small indianized kingdoms on the island organized, and what were the bases of their prestige and resources? Furthermore Henri Chambert-Loir has studies indigenous texts from Bima on Sumbawa which reveal a rather accomplished state structure (Chambert-Loir 1993; Chambert-Loir 2010). The spice sultanates of northern Maluku have likewise received some attention by historians such as Leonard Andaya and Muridan Widjojo: how could small island polities build up comprehensive power networks, how were they helped by Islam and "traditional" beliefs, and how could they exist concurrently with monitoring European powers? (Andaya 1993; Widjojo 2009). Finally, the fragmented and highly localized polities of Timor and adjacent islands have been studied in some detail, mainly by anthropologists such as Herman Schulte Nordholt (1971) and James Fox (1977). Much insight has been gained in the intricate structure of the realms, which structurally lie somewhere on a continuum between kingdoms and chiefdoms.

A map of eastern Indonesia from 1748. From G.-L. le Rouge, Atlas nouveau portatif (Paris, 1748).

While these studies have greatly increased our understanding of the historical societies of eastern Indonesia, the situation of the source materials makes it hard to reach back before the arrival of the Europeans in the sixteenth century (with the partial exception of Bali, where we possess epigraphical records back to the ninth century). Also, the picture that emerges remains to be compared with the larger kingdoms on the mainland and the central-western parts of the Archipelago which arose from about the fourteenth-fifteenth century, what Victor Lieberman has termed the post-charter states (Lieberman 2003-2009). There has been a lively discussion about Southeast Asian statecraft over the years where many scholars apply a "cosmic" model: while European states are characterised by fixed borders and bureaucratic institutions, Southeast Asian polities are more dispersed, somewhat like components of a galaxy. An exemplary centre binds satellites to its power more or less efficiently depending on its fluid capabilities. Not even smaller polities – the normal type in the pre-modern history of much of Southeast Asia – are characterized by any administrative solidity. Stanley Tambiah (2013: 528) speaks of administrative involution where the hierarchy of power and merit tends to fragment into a variety of competing administrative cells. In the well-known metaphor by the late Benedict Anderson, the state centre is like a lamp whose light (power, influence) diminishes with the distance (Anderson 2006: 21-3). One aspect of the dispersion is that regional and local lords tend to replicate the centre, thus emulating the institutions and ritual practices of the central lord as far as they can. Some scholars speak of a segmentary state where the constituents of a polity are structurally similar, so that their authority differs in extent rather than kind (Wellen 2014: 7-8). In these models the role of the ruler is paradoxical. As the central nave of a *negara* or polity, he is on one hand a passive maintainer of order rather than somebody who brings about change to achieve an ideal state of things. But on the other hand this passivity is punctuated by displays of warlike activity to defend or expand the realm (Tambiah 2013: 515-6).

The proponents of cosmic models draw their data from societies influenced by Indian culture, which is relevant for the mainland and Java but becomes problematic when we speak of eastern Indonesian societies. Bali is an obvious exception here, since several scholars have drawn parallels between this island and other indianized societies of South and Southeast Asia. For the majority of the hundreds of local polities that dotted the eastern Indonesian islands, it is debatable whether they should be properly be considered "kingdoms" at all. As noted by global historian Jared Diamond, the kingdom means a deepening and specialisation of hierarchical structures present in chiefdoms, and the borderline between the two is fluid (Diamond 1997: 278-9). It is however possible to make a rough classification of polities. In line with research by Henri Claessen and Jarich Oosten one may point out four basic criteria that a polity should meet to evolve into an early state in a meaningful sense: a sufficient number of people to constitute a complex society, control over an acknowledged area of land, institutions to harvest surplus (taxes, tributes), and an ideology that motivates unequal power relationships and institutions (Claessen and Oosten 1996: 4-16). While these criteria are fairly vague and flexible, they help us to single out some four geographical areas where early states emerged in the pre-colonial era, as will be seen below.

While Southeast Asia is a very late concept, Anthony Reid and several other historians have argued that it is justified to speak of it as a historical region with peculiar societal traits (Reid 1988-1993). Something similar has been argued with regard to eastern Indonesia,

perhaps more by anthropologists than historians. In a recent thematic issue of the journal *Archipel*, *l'Est insulindien* was studied as a category from archaeological, linguistic, anthropological, and historical perspectives.[1] The region is characterised by a stunning ecological diversity, which is matched by an ethno-linguistic one: three fourths of the 700 languages of Indonesia are spoken here, mostly by very small populations. While the eastern Indonesian cultures are far away from the large states and entrepôts of the mainland, Sumatra and Java, and may seem isolated to the outsider, this is not the whole truth. The ethno-linguistic groups mostly inhabit small or medium-sized islands, and the sea is omnipresent in ritual perceptions and connections to the outer world. The documented history of eastern Indonesia is filled with migrations, long-distance commerce, and cultural transfer (Rappoport and Guillaud 2015: 5-7). In the light of the important research on eastern Indonesian cultures that has accumulated in recent years, it is therefore worth the effort to study the evolution of pre-colonial statecraft in larger comparative perspectives. What I will do in this article is, first, to pinpoint some main characteristics of the polities of four areas of eastern Indonesia where polities of some consequence arose in the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, more or less the age of commerce posited by Anthony Reid (1988). These are Bali-Lombok, Sumbawa, the Spice Sultanates, and the Timor area, which fulfil the criteria of statehood posited by .Claessen and Oosten to a degree. Secondly, I will compare these four areas with each other using a set of variables. And finally, I will tentatively ask whether some of the processes of integration found in the larger Southeast Asian states at the same time are somehow applicable to the smaller polities of eastern Indonesia. Thus the study asks to what extent state-building mechanisms in the larger kingdoms were paralleled by political structures in the smaller realms of the east, and how the latter were able to survive in some form until the twentieth century.

Indianization and indigeneity: Bali and Lombok

On the following pages some general trends among the historical societies of the four chosen regions of eastern Indonesia are presented. Given the article format, this can only be cursory, but it might give a rough idea about their preconditions in the early-modern period.

From an economic-historical point of view, Bali and at least sections of Lombok are parts of Central Indonesia, a region characterised by labour-intensive *sawah* culture and a relatively high population density. It is also known that Bali was politically subjugated by Javanese kingdoms for periods, and the same probably goes for Lombok. Balinese epigraphical records from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries prove the existence of an Indic type of kingship which issued grants to villages and religious institutions. After a period of Majapahit rule on Bali that began in 1343, a new indigenous line of kings was established on the island under very obscure circumstances.[2] The ruler, his ministers, and grandees are

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1 "L'Est insulindien", thematic issue in *Archipel* 90 2015.

2 Kempers 1991: 33-49. The traditional historiography is studied in detail in Berg (1927: 93-167). Due to lack of space I will be relatively brief on the quality of the sources for the study of eastern Indonesia in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The lack of contemporary indigenous documents forces us to examine external (usually European) accounts and chronicles and traditions committed to paper at a much later date. While customs and institutions may have changed over time, it is likely that chronicles and other texts from the seventeenth century and later give an approximate idea of cultural processes in the preceding period.

understood in later historiography to be Javanese nobles of Majapahit origins, but the lack of dated documents from the mid-fifteenth to the late sixteenth century makes it hard to judge all this.

What is certainly known is that the first Dutch visitors to Indonesia met the king of Bali in 1597 and provided descriptions of his entourage and court. The VOC (1602-1799) was never permanently established on Bali, and the reports written about the island are too cursory to enable us to say much about the dynamics of local kingship. What little there is implies a highly decentralized structure of the kingdom, with 33 local lords (termed "kings" by the Dutch) under the central ruler in Gelgel near the south coast whose title is given as Raja Dalem or Raja di Bali (Colenbrander & Coolhaas 1953: 414-5). The latter was surrounded by splendour and much ceremony. At his side were an executive regent (*patih*) and a hereditary senior Brahmana priest. The ruler had an important economic asset in Lombok, was sometimes the overlord of Blambangan (easternmost Java), and lodged pretensions over Sumbawa. The VOC records also show that the island broke up in mutually quarrelling kingdoms in the second half of the seventeenth century, a pattern that remained until the colonial conquest in 1906-08 (Hägerdal 1998). The mainly Muslim Lombok underwent a somewhat different trajectory since it was subjugated by one of the Balinese micro-states, Karangasem, and eventually brought under the unitary rule by a Karangasem dynastic branch in 1839-94.

The nature of the pre-colonial Balinese state is much debated. The well-known study by Geertz about the late pre-colonial era postulates a kingship that was obsessed with pomp and glory as an end in itself and wielded limited influence over local society. The *desa* (villages), *banjar* (hamlets) and *subak* (irrigation organizations) were partly overlapping entities that were managed locally. Although the royal centre and aristocracy gathered taxes based on irrigation, there was no true congruence between political authority, land tenure and distribution of land tenancy; rather, the management of agricultural production was largely autonomous from the exercise of royal power (Geertz 1980: 45-86). Stephen Lansing has developed the theme further, arguing that the crucial irrigation works that underpinned the production had an organizational structure centred on temples, with one centre in Batur in the highland. He found traditional state power weak and detached from the work of the peasants, and argued that the island had never been politically united before colonialism (Lansing 1991). These views have been countered by Henk Schulte Nordholt and Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin, who have both found indications in the sources of royal intervention in local agricultural affairs. While the land was believed to belong to the gods, the aristocracy did have means to exert influence on the peasantry through control of irrigation works (Hauser-Schäublin 2003: 153-81; Schulte Nordholt 2011: 21-7). At the same time, Schulte Nordholt emphasizes the decentralized nature of the Balinese polities: satellites ruled by aristocratic families tried to replicate and emulate the exemplary centre, and would easily break away from the central court. From another perspective, J.-F. Guermonprez has followed a process of relative de-indianization and de-sacralization of kingship on Bali from the medieval period up to late pre-colonial times. With the transition to smaller competing states in the seventeenth century, the texts bear witness to a more active type of kings whose personal prowess and violent exploits grant prosperity to their realms. Still there is a strong sacred or spiritual element, *kasaktian*, in late kingship (Guermonprez 1985: 39-70). Finally, one may

mention the comprehensive study of Margaret Wiener who has emphasized the importance of magic and supernatural beliefs for the prestige of a Balinese dynasty, in this case the prestigious Dewa Agung line of Klungkung which held a precedence position on Bali up to 1908 (Wiener 1995). Neither Guermonprez nor Wiener says much about the economic and administrative underpinnings of royal power, however.

Sumbawa: stability and ethnic bifurcation

To the east of Lombok, Sumbawa offers an interesting and little-studied picture of a set of six minor states that co-existed from at least *c.* 1600 to the early Indonesian republic in the 1950s. The island is on average much less fertile than Bali and Lombok. Moreover, it is ethnically and geographically divided into two parts. The eastern half constituted the kingdom (sultanate) of Sumbawa (Proper) and has a language related to Sasak, the majority language of Lombok. The eastern half speaks an entirely different Austronesian tongue and was traditionally divided into the kingdoms of Bima, Dompu, Sanggar, Tambora, and Pekat – the last two exterminated by the infamous Tambora eruption of 1815.[3] Communication between the two halves was impossible along the south coast, and less than comfortable in the north.

However, although it was politically and ethnically split, the six-states-system was in a sense more successful than the nine rival kingdoms of Bali or the realms and factions of Lombok. To be sure there were a number of internal and external conflicts over the centuries, but they were fewer and briefer than the perennial warfare on Bali – a reminder that ethnic unity does not automatically means greater stability. Part of the explanation lies in the checks exerted by external suzerains – the Makassar kingdom was the overlord of the island from 1618/19 to 1667 when the VOC took over (Noorduyn 1987). Nevertheless, colonial control was weak and only had a symbolic presence up to 1905, and it is therefore plausible that the six kingdoms emerged as relatively stable units at an early stage, unlike the ever-changing political landscape of Bali and Lombok.

So far there is not too much research about the historical evolution of the Sumbawan kingdoms, in spite of important observations by Henri Chambert-Loir and a couple of local scholars. A problem here is the textual sources. While there are a few Hindu-Javanese inscriptions that indicate Majapahit influences, the preserved histories only give the post-Islamization perspective (De Casparis 1998). In Bima, the Sumbawan kingdom which preserved the most elaborated traditions, we learn that a loose, territorially organized federation was replaced by a Hindu-styled dynasty, ten generations before 1600. From an early Portuguese source we know that the Bima kingdom existed by 1515 (Cortesão 1944: 203). A governing body (*hadat*) was formed by means of oaths and obligations where the *sangaji* (raja) and his executive regent had to balance a number of territorial *ncuhi*. A local historian likened the system to Western feudalism (Tajib 1995: 76). The population was divided into some 70 hereditary guilds which were connected to the royal centre or certain title-holders by obligations of services (Chambert-Loir 1993: 80-1). In the western kingdom of Sumbawa (Proper), the ruler was seconded by a council (*tana' samawa*) with partly

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3 Andaya 1981, map 7. The people of the Tambora kingdom spoke a separate language, unrelated to the other two, now extinct.

Javanese-sounding titles, and two governing councils of 5 + 7 grandees. Land was controlled by the nobility, but the low population density meant that arable land was fairly available to the population. He also had to reckon with three largely autonomous vassals on the west coast (*kemutar telu*) (Manca 1984: 66-87). A series of Makassarese military expeditions in 1618, 1619 and 1626 turned the Sumbawan kingdoms into vassals and enforced the adoption of Islam, which led to new impulses in the administrative development of the kingdoms. Islam is described in historical tradition as a crucial tool of political-social integration, since royal power upheld the task of disseminating the faith through a number of practices (Tajib 1995: 123-4; Noorduyn 1987).

From an economic point of view Bima is known to have been part of a larger archipelagic network stretching from Melaka to Maluku by the early sixteenth century. Among Sumbawan export products were horses, sappan wood and rice (Chambert-Loir 1993: 86). Slaves were brought from Manggarai and Sumba where Bima had political interests since perhaps the mid-sixteenth century.

The spice sultanates: inter-insular networking

Of the four kingdoms of North Maluku – Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo – the two first-mentioned are better documented than the preceding areas, thanks to early curious Iberian writers, and later scrupulous VOC records. Historical traditions speaks of a four-division originating with four brothers who gave rise to the respective royal lineages. Thus Ternate was supposedly founded ten generations before the first documented ruler in 1512, and Tidore reportedly had nine rulers before that date.[4] The early, pre-islamic history can nevertheless not be substantiated. From various Iberian writers we can conclude that Islam gained the position as the religion of the rulers around 1435-1470, although it exerted an uneven influence on the local populations (Van Fraassen 1987 I: 32-3).

In contrast with the two previous regions, the North Maluku island kingdoms had an economic asset that gave the islands a global significance. The beginning of what Anthony Reid calls Southeast Asia's age of commerce in the fifteenth century made for an upsurge of trade in spices, whereas the coveted cloves were merely found on a number of minor islands in North Maluku including Ternate and Tidore. That made for a refined local organization of sellers and buyers, at about the same time as Islam was accepted by the rulers and transformed into sultanates. It also provided an international flavour of the elite culture. A Portuguese treatise from c. 1544 in particular points at Malay influences. By this time Malay had become the "Latin" of the region, and people dressed in the Malay fashion. However, Javanese influence could also be seen in some official titles and musical instruments, while Chinese import goods were widely used (Jacobs 1971: 75, 108, 112, 123).

The early Iberian writers portrayed the sixteenth-century sultans as lacking in conventional powers, although this might have been a grave underestimation of their symbolic role and functions. The smaller units of the kingdoms were autonomous, and the king/sultan was a *primus inter pares* rather than a world ruler of the Indic type. The spice sultanates were like systems of alliances rather than conventional states. With the onset of Portuguese influence

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4 Genealogies of Ternatean rulers are found in Van Frassen 1987, Vol II: 1-30. For early Tidorean rulers, see De Clercq 1895, Appendix.

after 1512, and the preponderance of the VOC after 1606, kingship seems to have changed substantially: on the one hand increasingly dependent on European dispositions, but on the other hand with enhanced internal power resources thanks to European diplomatic recognition and assistance.

Two of the sultanates, Ternate and Tidore, expanded their influence greatly over Central and South Maluku, the Papuan coast-lands, much of Sulawesi, and the Solor and Alor Islands. Much of this expansion took place after the arrival of the Europeans. In many Malukan islands there was a division between two bonds of settlements known as Uli Siwa and Uli Lima (the nine- and five-bonds) which was attributed to the rivalry between Ternate and Tidore, although this may have to be qualified.[5] There was a core area of Ternatean dependences (the Ambon Quarter) where noble Ternate families acted as sub-rulers, but for the rest the conquered areas tended their own business as long as they acknowledged the suzerainty of the sultan (Andaya 1993: 83-4). In fact the connections between the core islands of Ternate and Tidore and their dependencies were clearly tenuous, perhaps often being pretensions rather than implying actual influence. Local traditions on far-away islands such as Solor and Alor nevertheless credit Ternate with significant cultural influences, such as the early introduction of Islam. Also, Tom Goodman, researching trade networks within the Tidore sultanate, has recently pointed to the "social interaction of exchange networks as unifying factors in regions with elastic competing 'centres'" (Goodman 2006: 7).

The Timor region: ritual alliances and the role of sandalwood

The fourth region under scrutiny has both similarities and important differences with the preceding ones. The island of Timor and the regions in its vicinity – East Flores, Savu, Rote, Solor, Alor – were not subjected to foreign cultural influences in the same fashion as Bali-Lombok, Sumbawa, and North Maluku. Indian culture is absent in the area, and Javanese influences were weak. Islam played a role in some parts of the Solor and Alor Islands, mainly through Ternatean influence, and Makassar held a degree of authority in the region up to 1667.[6] The dominant powers after the early 1600s were however Christian; Portugal and the VOC strengthened their positions over the century and kept Indonesian competitors away. The main reason for this European activity was sandalwood, an item that grew in considerable quantities on Timor and gave the dry and resource-scarce island a wider commercial importance. It is mentioned in medieval Chinese geographical texts, but the large-scale sandalwood trade may have taken off with European (Portuguese) influence in the sixteenth century.[7]

The kingdoms, or rather realms which flourished on Timor and its neighbours were rather formed according to older Austronesian concepts of power and authority – partly known in the other three regions under scrutiny. Very little is known about them from contemporary records before the seventeenth century. Society, as described by somewhat later Western

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5 It has been argued that the Uli Siwa-Uli Lima division was disseminated to the southern parts of Maluku indirectly, without any direct Ternate or Tidore impact (Van Fraassen 1987 II: 460-85).

6 Rodemeier 2006 notes the importance of Ternate as an imagined cultural and ordering force on proto-historical Pantar (Alor Isands).

7 De Roever 2002 is the main work for the development of the early-modern sandalwood trade.

travellers and ethnographers, was based on symbolic dualism and quadripartition and paid great attention to cardinal directions, the construction and position of houses, and the role of ancestors and origins. The ruler of a kingdom was usually a non-active, symbolically "female" figure who was complemented by a "male" holder of executive powers, and a host of functionaries whose prerogatives varied from kingdom to kingdom.[8] Society consisted of several social layers, in East Timor known as *datos* (princes), *tumengões* (chiefs), commoners and *ate* (slaves). The distinctions were strictly upheld in theory, but frugal economic conditions resulted in relatively small differences in the actual living conditions.[9]

The kingdoms were small-sized, with populations that ran in the thousands rather than tens of thousands. Some 70 kingdoms existed on Timor in the early-modern period, about 19 on Rote, 6 on Savu, 5 on the Solor Islands, and about 9 on the Alor Islands.[10] Nevertheless there were larger bonds or realms that encompassed wide areas. Wewiku-Wehali in the fertile plain of south-central Timor was known as a nexus of Timorese political culture up to modern times, and seems to have emerged before the early sixteenth century. A Portuguese missionary account alleges that the lord of Wehali was honoured like an emperor by the minor rulers all over Timor, at least before it was wrecked by Portuguese military expeditions in 1642 and 1665. Other accounts speak of three "unique kings" who ruled Timor in pre-European times, namely Sonba'i in the west, Wehali in the middle and Likusaen (or Camenaça) in the east, where Wehali was understood to have a position of precedence (Hägerdal 2012: 62-4; Castro 1867: 205, 243). There was also a bond between the five Solorese polities called Watan Lema (the five shores) and another one between five Alorese ones known as Galiyao (Barnes 1995: 499; Rodemeier 1995: 438-42). Sometimes these were considered to be included in a larger bond of ten. None of these bonds seems to have enjoyed much internal cohesion, since wars between the smaller components are frequently mentioned in archival sources and local traditions. The general image is one of political fragmentation which was seldom remedied by calls of unity in the face of foreign encroachment. Nevertheless we should not underestimate the ideological importance of the bonds or realms. As pointed out by James J. Fox, there is an interesting paradox in the central position of Wehali whose ruler was ritually inactive ("eating – drinking – sleeping") and seldom seen by outsiders; at the same time he was evidently honoured in most places of Timor over the course of several centuries, though largely ignored by the European powers (Fox 1982). The invisibility and modest appearance of this "dark lord" is an intriguing counterpart to the paraphernalia and state rituals of the Balinese rulers described by Geertz (1980).

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8 See in particular Schulte Nordholt 1971, drawing on principles of structural anthropology.

9 The Timorese prince and researcher Alexander Un Usfinit (2008: 58-9) has described the very elaborate hierarchy of clans and functionaries in his home domain, Insana. Under the ruler or atupas are nine categories of clans in hierarchical order with various functions: supporting clans, warrior clans, custodian of the land clans, etc. Lists of rajas and polities in the late colonial period under Dutch suzerainty are found in Van Dijk (1925, 1934). The East Timorese rulers and kingdoms are surveyed in Belo 2013.

10 Maps showing the more significant ones are found in Hägerdal 2012: 63, 79.

Comparison between the four regions

How did polities in Bali-Lombok, Sumbawa, North Maluku, and the Timor region emerge in the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries? A fundamental problem is that contemporary sources, or extensive chronicular traditions, fail us. While the mainland kingdoms during this era also suffer from a relative dearth of sources, a combination of chronicles, Chinese and European texts, epigraphy, and archaeology, enables us to study these societies in some detail. For eastern Indonesia we are less fortunate. The only region under scrutiny where we have extensive records from the early sixteenth century is North Maluku, due to the enormous importance accorded to the acquirement of spices by European writers.[11] For the remaining three we have to draw conclusions from VOC records of the seventeenth century and later, and from much later chronicles and traditions.[12]

Victor Lieberman speaks of "charter polities", meaning early states that roughly defined the idea of an area as a territorial and cultural entity (such as the Khmer Empire, Pagan, pre-1407 Đai Viêt, etc.). The only region where such thing can be documented is Bali, where epigraphical records clearly show the existence of a kingdom from late ninth century to 1343.[13] However, historical tradition has retained few memories of this, and rather traces the cultural roots of Balinese life back to the Javanese kingdoms, especially Majapahit (Berg 1927: 93-121). Nothing of that sort can be documented for Sumbawa, although some of the local kingdoms, such as Dompu and Bima, seem to have existed in some form in the fourteenth century (Hitchcock 1996: 30). Ternate may have arisen as an entity above chiefdom level with the upsurge of the spice trade and the coming of Islam, in spite of claims that its kingship goes back to the thirteenth century.[14] For the Timor area we cannot really say much since there are utterly few written sources before 1500, or even 1600. If there is any truth in the legends of Melaka influences on the emergence of Wewiku-Wehali, the latter would have arisen between 1400 and 1522 (Hägerdal 2012: 64-5). The emergence of increasingly tightly organized polities in these centuries ties in with the possible effects of resource accumulation conditioned by long-distance trade; but also with climatic data as established by scientific methods. In the period c. 1100-1400, eastern Indonesia appears to have suffered increased El Ninõ-related effects, followed by a relative stable period until a new disturbed period in the mid-seventeenth century (Chao 2008: 245).

The real and mythological roles of strangers are an interesting theme that seems to link the emergence of the four regions together. Anthropologists and historians have recently emphasised the so-called stranger king syndrome in the eastern part of the Southeast Asian archipelago: a propensity to refer to the founders of traditional polities as strangers coming from outside. These strangers have founded the present hierarchical order and ruling structure, and their strangeness is seen as functional because of their position as bringers of culture and ability to mediate between particularistic interests, such as different clans (Barnes 2008; Fox 2008). The Balinese kings of Gelgel, and the *Ksatria* and *Wesia* nobles,

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11 The narrative sources up to the early seventeenth century are summarized in Tiele 1877-87.

12 Not forgetting the hitherto relatively untapped possibilities offered by archaeology; for a recent attempt to use gravestones to fill out our knowledge of precolonial and early colonial history on Timor, see McWilliam et al. 2012.

13 The Balinese ancient kingdom is traced in Kempers 1990, chapter 3.

14 1257 according to the calculation of François Valentijn; see Van Fraassen 1987 II: 2.

supposedly came from Java at the height of the Majapahit Empire, while a *Brahmana* clan helped the second king of Gelgel to stabilise his realm in the sixteenth century (Warna 1986: 63-4, 78-81). According to West Sumbawan tradition the early rulers of Sumbawa Proper, Seran, and Selaparang on Lombok were descended from Sunan, probably meaning the Muslim lord or sunan of Giri on the Pasisisir coast of Java (Manca 1984: 26). The East Sumbawan chronicles trace the sultans of Bima and Dompu from the hero Bhima of the *Mahabharata* epic, who in this version would have come from or via Java (Tajib 1995: 42-5, 51-9). The rulers of Ternate, Tidore and the less powerful Jailolo and Bacan claimed descent from an Arab, Jafar Sadik (Van Fraassen 1987 I: 16). The Timorese origin stories are more varied, but many ruling lineages supposedly came from Wehali which in turn hailed from Sina Mutin Malaka, "White China Malaka" (Grijzen 1904: 53). This mytho-geographical term seems to combine two points of origin for external traders, and indeed mirrors the situation around the fifteenth century: from Malacca, which enjoyed Ming Imperial protection, sandalwood exported from the Timor area was trans-shipped to China and other places (Chao 2008: 36). For Bali-Lombok, Sumbawa and the spice sultanates the religious-cultural ramifications of the origin stories are obvious, with strangers representing Hindu-Javanese and Islamic influences. While the historicity of the stranger king pedigrees are up to debate, credible accounts tell of strangers being present in or near the court in the four regions under scrutiny during the age of commerce. Thus, Bali's oldest mosque is found in Gelgel, near the old court, which is matched by stories of early Muslim settlers (Vickers 1990: 168; Warna 1986: 84). People with a Malay identity lived in a *kampung* at the Bima Bay from an early stage. They enjoyed close relations with the sultan's court and had a role in disseminating Islam (Sjamsuddin 2013: 27-38). Javanese commercial and religious contacts with the spice sultanates are said to have existed since the fifteenth century. The first Muslim sultan married a princess or noblewoman from Java who was important for the propagation of Islam, and both Ternate and Tidore had Javanese *soas* (Van Fraassen 1987 I: 129, 428).

Of the four regions, Bali-Lombok possessed a pronounced tradition of literacy which, as shown by all inscribed and written charters, had a vital role in the execution of royal power. Javanese script was known on Sumbawa although we know little about the consequences, and the kingdoms later on adopted Jawi and Makassarese scripts (Hitchcock 1996: 43). The spice sultanates presumably knew Arab-derived script from the fifteenth century, though it may have had limited importance for state affairs.[15] Such script was only very marginally known among the Muslims of Solor-Alor, and on Timor itself the elites were acquainted with Latin script in the seventeenth century, again very marginally. While European sources are clearly biased and rooted in Western conceptions of how a society worked, they seem to imply that administrative routines within the kingdoms (possibly apart from Bali) were normally handled without the issuing of written documents.

The geographical location of royal centres shifted much between the four, but the point of gravity was usually at or close to the coast. This may be less than surprising considering the modest size of most of the islands and the location of fertile areas downhill. Balinese historical tradition suggests however that the centre of the kingdom shifted from Samprangan

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15 There were however court secretaries (jurutulis); see Van Fraassen 1987 I: 154.

in the inland to Gelgel close to the coast, perhaps in the decades around 1500.[16] The six Sumbawan royal seats were also at or close to the shore, as were (of course) those of the tiny islands Ternate and Tidore, and the petty states of Solor-Alor. By contrast, the indigenous Timorese groups tended to keep away from the coast, although the central Wehali lay on a fertile plain within easy reach of the dangerous southern coast. Security concerns seem to have been decisive here; for example, a Dutch account from 1656 relates that the centre of the powerful Amarasi kingdom consisted of small settlements on hilltops.[17]

The kingdoms in the four regions were all heavily involved in trade. This is most apparent in the spice sultanates whose very creation was due to the location of Ternate and Tidore at one of the eastern terminal points of the net of trade routes that bound maritime Asia together. One trade route connected Maluku to Java and Melaka, while another route went towards the north and connected Maluku with mainland Southeast Asia and China via Borneo and the Philippines (Ptak 1992: 27-8). Through Ternate and Tidore the long-distance traders had indirect access to the lands further to the east and south, such as Papua and Aru, which offered massoi bark, birds of paradise, etc. (Warnk 2010: 110-1, 115). Early European reports on Timor likewise indicate that the authority of Timorese rulers near the coast (such as that of Kupang) was underpinned by anchorage fees and trading fees. A recent archaeological investigation has suggested that increasing trade opportunities in the small Timorese polities made for increasing warfare and alliances, drawing early European intervention (Chao 2008: 254-5). The Timorese were, however, hardly active traders and let other groups handle the export. This pattern is also valid for Bali where the Gelgel ruler controlled the main entrepôt Kuta in the south via a sub-ruler. Traders from the Javanese *pasisir* purchased cloth on Bali to sell further to the east (Schrieke 1955 I: 20-1). Surplus manpower was exported as slaves. The connection between royal power and trade is less clear-cut on Sumbawa, though it is known that sappanwood was felled on royal initiative in the VOC period and delivered to the Company servants.[18] Horses, sappan, rice, sandalwood, sulphur, and so on, are mentioned as trade goods by the sixteenth century; nevertheless the island had few truly important export items, presumably a contributing reason why it was largely left to its own devices.

In all the four cases the degree of centralisation and cohesion was weak within the territories claimed by the kingdoms, however with great variations. For example, Tidore was more troubled by internal rifts than its neighbour Ternate, and Sumbawa Proper much more than its neighbour Bima. Rebellions and usurpations by new lineages or side-branches are however attested in nearly all the known realms, which is not dissimilar to the situation in the larger Southeast Asian states. Royal rule expanded and contracted with the circumstances, and borders fluctuated much over the years. Ternate competed with Makassar over suzerainty over economically important areas on and around Sulawesi. Sumbawa Proper competed with the Balinese over influence on Lombok while Bima vied with Makassar for overlordship over Manggarai and tried to maintain a degree of influence on Sumba (Hitchcock 1996: 33-4).

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16 The traditional history of Samprangan and Gelgel is traced by Berg (1927: 103-67) who however believed that Samprangan was replaced by Gelgel earlier, in the fourteenth century. The date 1380 found in some textbooks is based on speculation and has no value.

17 VOC 1217, f. 332r-332v, 1.04.02, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag.

18 De Jong Boers 1997: 261-80. Rice from Bima did have a role in parts of Maluku, however, and the rice production might have been a contributing reason for the Makassarese conquest in 1618-26.

Balinese suzerainty over East Java, Lombok and Sumbawa also fluctuated a lot during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The major realms on Timor, such as Sonba'i, underwent great territorial changes due to inner and outer conflicts. The more sizeable eastern Indonesian realms were therefore characteristically "contest states" where vertical relations between the centre and constituents had to be reconstructed or reinforced from time to time.[19]

The royal centres were characterized by architectural symbolism and ritualised institutions that underlined their power and charisma as so-called exemplary centres – politico-cultural centres that the satellites/dependencies tried to emulate – but on very different levels. While Gelgel's satellites on Bali, East Java and Lombok replicated Indic models, Bima's dependencies on Flores and Sumba did not emulate its Muslim or Indic features. As for the far-flung satellites of Ternate and Tidore, some did take up miniature versions of the Muslim-Malay court culture, including the principalities on the Papuan Islands (Warnk 2010: 112-3). Tidore's image as an Islamic exemplary centre was sufficiently strong for stories to circulate in faraway places like Aru, where the sultanate had no formal power.[20] On Timor the central Tetun-speaking kingdom of Wehali, although lacking strong control mechanisms, made a great cultural impression on polities all over the island, which was more a matter of symbolic deference than real political subordination.[21] The cosmic model of Southeast Asian statecraft is therefore selectively applicable to eastern Indonesia. There are hardly any palaces left from the early-modern period, but preserved descriptions indicate that extensive *puri* compounds existed on Bali in the sixteenth century, comparable with those known in modern times. Several temples known on Bali today have alleged roots back to ancient times, and some, most famously the Pura Besakih, are closely linked to the old Gelgel kingship (Wiener 1995: 122). The royal compounds of Sumbawa, the spice sultanates, and Timor, appear to have been of comparatively modest dimension and built in perishable material. We may get an idea of the variations from the well-preserved Dalam Loka of Sumbawa Besar with its barn-like structure, and the small beehive-shaped *sonaf* (residence) of Insana on Timor. In no case were the residences located in proper towns. Typically, they would be surrounded by the hamlets of royal artisans and servants, in turn surrounded by residential areas for merchants and poorer people (Hitchcock 1996: 75-82).

Perhaps the most important question to be posed in this context is the ability of the royal centre to reach out to the components of the realm. Did the rulers have the prerogatives or means to secure the delivery of taxes, tributes, and fees? Or did their actual power depend on other sources? As mentioned before, there are irreconcilable differences in opinion between scholars with regard to the efficacy of Balinese royal rule. However, scholars who have scrutinised both historical sources and anthropological data seem to have identified administrative cycles of expansion and contraction. Thus the Gelgel kingdom may have

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19 For the contest state, see Schulte Nordholt 1996: 4-10.

20 Emilie Wellfelt, Linnaeus University, personal communication. In a later case, from the 1780s, the Arunese heard and believed that Tidore had the power to eradicate the European possessions and impose Muslim rule in the region; see VOC 8034, Report Nicolaas Harmansz, 1.04.02, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag.

21 This is in particular visible in the oral traditions from West and East Timor collected by the Australian scholar Peter Spillett in the 1990s, in his unpublished manuscript "The pre-colonial history of the Island of Timor together with some notes of the Makassan influence in the island" (Darwin, 1999). The majority of all the traditional domains, from Kupang in the west to the Falaluku-speaking area in the east, have references to Wehali influences.

flourished for about a century and a half, from the decline of Majapahit in the early sixteenth century to its own decline in the period between 1651 and 1686. The sources give the impression that the principal ministers, taken from a particular clan, were the main wielders of executive power, rather than the person of the king. In spite of the Indic inspiration of the cultural manifestations, this is rather similar to the division of authority on Sumbawa and Timor, as we shall see. Gelgel was followed by a series of shorter hegemonies, such as Buleleng in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and Mengwi for much of the eighteenth century.[22] During their heyday, these hegemonies may have been able to control the main paddy irrigation areas through effective cooperation with local lords (*manca*, *punggawa*) who in turn oversaw and taxed the irrigation works of the rice peasants. It has been suggested that the *banjar* (wards) of the Balinese settlements were introduced by the royal authorities in the post-classical period to ensure the duties of the peasantry; they were headed by *klian* or headmen appointed by the rulers (Vickers 1989: 47-8, 218). The military capabilities of the Gelgel elite were considerable, with an elite force and levies that reportedly reached 20,000 people, although such figures must be considered vastly exaggerated (Berg 1927: 153-5). The fragility of the system is nevertheless obvious, as seen by the rapid breakdown of successive hegemonies.

The capabilities of the Sumbawan kingdoms to control the local scene were limited, but the apparent stability of the institutions after the coming of Islam, and especially after the contracts with the VOC, may have petrified exchange relations to the benefit of the six royal centres. To take the example of Bima, there was a rather pronounced system of social ranks where the princely estate and the nobility were major landowners. The commoners were organized in *dari* (genealogical groups somewhat similar to guilds) with obligations towards the royal centre. Much of this may be attributed to Javanese, Malay and Makassarese influences, but there are also aspects that point to older political structures. Bima has been likened to the small polities on the non-Islamic Sumba as a case of "dual monarchy". The sultan was the revered central figure but was not originally expected to be an active one, and the *ruma bicara* or prime minister was the active, secular prince (Hitchcock 1996: 77). Henri Chambert-Loir, studying court diaries, has noted that the material seems to support the idea, common among modern Bimanese, of a relatively strong local voice vis-à-vis the governing centre. Thus village heads might gather before the sultan and demand action against corrupt functionaries, even if closely related to the sultan (Chambert-Loir 2010: 44). Locally, a custodian of the land, *malar*, took care of agricultural rituals and the distribution of land (Hitchcock 1996: 75). This is similar to functionaries in several eastern Indonesian societies, such as the *tobe* on Timor (Schulte Nordholt 1971: 186-8).

The case of the spice sultanates is more complicated since it involved external economic relations to a much higher degree than on Bali-Lombok and Sumbawa. As shown by Christiaan van Fraassen, the organization of the societies of Ternate and Tidore was based on an idea of quadripartition, under which were settlement units called *soa*, somewhat similar to *kampungs* in western Indonesia but not based on kinship (Van Fraassen 1987 II: 693). The *soas* in various parts of Maluku share a few characteristics: they are the units of which a polity is based, they have hereditary chiefs recognized by the ruler, and deliver tribute or

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22 For these successive hegemonies, see De Graaf 1949; Schulte Nordholt 1996.

services to the royal centre. However, the extensive realms created by Ternate and Tidore also depended on interaction with outsiders, Asian and European groups who arrived to take advantage of the products of Maluku. Moreover, the peoples of Maluku often benefited from these commercial relations, something that helps explaining their inclusion in the far-flung realms. A rather dialectic relationship between integrative and autonomous forces in the polities can be discerned. In the example of Ternate we see that the royal council included 18 *soa* chiefs, who had a strong voice against the sultan in the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth centuries (Van Fraassen 1987 I: 343-4). However, the power of the sultans vis-à-vis the local leaders increased under VOC suzerainty. Like on Bali, the sultan had a detachment of core troops, and could call up considerable additional troops in case of warfare. The subjects of Ternate and dependences would deliver a stipulated number of manned warships for defence or expansive enterprises (Van Fraassen 1987 I: 363-4). At the same time Christiaan van Fraassen has shown that the Ternateans themselves did not identify the state with the sultan's court, but rather saw the *soa* chiefs (*bobato*) as co-responsible for how the state was run (Van Fraassen 1987 II: 695). The PhD Thesis of Tom Goodman interestingly shows how a local category of traders known as *sosolot* maintained economic exchange and political cohesion in the Tidore realm, a fact largely unnoticed by the VOC suzerains – but at the same time they impeded the centrality of the sultan's power (Goodman 2006: 7) .

As for Timor and adjacent islands, the capabilities of the royal centres are much more "indigenous" in character than the other examples. The marginal role of Javanese, Malay and Islamic influences have a role here. To be sure, Christianity made inroads from the seventeenth century when Dutch and Portuguese political influence increased, but European impact on the structure of the petty realms was indirect and piecemeal. Western sources about early Timor are ambiguous about the capabilities of the rajas, describing them as despotic at times, but at times emphasizing their lack of executive powers. Ethnographic literature from the last two centuries describe a dual monarchy (akin to the one mentioned for Bima), and a rather intricate system of title-holders that reach down to the local hamlets. "Taxes" consisted of harvest gifts which were regularly provided to the princely centre.[23] However, the documents show that the realms often lacked inner cohesion, as local *temukungs* (chiefs) and groups of commoners refused to obey the commands of the raja and regent. Timor's history is full of migration of smaller and larger groups due to political crises. Like in Sumbawa and the spice sultanates, European backing nevertheless strengthened the position of some realms.

Eastern Indonesia and the major Southeast Asian kingdoms: protected and exposed zones

In the first volume of his *magnum opus, Strange parallels*, Victor Lieberman has identified a number of characteristics for the major mainland states of Southeast Asia in the so-called post-charter era. They all fall into a period of political and cultural integration which had to do with the convergence of several factors: demography, agriculture, military factors, inter-state competition, and foreign commerce. The emergence of Ayudhya, Lan Xang, the Lê

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23 The anatomy of the traditional Timorese realms is analysed in detail in Schulte Nordholt 1971.

regime of Đai Viêt, post-Angkor Cambodia, and the Toungoo Empire, was apparently reinforced by what Anthony Reid calls Southeast Asia's age of commerce (although some of these realms were founded before this age, as defined by Reid). The integration was characterized by a "growing standardization of ethnicity and cultural practice" (Lieberman 2003: 457). Although the integrative processes were broken by periods of crises (such as in Burma at the end of the sixteenth century and Đai Viêt for much of the same century), we can discern a general long-term move towards larger political units. In the early nineteenth century, before European colonialism disrupted the picture, there were only three major polities on the mainland.[24]

Some of this can be discerned in the Archipelago as well. Post-charter states such as Majapahit, Demak and Mataram, and states without any real charter predecessor, such as Aceh, Makassar and Ternate, governed over truly vast island realms (Reid 1993: 211-4). Here, both Islam and the classical Javanese models constituted vital frames for state integration. However, they suffered a deficiency that clearly set them apart from the mainland realms. The last-mentioned lay in a so-called protected rim zone. Like Japan, Arabia and western Europe, their geographical features made them less vulnerable to foreign military expansion (although the mainland kingdoms certainly invaded each other). The islands, too, were mostly free from foreign intervention up to the early sixteenth century. Then, however, the force of European maritime technology turned the island societies into an exposed zone where the Portuguese, Spaniards and Dutch all carved out spheres of political and commercial influence and even settlements.

One result of this was to disturb any development towards larger and more integrated archipelagic states. To be sure, the preconditions for such integration differed from the mainland due to the enormous number of small ethnic and linguistic groups, but it should be recalled that waterways were often less cumbersome lines of communication than land routes. The archipelagic states could uphold major spheres of influence by fleets of ships, but precisely this asset was ruined through the confrontation with the European seaborne powers. Only Ternate and Tidore in eastern Indonesia were able to keep large areas, but merely by complying with European demands for commercial surveillance.[25]

Had the European powers not disrupted the political structures of the Archipelago, the future of the minor polities of Bali, Sumbawa and Timor might have been in doubt. Bali was the subject of hostilities from both Java and Makassar, and at least part of Lombok was under Makassarese suzerainty for a while (Hägerdal 1998: 65-75). The Sumbawan kingdoms were increasingly drawn into the political system of Makassar in the seventeenth century, a process that was only interrupted by the Bungaya Treaty in 1667 that transferred suzerainty to the VOC (Tajib 1995: 132-7). Timor was on the verge of being subjugated by Makassar in 1641, but European interventions changed its political relations to the outside world. Ternate was a rival of Makassar, and it is a moot issue whether it could have held its own in the long run if Makassarese expansion had not been stymied by the VOC.

With the larger Archipelagic states weakened, however, the numerous small polities of eastern Indonesia were able to live on, often under VOC or Portuguese suzerainty that did not

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24 Burma, Siam, and Vietnam; Laos and Cambodia being dependent on stronger neighbours.

25 The process is described in detail in Andaya 1993. To a lesser degree, this also applies to Bima with its (contested) claims on Flores and Sumba.

interfere heavily with their inner structures. The Balinese, Sasak and (West) Sumbawan societies cultivated values and customs deriving from Java, which on Sumbawa were overlaid by Malay-Muslim and Makassarese traits. In that sense they were miniature versions of the Indianized statecraft of the mainland states and Java. This is seen in the sacred symbolism of the royal centre, the clearly defined hierarchy of social categories, and the legends and myths that accompanied the royal lineage. Similar to the rice-producing central basins of the mainland kingdoms and Java, rice was essential for the economic maintenance of Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa, while trade had a supporting rather than basic function. On the other hand, the lack of any real bureaucratic depth was even more pronounced than in the mainland and Java, in spite of the carefully named royal ministers and officials. The spice sultanates are different in the sense that they owe more to an interesting mix between traditional structures and Malay-Islamic influences, with comparatively less Javanese input (although the very name for a prince, *sangaji*, is Javanese).[26] Timor, finally, is peculiar by its relative lack of either Malay-Islamic or Indic-Javanese input. In North Maluku as well as Timor, the agricultural base was comparatively weak, which sets them apart from the mainland/Java pattern.

Conclusion: major realms versus petty kingdoms

To sum up the discussion, we may ask if the integrative processes that Victor Lieberman identified with regard to mainland Southeast Asia can somehow help us to understand the history of the small kingdoms of eastern Indonesia. Perhaps it encourages us to realize that these polities are not cut in stone, unlike the impression that structural anthropology might have given us. While they surely display archaic features, partly observable until recent times, their preconditions were greatly changed when island Southeast Asia changed from a protected to a vulnerable zone in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or thereabout (Ptak 1992: 46-7). The efforts of the European sea powers to defeat political rivals and regulate trade to their own advantage halted attempts at multi-island integration by relatively resource-rich states such as Aceh, Mataram and Makassar, and gave the eastern princedoms a respite up to the true implementation of colonial rule in the early twentieth century.

To compare the post-charter mainland states that arose in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries with the small polities east of Java may seem rash, but the question must nevertheless be posed: what elements underpinning the integration of the larger states are also valid for eastern Indonesia? The Gelgel kingdom of Bali, the main Sumbawan kingdoms, Ternate, Tidore, and (presumably) the major realms of Timor arose in about the same period, and it is hard to see this as a coincidence. Reid has pointed out a number of factors which underpinned the rise of port polities in various parts of Southeast Asia in the fifteenth century, followed by state formation in what he calls "the long sixteenth century". These included increasing trade revenues, bound up with the Chinese impact, and the import of advanced military technology (Reid 1993: 204-33). Lieberman has similarly argued that external input, such as the growing market demand in parts of Eurasia after 1400/1470, was crucial to bring economic and military advantages to privileged lowland areas (the Menam

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26 The indigenous term for a king was kolano, a local word that was used parallel with sultan; see Van Fraassen 1987 I: 16, 18.

basin, the Red River delta, Irrawaddy, etc.) (Lieberman 2003: 45). Population increase is given a considerable role in this model, underpinning inclusion in wider commercial networks. Densely populated core areas facilitated domination of outlying regions with sparse population. Technological novelties played a role; the use of firearms spread to Southeast Asia in this period. Culturally, world religions such as Buddhism and Confucianism increasingly helped stabilising the kingdoms in a process of cultural standardisation. Clifford Geertz among others has postulated the importance of a ritually laden court as an exemplary centre, which the satellites and dependencies of the polity tried to emulate (Geertz 1980: 11-5, 58, 109).

Some of this is no doubt present in eastern Indonesia, but on a very uneven scale. Demographic developments are not traceable, but at least early European reports confirm the unusually dense population of Bali by the late sixteenth century, no doubt a major reason for its ability to hold its own against Muslim neighbours. East Sumbawa is likewise said to have been densely populated by 1515 (Cortesão 1944: 203). Population in parts of eastern Indonesia may have increased due to the early import of American crops, such as maize (after c. 1540) (Boomgaard 1997: 419). The general rise in long-distance commerce after the founding of Melaka in c. 1400 was probably crucial for the development of statecraft, and accompanied by cultural imports. The impact of the market demand is most obvious in the spice sultanates, but all four regions were involved in long-distance trade that may have benefited the core areas of the respective realms and even enabled limited import of weapons technology – at least, muskets and cannonry were known in Gelgel by the late sixteenth century (Lintgensz 1856: 207). These core areas were usually situated in comparatively fertile or productive parts of the islands at or near the coast (Gelgel, Sumbawa Besar, Bima, the Ternate and Tidore courts, Wehali). Comparatively stable climatic conditions between the early-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries supported the integration of such core areas. Unlike the mainland and Java, river basins played no major role here. The stranger king syndrome found in the four areas speaks for the importance of foreign influences and again reminds us that the eastern Indonesian realms were insular but not isolated. In fact this syndrome sets them apart from the mainland states and Java where the ruling elite was usually seen as autochthonous.

Apart from Timor, advanced external religious systems played a great role to legitimize the polities: Hindu-Javanese concepts in Bali and early Lombok and Sumbawa, Islam in Lombok, Sumbawa and the spice sultanates. Like on the mainland, religion played an integrating role in the stabilization of the realms, as seen in the great expansion of Ternate in the sixteenth century. Nothing of this sort can be discerned for Timor, although it could very well have gone that way: Islam was accepted by the central ruler of Wehali in about 1641 when he briefly allied with Makassar, although the islamization project was abruptly impeded by the Portuguese (Hägerdal 2012: 85-90). The major eastern Indonesian courts accord to some extent with the model of the exemplary centre discerned in many "galactic" or "cosmic" polities of Asia. This is seen in the importance of Gelgel (and its Majapahit roots) in the Balinese view of the past, as well as the awe in which Ternate and Tidore stood in various parts of the archipelago as sources of culture and Islamic propagation. Interestingly

the Timorese realms of Wehali and Sonba'i held similar roles in spite of their limited governing power, as seen by their great role in traditions all over the island.[27]

Anthony Reid and later Victor Lieberman have shown that the period after 1400 was a period of dynamic political, economic and cultural change, partly driven by the increasing commercial connectivities that linked parts of the "Old World" (Reid 1988-93; Lieberman 2003-09). In that sense the term "early-modern" is not the Eurocentric concept it is sometimes portrayed as, but on the contrary applicable to much of Asia. While small and vulnerable, the states of eastern Indonesia fall in line with their larger mainland and Javanese counterparts in some important respects. That should not detract from the fact that there were fundamental geographical differences. Maritime Southeast Asia was a semi-Mediterranean region where multiple civilisations interacted, migration and commercial activities were relatively feasible, and major realms were often characterized by strong maritime power – unlike Toungoo, Ayudhya, Đai Viêt and inland Java (Wang 2012: 72). For the islands to the east of Java, a number of realms arose around the same time as the mainland states in 1400/1600, and partly for similar reasons. The sea-roads may often have offered more obvious means of exchange and communication than the cumbersome land-roads of the mainland kingdoms and Java; still, the fragmented ethno-linguistic picture complicated integration and expansion of the eastern Indonesian realms. The arrival of profit-driven European groups, and the ensuing sharpening competition between these and Muslim polities, made the area volatile and open to fast changes – but also offered chances of political survival under modest or subdued circumstances. Sometimes the process even strengthened the prerogatives of the rulers. The princedoms of the four studied areas would survive as archaic entities until the tempests of the twentieth century.

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27 As noted above the occurrence of Wehali stories all over Timor can be seen from the unpublished study by Peter Spillett, "The pre-colonial history of the Island of Timor together with some notes of the Makassan influence in the island'" The same study shows that Sonba'i was a dynastic term known in most regions of West Timor.

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A post-modern mandala? Moving beyond methodological nationalism[1]

Claire Sutherland

Figure 1: 'Returning Home' by Anthony Key

The work of art entitled *Returning Home* (Figure 1) is a chest-high, cylindrical trunk made from thousands of chopsticks. Painstakingly built up from the inside out, it is a satisfying whole made of many parts that represents home in a solid and enduring, but 'rootless' way. As such, it challenges the notion of rootedness as a prerequisite for belonging, suggesting that 'home' can be conceived in ways that do not necessarily erect barriers to belonging for non-natives, or outsiders. Fittingly, it also represents the culmination of a long personal journey for its creator, Anthony Key, as a migrant to Britain. The piece featured prominently in a recent UK museum exhibition exploring nation-building in Vietnam. Co-curated by the author of this article, the exhibition was both an attempt to distil a decade of research for a non-academic audience, and an opportunity to challenge visitors' perceptions of nation-building more widely. Further, it offered a starting point for reflection on the theoretical

contribution of Southeast Asian studies to ongoing debates surrounding 'methodological nationalism' (Beck and Sznaider 2010 [2006]), which challenge the widespread use of the nation-state as a taken for granted category of analysis. Hence the playful coining of the term 'post-modern mandala' to bring Southeast Asian studies into conversation with these interdisciplinary debates.

Social science theorists have long cautioned against 'methodological nationalism' (Beck and Sznaider 2010 [2006]) and 'methodological groupism' (Brubaker 2002) in the study of social relations. These approaches take bounded, homogenous nations or ethnic groups as the starting point of analysis, and assume they are capable of collective action. Recognition of multiculturalism and individuals' multiple identities has tended to be within a limited spectrum of accepted nationalist and ethnic/racial categories that simply reproduce the notion of discrete ethnocultural groups and constrain rather than liberate people to choose who they want to be (Wise and Veluyatham 2009, 2014). The national and racial identifiers that feature strongly in both everyday and social science discourse have been termed 'limited and violent' (Barabantseva and Lawrence 2015, 913 fn. 8) in constraining people's sense of self into reductive categories. Though scholars across the humanities and social sciences have been questioning nation-state-centric analyses for some time, the academy is still far from a Kuhnian paradigm shift away from methodological nationalism (Kuhn 1962). Nations and nation-states also remain taken for granted, deeply embedded bases for individuals' identity construction, as suggested by visitor feedback to the exhibition. The following article connects these theoretical and empirical realms and thinks about how a critical awareness of the nation can be fostered in practice. It aims to challenge common sense notions of the nation across both realms in order to avoid essentialising nation-states and the minority and majority ethnic and racial groups within them.

The anthropologist Tim Ingold (2007, 2) has described colonialism as 'converting the paths along which life is lived into boundaries in which it is contained, and then […] joining up these now enclosed communities, each confined to one spot.' In Politics and International Relations (IR), for example, these communities have long been defined as nation-states, but this is changing as critical scholars "challenge (reimagine) the possibilities of state-based international relations" (Ni Mhurchu and Shindo 2016, 2). Postcolonial historians have also studied 'the inadequacy and the indispensability of the nation' (Burton 2003, 1), highlighting the deep impact of imperialism on colonizing countries that often goes unnoticed to this day. This is a corrective to the kind of national history 'that serves as justification for the existence, the particularity and often the greatness of the present nation state' (Berger and Conrad 2015, 4), although it is also possible to imagine national history as a critical, polyphonic arena which a challenging museum exhibition could aspire to emulate (Curthoys 2003).

Given that the nation-state system is and remains the world's dominant organising paradigm, it is still tempting to use it as the starting point of political enquiry. Geographers have long recognised this as a 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1994), however, and have been influential in developing more performative understandings of territoriality (Painter 2010). Anthropologists too are now imagining human (power) relations as 'tangles' (Ingold 2007) or 'knots' (Green 2014), in order to escape the limiting mental map of communities bound in what Benedict Anderson (1991) called homogenous, empty time (Horstmann and Wadley

2006). In the Southeast Asian context that informed Anderson's work, the historical, colonial translation of nationalism and sovereignty has often been accompanied by a methodological translation akin to 'methodological nationalism.' Historians of Southeast Asia, keenly aware of this paradigm's relative novelty, have been vocal in rejecting nationalist historiography and instead writing 'Borderless Histories' (Tran & Reid 2006; Tagliacozzo 2009). There is much to learn from them "about how state centricity limits our imaginations of political life" (Ni Mhurchu & Shindo 2016, 2).

The article begins by exploring Southeast Asian studies' contribution to interdisciplinary debates around what I will call critical nationalism studies. The next section thinks about ways of transcending national analytical boundaries in theory, before analysing one attempt to do this in practice, always with the aim of fostering a critical awareness of the nation, its far-reaching ramifications and implications. What the article does not do is attempt a historical comparison of precolonial and postcolonial polities, though it could be argued that there are Southeast Asian examples of "states with a patina of modern governmental institutions but whose citizens live daily lives far removed from the modernizing impulses of their leaders" (Acuff 2012, 134). Rather, it uses the idea of a postcolonial mandala as a heuristic device to question methodological nationalism and explore alternative ways of approaching contemporary politics.

Section I

In historical studies of Southeast Asia, the meta-narrative of national sovereignty is commonly understood to have superseded what O.W. Wolters (1998) called the pre-colonial mandala model. The mandala model describes the power exerted by a sort of central 'sun king' (Lieberman 2003) whose gravitational pull weakened with distance and was overlapped by other spheres of power in a complex system of tributary relationships. It does not evoke a bounded polity in any sense, but emphasises rather a 'tangle of relationships in which [people] are enmeshed' (Ingold 2007, 2). To this extent, and to the extent that the mandala model depended on the regular performance of sovereignty by the monarch's messengers and agents, it chimes with analyses emphasising encounters and webs of relations as an alternative means of theorising (national) community (Closs Stephens & Squire 2012). It also resonates with a postcolonial '*critical return* to the connections between metropole and colony, race and nation' (Burton 2003, 2, emphasis in original). Similarly, the exhibition discussed later in this article sought to encourage a critical return to the nation and national identity for an audience outside the academy. Criticality in this context is understood as self-awareness and conscious reflection about the national construct and its consequences.

Historians have done much to illuminate the porous and shifting nature of Southeast Asia's empires. Anthony Reid's *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce* (1998) and Victor Lieberman's *Strange parallels* (2003) offer a magisterial sweep of the region. Keith Taylor (2013), John Whitmore (1983) and Alexander Woodside (1976) have explored Vietnam's premodern period, work continued by a new generation of scholars including Li Tana (1998), Nola Cooke (1998) and Liam Kelley (2003), among others. Today, Oliver W. Wolters' interpretation of the mandala concept is still often used as a shorthand to characterise the age of empires. Benedict Anderson's *Imagined communities* is frequently applied to the age of

nations, whereas James C. Scott (2009) and the related field of Zomian studies have developed a competing focus on the 'ungoverned' uplands of Southeast Asia. The imposition of Westphalian borders and the attendant concept of sovereign states clearly had a profound impact on Southeast Asian power dynamics, shaping everything from anti-colonial nationalism (Marr 1971; Tai 1992), through geopolitical imaginations (Thongchai 1994) to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' constitution and decision-making conventions (Sutherland 2005a; 2009). However, marking a caesura between the pre-modern and modern histories of Southeast Asia can obscure possible, messy continuities, whilst perpetuating the idea of linear progress through developmental stages that is so central to national imaginaries.

The historian of South Asia Sheldon Pollock (1998, 6) makes a tentative link between the "creation of one cosmopolitan order at the beginning of the first millennium and another and far different one - through colonialism and globalization - at the end of the second." According to this view, an emphasis on transformation should trump a monolithic, essentialising view of "the unexamined territorial frame of the nation-state" (Harvey 2008, 267). Beck and Sznaider (2010 [2006], 389) called for scholars to move away from 'a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook' and questioned the familiar binary between domestic and international politics, unthinking reproductions of the nation-state as 'society', and the use of Westphalian borders as analytical frontiers. Cosmopolitanism is a political, cultural and ethical ideology or *Weltanschauung* (Sutherland 2011), but it is also 'a set of projects toward planetary conviviality' (Mignolo 2000, 721) from which a less state-centric methodological approach can be derived. Scholars have highlighted the dire political consequences of failing 'to understand that we are already cosmopolitan, however much and often this mode of being has been threatened by the work of purification' (Pollock *et al* 2000, 588). Nationalism is one such mode of purification, though its apparent incompatibility with cosmopolitanism is not as clear as may first appear (Cheah 2003; Sutherland 2012; Sutherland forthcoming). In sum, "methodological nationalism needs to be transcended because, rather than allowing us to capture the actual complications of the history of the nation-state in modernity, it turns the nation-state into the natural organizing principle of modernity" (Chernilo 2006, 13).

Nationalist ideology and nation-building are such a pervasive part of today's world order that the temptation is strong to project their legitimacy back through history, and to treat phenomena like migration as correspondingly marginal or peripheral. Similarly, there is a tendency to view economic networks, trade, international security, regionalism and international law through the prism of the nation-state, skewing analysis from the outset (Sutherland 2011). One way to destabilise this 'hegemonic imaginary' (Mignolo 2000, 736) is to listen to subaltern voices. Another gesture towards 'disciplinary cosmopolitanism' (Pollock *et al* 2000, 588) is to learn from historians, who are well placed to identify anachronistic approaches and highlight alternative models from the past. As O.W. Wolters (1998, 41) put it with reference to nations and nationalism, 'the historian should be surprised that these tendencies have been accepted with such indifference.' Wolters (1998, 27-8) defined the mandala as a "particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries.' The term post-modern mandala, in turn, seeks to reconnect contemporary politics with these characteristics, in contrast to the nation-state structures associated with modernity. Crucial to the mandala polity were

attributes that would often be associated with 'soft power' (Nye 2011) today; intelligence-gathering, diplomacy and the ability to engender loyalty through force of personality. Clientelism, patronage and factionalism were probably rife. The centre was concerned with events on the fringes of its control and beyond. Relations of power would shift. Claims to spiritual authority would ebb and flow. Lesser princelings would report to the overlord. Networks of messengers and mediators to manage relationships within and outwith the territory were essential to maintaining the loyalty of vassals and vicariously project the king's magnificence to the outer reaches of the mandala. These 'sinews of government' (Wolters 1998, 31) enabled the kind of surveillance that encouraged obedience, tempered by the sovereign's role as a spiritual guide and benefactor.

The aim of this summary is not to emphasise continuities between pre- and postcolonial politics, even if it might be instructive to challenge this binary (Acuff 2012, 136). Clearly, the mandala model does not describe contemporary nation-states, though aspects of the power relations it describes do still ring true today. Indeed, Wolters identifies early Vietnam as the one example that did not conform to the mandala model, due to its permanent capital, fixed borders along mountain ranges, dynastic succession and territorial, provincial hierarchy. What is striking about the mandala model is its inherent dynamism, and the constant activity required to exert domination and maintain 'networks of loyalty' (Wolters 1998, 34). The purpose of nation-building as the legitimating ideology underpinning nation-states is no different; it must mobilize loyalty to maintain the state's *raison d'être* as the representative of a people, or nation. However, in a direct comparison, Wolters (1998, 36) opined that mandala probably did not engender the 'persisting prejudices' associated with European nationalisms. It is useful to examine just how pervasive these prejudices have become using the work of another historian of Southeast Asia, Keith Taylor.

Keith Taylor's *History of the Vietnamese* begins by recasting "what we know as the country of Vietnam [as] the mountainous western edge of a broad plain" (Taylor 2013, 1). In contrast to his earlier work *The birth of Vietnam* (Taylor, 1983), whose very title is redolent with nationalist imagery of belonging projected back in time, Taylor's *History* explicitly rejects nationalist historiography. He does not set out to examine the past for "evidence of people who attain significance primarily as precursors of people today [and] an internal logic of development leading to the present" (Taylor 2013, 3). In Taylor's view, his history is Vietnamese only inasmuch in that it is now associated with the country of Vietnam, and what has been taught to Vietnamese speakers as 'their' past. Taylor's explicit attempt "to move beyond the propaganda of memory and memorializing" (Taylor 2013, 7) thus has clear parallels with a shift away from state-centrism.

Keith Taylor's view of human history as ultimately episodic resists both temporal continuity and spatial boundaries, exploring instead the "possibility of imagining Asian surfaces as something other than parts of nations" (Taylor 1998, 973).This is not to assert that the nation-state does not exist or that it is not important, but simply not to assume it to be central to analysis. Taylor's approach rejects dichotomous thinking that tends to reinforce linear national narratives, and his refusal to imagine the nation as the starting point of investigation enables us to perceive other forms of political organization. The environmental historian David Biggs (2009) is clearly influenced by what Keith Taylor calls a surface orientation, understood to mean the "surface of fluid human experience in time and terrain,

which softens and fables the coherencies of historicized regions and nations" (Taylor 1998, 954). It is perhaps no surprise that Biggs focuses on the watery realm of southern Vietnam and the Mekong Delta, "a society in which the lines between 'the local' and 'the foreign' (or between 'traditional' and 'modern') had long been blurred" (Biggs 2009, 141).

Even though Biggs has a very specific definition of nation-building applied to Cold War South Vietnam, his approach can be applied to the wider definition of nation-building adopted here, namely state-led nationalism. By focusing on the local, Biggs' work shows how grand nation-building plans were adapted to conditions 'on the ground' with widely varying results across Vietnam. Similarly, Shawn McHale (2009, 105) points to the growing post-war autonomy of the Mekong Delta, something that was unsurprisingly underplayed in subsequent nationalist propaganda. Biggs and McHale question accounts of border zones being gradually brought under the state's purview through the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's New Economic Policy. This is not to cast doubt on this process and the scholarship elucidating it (Hardy 2003), but merely to point out that research questions framed to fit the nation-state container might overlook more fine-grained findings and the "forging of new representations" (Biggs 2009, 143). Neither is this about dealing in counter-factuals, or looking for unfulfilled potential (Duara, cited in Taylor 1998), but simply about looking for perspectives, narratives, approaches and insights outside the nation-state frame. For example, the historian Christopher Goscha (1995) has shown how the borders of Indochina and Vietnam remained fluid in the minds of the Vietnamese (erstwhile Indochinese) Communist Party for much of the 1930s and 40s, an ambivalence that found expression in Vietnam's Cold War relations with Cambodia and Laos. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's ascendant leaders did not feel constrained by a particular nationalist narrative, which they only began to promote *ex post facto*. Similarly, there is nothing 'natural' about the nation-state.

Keith Taylor's (1998, 950) work restores historical specificity to enduring, nationally or regionally-imbued stereotypes and breaks the spatial and temporal linearity of nationalist narratives, embodied in the notion of the Red River Delta as the cradle of Vietnamese civilization and its southwards march (*nam tiến*). Yet in substituting the temporal plane of *longue durée* for a territorial plane, Taylor retains some of the restricted, two-dimensional approach he is attempting to transcend. Similarly, Tappe and Pholsena (2014, 9,10) question the 'holism' of the national community and the 'state-staged national imaginary,' only to conceptualise landscape as a 'contextual horizon of perception' that frames people's sense of place, time and community (Tappe and Pholsena, 2014, 6). Their evocation of layers of meaning also suggests flat, delineated surfaces that recall cartographic representations, rather than three-dimensional nodes or networks (Sutherland 2010, 22). The following section asks how an approach inspired by the notion of post-modern mandala might find expression today.

Section II. Moving beyond methodological nationalism

What are the normative projects to emerge from existing critical deconstructions of the nation-state container? We can look for them in the vast and varied literature on political cosmopolitanism (Held 2005, Pollock *et al* 2000), in critical geography (Closs Stephens 2013), in citizenship studies (Isin 2012) or in Bridget Anderson's (2009) radical conception

of a borderless world. We can seek them in critical border and migration studies (Belcher *et al* 2015), critical geopolitics (Parker & Vaughn-Williams 2012), anthropology (Green 2014) and postcolonial history (Burton 2003) as well as in the Southeast Asian histories discussed above. What these approaches have in common is that they focus on the practice/performance of sovereignty in a way that recalls the mandala model of exerting power, thereby shifting the focus away from the Westphalian and colonial concept of the bounded and sovereign nation-state. The implications of this are not confined to the academy, but also help challenge political hierarchies that stymie regional responses to refugee crises, entrench moral binaries that put obligations to compatriots before others, and stoke popular fears and incomprehension of 'non-nationals.'

Belcher *et al* (2015, no page) point out that the concept of migration is a product of the modern international world, in that it presupposes movement across borders from one nation-state to another (see also McKeown 2008). This goes much further than simply defining territorial limits. Bordering practices are also embodied in the very act of ascribing migrant status and whether it is 'irregular' or 'illegal'. As a powerful 'geopolitical imaginary' (Belcher *et al*, 2015, no page), borders go to the heart of relationships of sovereign power. Even recognising that 'margins are central to nationalism' (Harms 2011, 20) reproduces the dichotomy of centre and periphery, insider and outsider (Roszko and Sutherland 2015). Migrants, for example, are "contained through multiple borders (geopolitical, economic, juridical and racial)" (Tazzioli 2015). Geographers have turned their attention to bordering practices and the construction of sovereignty as 'theatre' (Cuttitta 2014) in order to break away from 'the geometric habits that reiterate the world as a single grid-like surface' (Whatmore 2002, 6). Using notions of knots, nodal points or even the post-modern mandala as heuristic devices 'transcends borders' (Tran and Reid 2006, 3) by not delimiting the 'geobody' (Thongchai 1994) in two-dimensional terms. Rather than a given, borders become an element of discourse, a performative space that contributes to creating the 'imagined community' of the nation and its attendant institutional structure, the state. As the unpredictable lifting and enforcement of the European Union's eastern borders to migrant flows in the summer of 2015 clearly demonstrate; 'delimitation, contiguity and coherence have to be constantly reproduced to sustain the effect of territory through time' (Painter 2010, 1105).

Elsewhere (Sutherland 2005c), I have used discourse theory to analyse the nation as a nodal point of discourse, defined as a privileged discursive point of partial fixation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112). Similarly, the notion of a post-modern mandala entails looking for nodal points of power rather than bounded sovereign blocs, and not assuming these will be synonymous with, say, Hanoi or Bangkok. It imagines agents of power as being 'enmeshed' (Ingold 2007, 2) in complex, overlapping networks, just as tributary relationships ebbed, flowed and overlapped. To take another example, translation is a bordering mechanism in that it can entrench, undermine, erase or recreate borders, thereby highlighting their lack of fixity. The consolidation and codification of selected languages as national languages has been crucial in delimiting the contours of modern nation-states in a way that was never the case in pre-modern empires and city states. Strong associations between language proficiency and integration in today's naturalization regimes is a clear legacy of this, with the native speaker as an aspirational norm. The study of language is therefore one means of

transcending the fixed categorizations inherent in methodological nationalism. As Mezzadra and Sakai (2014, no page) point out:

> It is a truism that a language is something one acquires after birth, but against all counterevidence, the concept of the native speaker reconstitutes an individual's belonging to the nation in terms of his or her innate and almost biological heritage. This is how the concept of nationality is most often asserted in ethnic terms.

Benedict Anderson (1991) showed how the introduction of the census, map and museum served to entrench bounded and exclusive ethnic, racial and national categories in Southeast Asia. Census and other such statistical data are still extensively collected across the globe and used for policy-making in all areas of public life, from housing to university admissions. Even when census categories are periodically modified in order to capture population change through intermarriage and migration, they uphold the prevailing view of community diversity as multiple ethnicities and nationalities living side by side, rather than taking a more dynamic and holistic view of people as engaged in a constant process of becoming (Appadurai 1990). Echoing Anderson's (1991) account of the census, Mezzadra and Sakai (2014) show that languages have been bordered off from each other into comparable, countable units. In practice, however, these are no more real than the unity of the nation itself. They are a construct that is reproduced and further entrenched each time the nation-state is used, explicitly or implicitly, as a category of analysis and a badge of belonging to a nation-state whenever would-be citizens are required to assimilate. Yet in his discussion of the linguistic diversity of Vietnamese across territories and centuries, including its written form of *Nôm*, Keith Taylor (1998, 972) suggests that "the actual practice of language on the surfaces of pronunciation, vocabulary, and syntax where local orientations have arisen in response to unshared experiences, aspirations, and creativities" fatally undermines any notion of a common (national) language.

Similarly, a new turn in translation studies challenges the discipline's long-standing but rather simplistic binary that translation takes place from the language of one national culture to another. Edwin Gentzler (no date) points out that translation is inherent in the everyday lives of migrants, commentators, journalists and others whose written and spoken language render a mix of cultural references that cannot easily be disentangled into neatly bounded 'national languages.' Some original language texts are already translations of protagonists' multicultural experience into an imaginative and often innovative vernacular. According to this view, translation is not a unidirectional process across linguistic borders, but rather an ongoing activity within every society, however defined. As a result, the idea of meaningful boundaries breaks down. To 'think without borders', Gentzler suggests we weave a path through 'the translational fabric of a nation.' We are encouraged to seek the lines of communication that have little or no regard for traditional boundaries, and ultimately to leave borders behind completely as part of an analytical framework (though not as a subject of study). Cultural or migrant flows can be defined on their own terms rather than in terms of crossing borders.

In an attempt to break away from the conception of community as a bounded whole dividing insider from outsider, Reiko Shindo posits that no translation can completely render a word's every connotation and association into another language. Rather, translation is

multivocal; its meaning derives from many people sharing it. Shindo (2012, 153) extends this idea to community; 'At the threshold of community is trans-lation (sic) communication where people expose their inability to exist alone.' This, in turn, makes it possible to imagine community not as a closed circle but 'as a line woven by endless sharing' (Shindo 2012, 153), or a continuum of shared moments. According to this relational reading, self and other are not a bordered binary but 'emerge only through surface contact' (Shindo 2012, 158), a momentary meeting in time. Shindo's approach allows us to step outside binaries of insider and outsider, national and foreigner and follow a different route. A relational reading helps to make sense of the patchiness and arbitrariness of border crossings and enforcement, passports, policing and other trappings of the nation-state construct (Lentz 2014, 3; Viyas Mongia 2003; McKeown 2008). This brings me a little closer to something that may or may not be called a postmodern mandala, but is certainly not premised on the nation-state. The final section begins to imagine what an alternative to methodological nationalism might look like in practice through critical reflection on a museum exhibition and visitor responses to it.

Section III. Museums and national metaphors

In *Routes: travel and translation in the late twentieth century*, the anthropologist James Clifford (1997, 24) already critiqued his discipline's 'focus on separate, integral cultures,' arguing instead that "one needs to focus on hybrid, cosmopolitan experiences as much as on rooted, native ones." Clifford's account of travel and translation as integral to cultural analysis made 'constructed and disputed *historicities*, sites of displacement, interference, and interaction, come more sharply into view.' (Clifford 1997, 25, emphasis in original). Museums were central to his analysis. Traditionally powerful centres of 'scientific' authority, museum expertise in preservation and 'accurate' interpretation has been increasingly called into question by the source communities whose cultures it seeks to represent. As both instantiations of power relations and 'performances of identity' (Clifford 1997, 197), museums have a responsibility to be as inclusive as possible and to surrender complete curatorial control over exhibitions. Artefacts and works of art can entrench but also challenge dominant nation-building paradigms in powerfully emotionally or spiritually evocative ways (Miller 2008). As '3D narratives' (Albano 2014, 2) that create atmospheres and evoke emotion through film, photographs, objects, exhibition layouts and other sensory techniques, museums are suitably multifacetted fora for exploring critical responses and alternative approaches to the nation.

Museums have always been and continue to be key nation-building sites (Anderson 1991; Aronsson and Elgenius 2015) as well as contested sites of identity in themselves, and this applies not only to national museums (Kaplan 2006, Sutherland 2010, 2014a, 2014b). Many museums have become more responsive and inclusive towards both local and source communities, however defined (Montanari 2015). In an analysis of a French ecomuseum in a multicultural community, for example, Montanari notes that its local commitment encourages self-reflection and self-awareness, reflecting the view that ecomuseums should be like a 'mirror in which a population could seek to recognize itself and explore its relationship to the physical environment' (Rivière, cited in Montanari 2015, 369). Montanari emphasises stable identity, cultural memory and rootedness in a place, however, whereas a museum's role may

also be to challenge and explore supposedly stable identities. For example, Kylie Message (2006, 4-1) examines the Centre Culturel Tjibaou in New Caledonia as embodying an image of "Kanak culture as flexible, diasporic, progressive and resistant to containment by traditional museological spaces." Message identifies this institution as one of the 'new museums' that explicitly challenge contemporary nation-states and their boundaries in a self-consciously political, postcolonial and inclusive way, often through non-linear exhibitions, and the mingling of contemporary art with everyday artefacts in innovative architectural spaces. According to Message, this readiness to embrace the contradictions and tensions within contemporary culture works against static or essentialising representations, privileging instead interactive displays of renewal and becoming. In the New Caledonian context of a postcolonial 'struggle over nationhood' (Message 2006, 4-1), for example, such an approach is in stark contrast to depictions of the nation in terms of historical *longue durée* and 'bounded serialities' (Anderson 1991). Angharad Closs Stephens (2010, 2013) has successfully critiqued linear and bounded 'ways of seeing' the nation, using contemporary art installations to develop alternative imaginaries that convey the fragmented and fluctuating nature of identities.

In Vietnam, analyses of museum exhibits have been used to illuminate aspects of its postcolonial nation-building, including colonialism (Sutherland 2005b), the Vietnam War (Schwenkel 2008), the subsidy period (Mclean 2008), and nationalist historiography (Sutherland 2010). The following discussion adds to this scholarship from the perspective of an exhibition co-curator, also incorporating evidence of visitor responses. It is important to contrast this critical approach to Vietnamese nation-building with the voices of those contemporary political dissidents who are deconstructing myths of Vietnamese nationhood, challenging the Vietnamese Communist Party's nation-building narrative, and searching for new values to fill the empty vessel of the Vietnamese nation-state. Even though they variously define Vietnam as 'a fragmented, inorganic, and shifting collection of insecure and confused individuals' (Phạm Thị Hoài cited in Vu 2014, 47), or "a giant formless mass" (Vương Trí Nhàn cited in Vu, 48) they remain within the analytical frame of the nation. They neither engage in the semantic acrobatics of earlier VCP leaders attempting to reconcile nationalism and international socialism, nor do they adopt the sub-state perspective illuminated in the work of McHale and Biggs, or the regionalist views chronicled in Goscha. Finally, they appear to eschew what we might call the cosmopolitan model, exemplified in online communities of like-minded activists, to create new allegiances by connecting with political exiles, diasporics and other supporters beyond Vietnam. The exhibition discussed below set out to do something else again, namely to challenge visitors' assumptions around the nation-state paradigm itself.

Curated by the Oriental Museum in Durham, a small university town in the north-east of England, the aim of the exhibition 'Vietnam; A Nation not a War' was to highlight the constructed nature of the nation through a country case study unfamiliar to most visitors. Although something of a cliché to observers and researchers on Vietnam, the title immediately resonated with curators as an appropriate 'hook' to draw in visitors, whilst acknowledging the fortieth anniversary of the Vietnam War's end. The paying exhibition attracted 849 visitors over three months. An accompanying schools education programme – initially titled Parallel Lives - was designed to encourage young visitors to compare their

sense of national identity to selected aspects of Vietnamese national identity. One of the exhibition's achievements was to develop the Oriental Museum in Durham as a principal collection of Vietnamese artefacts in the UK, since initial research had identified limited holdings elsewhere. Alongside ceramics and colonial objects, the exhibit featured personal belongings, specially collected everyday items and consumer goods, confounding some visitors' expectations that a museum exhibition should predominantly contain antiques (personal communication).

In some ways, the exhibition did not represent a radical departure from linear nationalist narratives. Partly for reasons of limited space, the exhibition was laid out along a predetermined, snaking path, first chronologically and then thematically. This did not in itself encourage visitors to interpret the nation and national identity as 'contested, diverse and multicultural.' (Sutherland 2010, 103; Message 2006). The exhibition also began with a timeline, reinforcing the linear structure through a conventional nation-building narrative stretching back thousands of years. Two separate cases devoted to Vietnam's ethnic minorities probably gave a first impression that they stood apart from the majority ethnic *Kinh*. This is a curatorial strategy I have explicitly criticised in Hanoi's National Museum of History's aestheticised – as opposed to historical - representation of Cham culture (Sutherland 2010, 126). The predominance of textiles in these cases, roughly separated into inhabitants of Vietnam's central and northern Highlands, may have reinforced an essentialising view of ethnic minorities as unchanging and folkloric. Practical display constraints excluded an item of Bahnar clothing combining a 1960s, 'hippie' aesthetic with traditional woven colours and techniques, which could have helped undermine this perspective. The case displaying Hmong textiles, however, included items that had been produced for the tourist market, as well as commentary from young Hmong women themselves who have become part of northern Vietnam's tourist economy by selling handmade items in Sapa (Turner *et al*, 2015, 125). The accompanying information panels explicitly addressed the idea of minorities as being on the geographical and discursive periphery of Vietnamese nation-building. The exhibition was also designed to subvert and disrupt the display techniques outlined above, thereby challenging the dominant narrative at the same time as 're-presenting' it. In so doing, it took a small step outside methodological nationalism as a frame for understanding Vietnameseness, to offer less nation-state-centric perspectives. For example, the panel accompanying the timeline explicitly questioned this way of presenting history. A large storycloth stitched by Hmong refugees dominated the section on the 'Vietnam War,' in order to highlight its devastating impact on Laos and Cambodia. Installations by the contemporary artist Anthony Key, interspersed among glass-cased exhibits throughout the exhibition, were the principal means used to question the dominant national narrative. These had the advantage of not addressing national identity through predefined groups or even individual experience (Purkis 2013, 55), but through conceptual art open to a wide range of interpretations and personal reflections. The curators also made a conscious decision to present the exhibition space as a 'white cube', in order to distance the visitor somewhat from the more immersive space of a museum.

A British citizen of Chinese heritage, who grew up in South Africa, Anthony Key has spent his life as an artist exploring hybrid identities through the ironic and playful appropriation of stereotypes surrounding Chinese food. It was the artist's express wish that

his works be allowed to 'speak for themselves.' Accordingly, the pieces had short labels, as in an art gallery setting. The artist's statement was also kept to a minimum, whilst situating his work in the following way:

> Anthony Key's work encourages us to think about national identity in the UK context and to draw parallels between Vietnam and our own countries of origin. His focus on food is a good way to grasp more difficult ideas like national belonging, especially as lots of people first encounter other cultures through their most famous dishes [...] Anthony Key's experience as a migrant to Britain is powerfully expressed in his artwork, from the sense of 'Trespassing' evoked through barbed wire, through the waiting room for residency rights documented in 'Jerusalem', to the cultural intermingling captured in his food-based works. He prompts us to reflect on who we are and how we identify with, or exclude, other members of our chosen national community.

On turning the first corner of the exhibition, visitors encountered *Trespassing*, a large-scale installation composed of delicate coils of barbed wire made of noodles and twisted around a wooden spool. Further on, they passed *Jerusalem*, a wall of numbered tickets picked from the floor of a UK immigration office, and a specially commissioned tea cosy made of knitted noodles. An intricate and fragile evocation of tea-drinking as a shared 'national tradition' in Vietnam and the United Kingdom, the unusual material could be read as a comment on how migrants were knitted into the fabric of British society. Humour pervaded the works, such as a satellite dish made from a wok set alongside a case on Vietnam's economic renovation (*đổi mới*). In *Peking Ducks,* a series of Chinese takeaway containers 'flew' across the wall above an old-fashioned fireplace in place of the decorative ceramic ducks popular in post-war British homes. At the end of the exhibition, a touchscreen survey and feedback wall composed of questions above line-drawn maps of the UK and Vietnam encouraged visitors to explore national identity further. There were only 36 responses to the seven question survey – perhaps because it was relatively time-consuming or easily overlooked - but 14% of visitors (n=114) left post-it notes on the feedback wall. This was a high response rate for this medium, suggesting that the exhibition was thought-provoking. Indeed, all but two survey respondents (95%) felt the museum was an appropriate place to address nation-building, and 61% saw similarities between the UK and Vietnam with regard to nationhood and identity. Follow-up answers singled out a shared, defining attachment to history, ethnic diversity and integration, national pride, and a commitment to family linked to a wider allegiance to the nation-state. A single comment sidestepped the comparison with what might be described as a relaxed, cosmopolitan response; 'all humanz man, we aint so different (sic).'

Visitor tracking was undertaken for 5% of visitors, giving an impression of how much time was spent at each exhibit. Figure 2 shows that, taken as a whole, less time was spent viewing and discussing the art works than the exhibits. This also applied to the time spent specifically looking at the objects in glass cases, rather than reading the accompanying text panels. Despite the art gallery aesthetic, then, visitors preferred to examine museum objects than contemplate art works. Visitor feedback to museum staff suggested they would have valued more information on the art works to aid interpretation (Rachel Barclay, personal communication). The relative lack of guidance appears to have left visitors nonplussed, rather than inspiring them to reconsider the nation-state construct. Similarly, a large-scale survey of

visitors to nine national museums in Europe found that although the exhibition structure, approach and contents could influence national identity construction, visitors 'tended to use their visit in order to reinforce and support their pre-existing views and ideas' (Bounia *et al* 2012, 17).


Figure 2: Results of visitor tracking

An analysis of the feedback wall using the Generic Learning Outcomes framework, which was developed for museums to code qualitative data (Hooper-Greenhill *et al* 2003), showed that 55% of the comments related to attitudes and values and a further 19% to enjoyment, inspiration and creativity. This was a very positive result in relation to the aims of the exhibition, which set out to challenge notions of the nation as much as inform the visitor about Vietnam (only 9% of responses related to knowledge and understanding). Further analysis of substantive comments in the attitudes and values category showed that many respondents reproduced dominant paradigms of nationhood, variously singling out tradition, borders, culture and memories in response to the question 'What is a nation?'. All the Vietnamese visitors who posted on the wall, among them the Durham University students whose input had helped inform the displays, expressed pride in their country and gratitude that an exhibition should be mounted about 'little & humble Vietnam.' Two of them also signed off on behalf of the Vietnamese people, their narrative of the nation clearly reconfirmed rather than destabilized. Many postings on the feedback wall's outline map of the UK suggested positive associations with the nation, including tolerance, compassion, humour, sharing, family, community and specific characteristics like the countryside, industry, good food and good football teams. Others, by contrast, evoked strongly critical

connotations, commenting in the following terms; 'worthless atavistic throwback' and 'aggressive, bullying, arrogant.' The eighteenth century English writer Samuel Johnson's view of patriotism as 'the last refuge of the scoundrel' was also quoted approvingly. Nobody commented on the appropriateness or otherwise of using two-dimensional outline 'logos' to represent nations (Jazeel 2009), or on the (mapmaker's) choice of 'national' landmarks for illustration. Many of those posting comments on the UK map chose to affiliate with a city or region on that map, suggesting that this was a more immediate identifier for them. Only three respondents rejected the national frame of reference altogether, professing pride in being human or in being themselves. The single negative piece of feedback on the exhibition was also the most attuned to the subjectivity permeating its themes and artefacts; "I've learned that whoever designed the exhibition is very forceful in imposing his/her political beliefs on every aspect of the exhibition."

Although several responses singled out Anthony Key's artworks for praise, none linked these explicitly to reflections on the nation. Yet *Trespassing* and *Returning Home* (as described in the introduction to this article) were chosen to open and close the exhibition precisely because they comment powerfully on the spatial metaphors that constitute conventional, imagined geographies of the nation-state. In Anthony Key's *Trespassing* (Figure 3), the barbed wire wound around a central core presumably lies ready to be extended against the trespassing of the title. However, the fact that the barbed wire is made of Chinese noodles suggests a different reading, namely that if the 'foreign body' forms the border, then that also dissolves the binary of belonging. In other words, if this is the barbed wire embodying the border, perhaps the 'Essential Outsider' (Chirot & Reid 1997) that serves to delimit the boundary between 'us' and 'them', in this case nation and other, is not as clear-cut as the nation-state construct would have us believe. *Trespassing* calls to mind Bruno Latour's 'skeins' (cited in Sutherland 2010, 6) and the 'skein of journeys through which each state was experienced' (Anderson 1991, 115) initially by colonial functionaries, increasingly by indigenous intelligentsia and today by migrants. At the very least, it draws attention to the violence inherent in bordering and exclusion, without which nation-state sovereignty would be largely meaningless. Although the foreign body is only represented in abstract terms, the imposing presence of *Trespassing* disrupts the 'Insider's' unquestioned sense of national belonging.

Figure 3: 'Trespassing' by Anthony Key

Conclusion

"It is no easy matter" as Sheldon Pollock (1998, 32) put it, "to displace let alone replace the notion of the nation form." Stepping outside methodological nationalism requires us to think outside the conceptual apparatus of the nation-state model, as bequeathed by modernity. The once heralded decline of the nation-state (Ohmae 1996) has been overstated, but the analytical and methodological imperative to escape or at least question its structural logic remains. The notion of a post-modern mandala is but another metaphor to add to that of knots (Green 2014), webs (Closs Stephens and Squire 2012) or tangled lines (Ingold 2007) as a means of moving beyond analyses premised on bounded communities. It pays homage to the pioneering work of historians of Southeast Asia in writing 'Borderless Histories' (Tran & Reid 2006). In a recent interview, the eminent anthropologist and historian Anne Laura Stoler (2015) referred to a student's work on bombs in Lebanon. Rather than ask how predefined communities responded to the presence of these bombs, the student's approach was to examine how their existence produce relationships and political claims. In other words, the student did not assume bounded communities and investigate these, but rather set out to address the knot or tangle of relationships created by a particular object and situation. Similarly, museums exhibitions use - less explosive - objects as a starting point for reflection. As a means of representing and interpreting the nation, artifacts and works of art can entrench but also challenge dominant nation-building paradigms in powerful ways that encourage

critical reflection and open up alternative approaches to methodological nationalism. By disrupting the linear national narrative of *longue durée* with thought-provoking works of contemporary art, the exhibition 'Vietnam: A Nation not a War' encouraged visitors to question notions of national belonging that are often taken for granted. The evidence suggests that this ambition was only partially realised. Nevertheless, many visitors were led by the Vietnamese example to interrogate their own view of the nation, and were touched by Anthony Key's works, which offer innovative perspectives on national belonging for further research.

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Large-scale music compositions and novel technology innovations – Summarizing the process of *Voices of Umeå*, an artistic research project

Anders Lind

Abstract

Voices of Umeå was a three-year interdisciplinary artistic research project initiated in 2012 by the author. The main aim with the project was to explore new artistic possibilities for composition and performance practices within the field of contemporary art music. More specifically, artistic possibilities, which arises when non-professional performers regardless musical backgrounds enables to participate in the composition and performance processes. The idea was to develop and explore new pedagogical methods to involve non-professional performers by using new technology and combining knowledge from the fields of artistic and educational practices. Different aspects of participatory art were embraced in the artistic processes aiming towards three compositions, including two concerts and one exhibition. An action research model in three steps –planning, action and analysis of results inspired the methodology, where the analysis and experiences of each cycle within the project were affecting the further cycles of the project.

This article reports from selected parts of the process of the project and contributes with new knowledge to the fields of animated music notation and participatory art.

Keywords

Animated Music Notation, Participatory art, Non-Professional Performers, Interactive Music Instruments, Music Composition, Music Performance, Technology Innovations, Pedagogical Innovations, Human Voice, Action Research, Artistic Research.

Introduction – Background and aims from two perspectives

Composers working within the field of contemporary art music are in general used to compose music directly for high-skilled professional musicians. Having professional musicians as performers gives you the opportunity to explore the whole register of artistic possibilities of the traditional instruments. Since musicians dedicated to performing music within the field of contemporary art music are specialists on interpreting the western traditional notation system, as a composer you can communicate the musical ideas exactly as intended to the performer. However, as a composer you still have to be aware of the impact the choice of performers and their specific musical backgrounds will have to the artistic result. What would for instance happen to the artistic result if non-professional performers

regardless musical background would be able to participate in a composition written within the field of contemporary art music?

As a composer I´m primarily interested in sounds and how they could be organized to achieve a novel composition. More specific, sounds organized in multiple individual parts to create interesting advanced musical textures. If the sounds were computer generated, performed by a professional musician or achieved by a school child, would in my opinion not necessary be crucial for the unique quality of the artistic expression. Indeed, having professional musicians performing in an orchestra gives you much more possibilities, due to their knowledge and background to accomplish your intended musical ideas. However, I do believe that having a crowd of non-professionals performing individual simple to execute sounds in multiple parts also could result in a unique artistic expression. The issue is how to organize the performance of a composition written in multiple parts if the performers not are familiar to the traditional notation system and to be led by a traditional conductor?. Indeed, experimenting with graphic notation could enable non-professionals to perform musical textures in multiple parts[1], but still the artistic result is hard to predict since it´s often based on improvisations and mainly open for individual interpretations.

In the artistic research project *Voices of Umeå (VoU)* I was interested in composing fixed compositions, where a crowd of non-professional performers also could be synchronized with electronically processed sounds. Furthermore, I wanted to work within the concept of participatory art, which fitted well into my intentions to work with crowds for the compositions. The choice of using the human voice and electronically processed sounds of the human voice as the only musical sound sources was because of its wide artistic possibilities and the fact that everybody with a sounding voice could be a potential participator in the project (Lind, 2015).

The artistic vision of the project was clear, but the overall question was how to get there. The complexity of the intended performances for the project demanded non-traditional methods to be able to reach the artistic visions within the project. Situated at a department with a focus on the field of education made me inspired to include a pedagogical perspective to achieve the artistic aims of the project. The ambition was to use an interdisciplinary approach to seek for innovatory solutions of the problems. The idea was: *-To achieve the artistic aims of the project a pedagogical method and tool needed to be developed and explored, and in the contrary: To achieve the pedagogical aims of the project an artistic process needed to be put into action and to be analyzed. The two perspectives would influence and be developed directly dependent on each other during the process of the project.*

Another choice made was that new technology should be implemented and used as a tool to achieve the artistic and pedagogical aims of the project. Mainly because of my interest and experience of using new technology to achieve defined artistic visions in my work as a composer, but also because of my ambition of exploring the potentials of new technology innovations as new pedagogical tools inspiring the development of new pedagogical methods in musical processes.

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1 http://www.teachingideas.co.uk/notation/graphic-notation (2016-10-08)
http://funmusicco.com/sample-resource-graphic-notation-for-primary-or-elementary/ (2016-10-08)

The aims of the project were formulated and divided into two perspectives:

1. Artistic perspective:
    -   Explore the possibilities of using a crowd of non-professional performers including schoolchildren regardless their musical backgrounds integrated with electronic sounds as sources for musical expressions.
    -   Explore the human voice integrated with electronically processed sounds of the human voice as musical expressions
    -   Develop new technology innovations to involve non-professional musicians including schoolchildren in the creative processes of music composition and performance to enhance an artistic idea.
    -   Develop new technology innovations as new music instruments to simplify performance of and enable new musical expressions.

2. Pedagogical perspective:
    -   Develop new technology innovations as pedagogical tools/ methods to enable non-professional performers including schoolchildren regardless their musical backgrounds to participate in composition and performance processes of advanced music compositions.
    -   Develop new technology innovations as new music instruments to enable non-professional musicians including schoolchildren regardless their musical backgrounds to perform advanced musical structures.
    -   Draw attention to – and educate about advanced experimental music to a diverse audience by involving non-professional musicians including schoolchildren into the creative processes.

To explore the formulated aims of the project my choice was to work with a methodology inspired by an action research model in three steps –planning, action and analysis of results. Since the idea was that the formulated aims from the two perspectives would influence and be developed directly dependent on each other I divided the project in separate cycles. Each cycle contained the three steps, were the action step of an individual cycle were analyzed affecting the further cycles within the project. Each cycle started with new research questions dependent on the previous cycle. The overall research question, which permeated the whole project was – *How to enable non-professional performers to participate in advanced composition and performance practices to enhance an artistic expression?*

   VoU involved thousands of common citizens of Umeå in the process and collaborations with several organizations and culture/ technology institutions like Norrlandsoperan[2], Västerbottens Museum[3] and Interactive Institute[4]. The project was also a part of the Umeå municipality´s European Capital of Culture program, which was realized in the year of 2014. Within the project two artistic music compositions: *Part I: We Speak Music!* (Lind, 2013) and *Part III: Everybody Scream!!!* (Lind, 2014), two interactive voice recording installations:

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2 <www.norrlandsoperan.se>
3 <www.vbm.se>
4 <https://www.tii.se/groups/umea>

The Voice Harvester (True et al. 2012) and *U-Paint!* (Lind, Yttergren, 2013) and one exhibition with three interactive music instruments: *Part II: The Singing Instruments!!* (Lind, 2013) were created. The project also included the development of *The Max Maestro - an animated music notation system* (Lind, 2014), which enables non-professional musicians regardless their musical backgrounds to participate in advanced musical performances with limited time for rehearsal. This article reports from selected parts of this interdisciplinary artistic research project and contributes with new knowledge to the fields of artistic practice and artistic research, more specifically, the fields of animated music notation and participatory art.

Survey of the fields

Artistic research

What is artistic research? And what is/are, or is/are there any difference/s between artistic practice and artistic research?. With a background as a freelance composer within the field of contemporary art music those were some of the questions about artistic research raised for me when started working at the Department of Creative Studies, Umeå University in 2011. The Swedish research council defines artistic research as follow:

> *The point of departure for artistic research is found in the artistic process and works. Research, regardless of art form, is practice-based and includes intellectual reflection aimed at developing new knowledge. The results of artistic research are usually presented both as creations and in written form.*[5]

Among researchers within the field, artistic research is defined as a young field in constant development (e.g Arlander 2014, 27). According to Sinziana Ravini the artistic research field has since its genesis been divided into two categories: (1) Those who think artistic research should challenge and incorporate the academic models by playing on the human sciences side of the pitch. (2) Those who think artistic research should be conducted with anti-academic approaches with the premises of art itself (Ravini 2013, 109). Furthermore Mika Hannula, Juha Suoranta and Tere Vadén (2005) emphasize the need for artistic research to develop a research culture suited for the field and not only adopted from other research fields. The opinion of the need for openness to different approaches in artistic research seems to be shared by many researchers (Ravini 2013, 115) and some even claims as Andreas Gedin, artist and PHD in Fine Art: "*…artistic research (read art) must be protected against the devastating, self-sufficient apparatus of institutional structures…*" (Ravini 2013, 113).

The fact that the field of artistic research is very young and seems to be in constant development could be seen from both a positive and negative perspective. From the positive, an artistic research field in development and open to new methods and theories not yet established by the academia could lead to new innovative forms of research approaches, and from the negative, the not yet fully established methods and theories of artistic research could affect the credibility of the results presented within an artistic research project. In the *VoU* project I wanted to explore if and how working within an artistic research project and

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5 http://www.vr.se/inenglish/shortcuts/artisticresearch.4.5adac704126af4b4be2800011077.html (2016-10-08)

adopting a specific methodology would affect my artistic processes and results, and in the contrary I was hoping that the artistic processes within the project could contribute to the development of the increasing field of artistic research.

As the *VoU* project was my first time formally working within the field of artistic research I saw this project as a pilot for me trying to get a deeper understanding of the concept of artistic research by practically working inside one. Still, I was not open to let a theoretical approach from a methodology accepted within another field in the academia, which not was designed to work with my artistic processes to fully take control of my project. My idea was to use my experiences working as a freelance composer as a fundament and guide my processes within the project by taking inspirations from accepted methods within the academia. Furthermore, as the definition by the Swedish research council states, developing new knowledge to the field/s of artistic practice and/or artistic research was an essential aim of the project.

Participatory art

My artistic and pedagogical aims to explore within the project fitted well into the context and form of participatory art, which could be described as a concept of art involving participatory elements as: interactive, relational, cooperative, activist, dialogical and community-based art (Kelly, 2014). More specifically a piece of art, which cannot be appreciated and function properly, unless the viewer is physically present in the artwork itself or a performance of it (Novitz 2013). In participatory art the participating people are often referred to as citizens, regular folks, community members, or non-artists and interacts with a professional artist to create the work (Kelly, 2014). In *VoU* I decided to use the term "non-professional" performers or singers for the participators, because the project involved a lot of students and school children, which were dedicated to different musical practices and therefor could not be seen as "common citizens". The ambition was still that the processes involving participatory elements should be open to anyone regardless their musical background.

In the VoU project I was interested in using some aspects of participatory art in the musical processes, but still maintain the control of the composition process being able to structure the musical material as a composer. The first aspect of participatory art was used in the sound collecting process, which was the fundamental process the artistic idea of the project was built on. The common citizens of Umeå were creating the musical material to be used within the project by interacting with two specially designed voice-recording instruments. Other aspects of participatory art were used in the performance situations of the three compositions created within the project. In the first and the third composition non-professional singers with no or very modest score reading knowledge or experiences of following a traditional conductor participated in the musical performances. The second composition was an exhibition with interactive instruments, where the art was created when people interacted with them. The main idea with adopting the concept of participatory art was to explore the artistic and pedagogical aims defined within the project by involving non-professional performers into a contemporary art music process, instead of the common use of having professionals especially dedicated to performing contemporary art music.

Animated music notation

As the project proceeded the processes were leading towards the field of animated music notation to be able to fulfill the artistic and pedagogical aims of the project. Animated music notation could briefly be described as animated graphics presented on a screen to give performance instructions of a music composition instead of the written traditional western notated musical score. The field of animated music notation could be described as small but emerging. In the web forum Animated Notation Dot Com (Smith, 2015) an attempt of gathering information about the field has been made. The Australian-based composers/researchers Cat Hope and Lindsay Vickery have been working with animated notation in their compositions, building their own Decibel Score Player and written articles on the subject (Hope, Vickery, 2010, 2011, 2013). Jason Freeman is another composer/researcher working with animated notation as well as aspects of participatory art in his projects (Freeman, 2008, 2010, 2013), not to forget the Icelandic composer collective S.L.A.T.U.R[6] which have worked with animated notation in several projects. From an educational and pedagogical perspective the composer and music teacher Shane Mc Kenna has used animated notation in his compositions as well as a pedagogical tool in school classes to encourage musical collaboration and ensemble performances (Mc Kenna, 2011). Shane Mc Kenna has also developed Dabbledoomusic, (Mc Kenna, Redmond, 2012) a music education application for primary school children.

The Process - Organization and methodology of a complicated process

Research setting

In 2011 I got employed as a Creative Director at the Department of Creative Studies (Teachers Education), Umeå University, Sweden. As a composer and musician working within the field of contemporary art music I was used to in my previous work explore my artistic ideas within a defined project. My artistic explorations, which always is a part of my composition process also includes aspects of research, even if they are not always formally expressed and documented. My background as a composer and the initial ideas for the project made me decide that the project should mainly be executed as a practice-based artistic research project, but I was also interested in exploring what my experiences working within the field of artistic research, would do for my composition process and my artistic expression.

The overall process of the project was organized and divided into a number of different cycles, where every cycle had its own internal process. Each cycle was linked together and connected to the overall organization influencing the development of each other's processes. The different cycles within the overall process were defined as: collecting sounds from the citizens of Umeå, experimental choir workshops, electronic sound processing, creative process with students/ children and the composition process. These cycles were leading towards and affecting the development of the novel technology innovations and the three music compositions (I: We Speak Music!, II: Singing Instruments!!, III: Everybody Scream!!!) to be created within the project.

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6 S.L.A.T.U.R is based in Reykjavik, Iceland. <www.slatur.is>

LJUDINSAMLING AV RÖSTER
FRÅN UMEÅS BEFOLKNING
COLLECTING SOUNDS OF VOICES
FROM THE CITIZENS OF UMEÅ

EXPERIMENTELLA
KÖRWORKSHOPS
EXPERIMENTAL
CHOIR WORKSHOPS

ELEKTRONISK
LJUDBEARBETNING
ELECTRONIC
SOUND-
PROCESSING

SKAPANDE I SKOLMILJÖ
CREATIVE PROCESS WITH
STUDENTS/CHILDREN

KOMPOSITIONSPROCESS
COMPOSITION PROCESS

PART I
WE SPEAK MUSIC!

PART II
SINGING INSTRUMENTS!

PART III
EVERYBODY SCREAM!!!

The content of the three compositions, where not initially defined and needed to be open to allow the outputs of the different cycles within the project to affect and make a clear impact. *From the artistic perspective: the behaviors of the pedagogical music technology innovations to be created within the project, would affect the process and the artistic outcome of the three compositions, and from the pedagogical perspective: the artistic intentions with the three compositions and reflections from putting the compositions into action, would affect the process and the outcome of the pedagogical music technology innovations.*

I needed to have some open lines within the project to fully be able to explore the defined artistic and pedagogic aims and to hold on to the process for the project, but I also needed to have some fixed elements, which would establish the foundation of the project. As stated in the introduction these fixed elements were to: **-** *work with the human voice and electronic processed sounds from the human voice as the only sound source for the artistic outputs*

within the project, -work with the concept of participatory art to enhance an artistic idea in both the composition and performance processes within the project and finally, - work with new technology as a tool to explore the artistic and pedagogic aims defined within the project. Some outlines were also fixed for the three compositions, where the compositions in part I and part III should be concerts exploring the concept of participatory art in performance practice. Furthermore the composition in part II should be an exhibition exploring the concept of participatory art in both composition and performance practices. I chose an artistic theme for each of the compositions: Part I: Speaking, Part II: Singing and leading to the expressive climax and grand finale: Part III: Screaming!. In this article I have chosen to focus on some of the cycles, which I found especially interesting and which had a significant impact on the project as a whole.

Methodology

The research approach applied within the project can be broadly characterized as artistic (e.g Hannula et al, 2005). The experience, knowledge and skills of me as a composer/researcher were an important source for the analysis of the cycles. Furthermore, the overall ambition with the project was to contribute with new knowledge to the domain of artistic research and practice, by analyzing the results of putting artistic compositions into action. More specifically, the methodology was inspired by an action research approach based on work by Lewin (1958). Lewin´s action research process evolves in cycles, each of which includes three key steps: *planning*, *action*, and *analysis*. Being aware of that Lewin´s model was created for research within the field of social science my idea was to pick out the parts I considered was best according to the aims of my project. The fundamental idea with action research of putting things into action and then analyzing the results and having the analysis affecting the further cycles within a project suited very well with my intentions. Especially since I needed to explore an approach, which enabled non-professional performers/singers to participate in advanced musical composition and performance processes, which I did not knew of yet. However, my intentions was to explore the artistic possibilities which arises in these settings and not to observe social behaviors of a group in a social experiment, which was my reason to base the methodology on some of the outlines of Lewin´s action research model. The actual implementation of the model was different for each of the cycles, but the template I used was defined as follow:

Step 1: Planning.	Considering my previous knowledge and experiences as a composer, considering analysis of results from other cycles within the project, inspiration from other related works, composing processes, building processes, planning processes.
Step 2: Action.	Performances/Exhibiting's of the three compositions within the project (2 Concerts and 1 Exhibition), the workshop sessions, putting the voice recording installations in public.
Step 3. Analysis of results	Analysis of results of step 2. (The analysis of results would affect the step 1 in another cycle within the project)

Each cycle started with new research questions, which was defined dependent on the analysis of the previous cycles. Audio recordings were made of the action steps to enable analyzing the artistic output of each cycle. The experiences of myself participating as a composer, performer and researcher in the action steps were also included as data in the analyzing processes. As a result of me being the composer, performer and researcher in the project my previous artistic knowledge and experience also had a significant impact on the analysis of results.

The Voice Recording Instruments - Collecting sounds of voices from the citizens of Umeå

The fundamental idea was to start collecting sounds of voices from the citizens of Umeå and create a large electronic sound bank with different voices, which later could be used as the main musical material for the three compositions to be created within the project. For the voice collecting process two voice recording instruments where created in collaboration with a team from Interactive Institute in Umeå. The aim with the two instruments was to engage and inspire the citizens of Umeå to participate in the project and record their voices by interacting with the instruments. As a composer I found the idea to use aspects of participatory art to collect the fundamental music material for a composition very interesting. By adopting this method I was inviting the citizens of Umeå to create the fundamental music material for the project by using their voices. My role together with the team from Interactive Institute was to create a novel music technology innovation as an artistic and pedagogical tool to inspire the citizens to participate and make their best effort in creating unique, personal and interesting sounds with their voices. Initially I was interested in getting sounds, which were expressive, naïve and personal. Two main research questions were asked to start the development of the first voice recording instrument: *(1) How do we get people to be engage, inspired and most important to interact with the instrument?* and *(2) How do we get people to make expressive, naïve and personal sounds without inhibitions?*

The Voice Harvester

Step 1: Planning. Based on my own experiences from collecting voices in a previous project (Lind, 2008) I knew some of the crucial issues we needed to deal with to be able to collect the voices as intended. The experiences from the team of Interactive Institute working with this kind of public installations also was important in the planning process. (Fällman, 2003, 2008) The voice is a very personal instrument and even if it is used in our everyday communication with the world around us, we are in general shy to use our voice in expressive ways in public. We needed to approach the citizens with an instrument, which would engage them to go beyond their comfort zone to experiment and explore the full potential of their voices. The instrument should inspire the people to make intuitive and naïve sounds with their voices, without feeling awkward or embarrassed, which certainly would affect their interactions with the instrument. Ideally I wanted to have personal unique recorded sounds of voices from a diverse group of people, in terms of age, musical background, gender, social groups and so on...

The Voice Harvester finally took shape as a free-standing, interactive voice recording instrument. This physical, interactive installation was created to provide direct feedback in a physical, tangible form to whatever sounds the user fed into it (True et al. 2013, 3004). Three microphones were connected to a computer with a pre-programmed Max/MSP[7] stand alone application, which processed the input signal from the microphones and output it to three speakers. When the users altering their voices in terms of pitch and volume the installation would respond with immediate feedback. Three acrylic tubes containing three different materials were attached to the three speakers and when sound came out from the speakers the materials started to move. The material used for the three tubes were paprika powder, blue glitter and water with red cochineal (True et al. 2013, 3005).

Step 2: Action. *The Voice Harvester* was exhibited in various public spaces in Umeå to meet the citizens, starting in the beginning of 2013. A press release was handed out to various media in Umeå, announcing the start of the voice collecting process and inviting the citizens of Umeå to participate in the project. *The Voice Harvester* was first exhibited in various places at Umeå University, before the first evaluation of the recording process.

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7 A visual programming language for media used by composers and artists experimenting with sound and other media. https://cycling74.com/products/max/ (2016-02-10)

'The Voice Harvester' (photo: Elin Berge)

Step 3: Analyses of Results. The sounds recorded by the Voice Harvester and my experiences participating as a workshop leader, composer and researcher in the action process were used as the main data for the analyzing process. *The Voice Harvester* had between 7 February and 1 March been exhibited at Umeå University and collected about 2000 sound files. The content of the files consisted of sounds of voices with varied length from 30 seconds to 5 minutes, which I had programmed as a limit for the recording length. The various lengths of the files indicated that some people stayed to explore the instrument longer and some were just contributing with a short sound. As a composer the amount of files and the content from an artistic perspective collected this far was beyond my expectations. *The Voice Harvester* seemed to generate sounds, which were loud, raw and expressive, often with no absolute pitch. Different screams were commonly found and also noises made on consonants as: *schh, k, fff…* and short non-linguistics letter combinated words as: *Ba!, Te! and Kå!...* I realized at this point that I also was in need of other music material to get a more dynamic and varied sound bank of voices. Taking part in the actions of the process also made me realize that *The Voice Harvester* was not suited for all public spaces. The installation was quite loud, which was disturbing people in the near surroundings not interacting with the installation. The analyses were summarized with two research questions for the development of the second voice recording instrument: *(1) How do we create a voice recording instrument, which would inspire people to make sounds with definite pitches and various amplitude?* and *(2) How do we create a quiet voice recording instrument, which not is disturbing for the surroundings not interacting with it?*

U-Paint!

Step 1: Planning. *The U-Paint!* Instrument was developed based on the experiences and analyses of results from the cycle of *The Voice Harvester.* The initial idea was to create an interface, which could visualize definite pitches made by the human voice to inspire the citizens to use their whole register of their voices in terms of definite pitches. The first idea was to create a videogame, which would be controlled by the human voice in terms of pitch and volume, but in the process we realized that the game would be hard to play for people with no musical background. Finally we ended up with an idea for an interface, where the people could create unique paintings using the human voice in terms of pitch and volume together with tweaking knobs on a custom made interactive palette. The ambition was to inspire the citizens to make sounds containing definite pitches in various dynamics to be included and stored in the sound bank of voices within the project.

Step 2: Action. *The U-Paint* instrument was first exhibited and put together with *the Voice Harvester* at the MADE festival at Norrlandsoperan in May 2013. The festival was a three days event, involving experimental music artists and hundreds of people in the audience. The first recording process of *the U-Paint!* was evaluated after the festival.

Step 3: Analysis of Results. The sounds recorded by the *The U-Paint!* were used as the main data to be analyzed. 240 sound files had been collected by *the U-Paint!* instrument by comparison to 687 sound files collected by *The Voice Harvester* during the same festival. The audio contents of the files were more balanced and included mainly sounds with definite pitches in various amplitudes as expected. Different glissandos in various registers where commonly found. As a composer I found the sounds really inspiring and also a good compliment to the characteristics of the files collected by *the Voice Harvester*. The analysis of my own experiences interacting with *U-Paint!* made me to remove a sound element, which not seemed to make any difference for the experience using the instrument.

The Voice Harvester and *The U-Paint!* Instruments continued their tour during the year of 2013 to collect the sounds of voices from the citizens at various public spaces in Umeå. In the end they had been exhibited in places like Umeå University, Norrlandsoperan, Nolia-Mässan[8] and Västerbottens Museum and the electronic sound bank of collected voices from the citizens finally reached over 10 000 sound files. Nevertheless, it was impossible to say exactly how many people were involved in the collecting process, because one person could obviously record several files. The recorded sound files were later picked out and processed to be the fundamental music material in the three compositions created within the project.

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8 A big public event and trading post in the north of Sweden including 500 exhibitors and approximately 100 000 visitors during 9 days in August each year.

The three compositions

Artistic visions

The overall artistic ideas for the three compositions were a reflection of my ideas and visions as a composer. Initially in the project I had fixed some elements to be explore as artistic material for the compositions. These elements were divided into four categories, which is further explained in the article/exposition: *New artistic possibilities with The Max Maestro – an animated music notation system for non-professional performers:* (Lind, 2015)

1. **Performers: Crowd of non-professionals**
2. **Instruments: Human voices and novel music technology innovations**
3. **Sounds: Human voices and electronically processed Human voices**
4. **Musical material in focus:**
    4.1 **Polytempo textures**
    4.2 **Static and moving approximate pitch cluster textures**
    4.3 **Noise formation textures**
    4.4 **Rhythmical text canon**
    4.5 **Rhythmical accents**

Pedagogical visions

The pedagogical ideas were different in each of the three compositions. In the first and the third composition the idea was to develop a novel music technology innovation as a pedagogical tool to enable the performances in the concert situation. Both as a pedagogical tool replacing the traditional conductor and also as a pedagogical tool replacing the traditional music notation system. The novel music technology innovation as a pedagogical

tool should make the musical material to perform understandable for the performers and also to be able to guide them through the musical performance. In the second composition the idea was to create a series of novel music technology innovations as interactive music instruments. The ambition was to develop the instruments as pedagogical tools, which would enable non-professional performers to compose and perform advanced musical structures within the field of contemporary art music.

Part I: We Speak Music! - A composition including a pilot of an electronic conductor system

Voices of Umeå Part I: We Speak Music! was the first composition to be performed within the project. It was premiered by 40 students from the Department of Creative Studies, Umeå University together with electronically preprocessed sounds of voices through a multi-channel speaker system. The composition was for me seen as a pilot composition, where the concept of participatory art was adopted in the performance situation. The idea was to use the recorded and processed sounds from the citizens of Umeå together with non-professionals with no or very modest score-reading knowledge and no or very little experiences of following a traditional conductor as performers on stage. The process of this pilot composition was the first step of the development process for a pedagogical music technology innovation, which later in the project was leading towards the development of *The Max Maestro* – an animated notation system. As previously described in the process section - The artistic ideas and intentions with the composition would affect the development process of the pilot pedagogical music technology innovation and in the contrary: - The pilot version of a pedagogical music technology innovation and its behaviors and possibilities would affect the artistic outcome for the composition. The initial artistic vision for *We Speak Music!* was to take advantage of the rich capacities of the human voice as a sound source and the possibility to create advanced musical textures in a group of non-professional performers. By performing individual patterns with simple to execute sounds made by their voices and integrating these with electronic pre processed sounds advanced musical textures could be created. The main questions to start the cycle were:*(1) How to synchronize the group of people with the electronic sounds?* and *(2) How to conduct the people with the right performance instructions through the composition?..."* (Lind, 2015)

   Step 1: Planning. The composition process started with examining the content of the electronic sound bank of voices collected by the two voice recording instruments. At this time about 2000 sound files were collected and only by *the Voice Harvester*, since *the U-Paint!* Instrument was first exhibited the day after the premiere of *We Speak Music!*. In general the sounds were very fascinating and abstract, with an expressive and often loud artistic expression. It was interesting to cut out small parts of the sounds and further process them and combining to complex musical textures or new individual percussive sounds. The method of using the voice recording installation to collect the sounds seemed very exciting, because I couldn´t imagine any other way of getting these types of sounds, by instructing a performer or singer verbally. However, I realized that the huge amount of sound files were impossible to examine by myself, which demanded for a method to sort out the most interesting sound files. I decided to concentrate on the recorded files with the biggest size -

longest duration, with a thesis that the longer the recording session with the instrument was, the more inspired and interesting from an artistic perspective the voice interaction would be. Sounds of people speaking were also one of the artistic inputs for the composition. To complement the electronic sound bank I made field recordings of people speaking by instructing them to read a text from Wikipedia about Umeå into my handheld microphone.

The composition process was dependent on the development of the pedagogical music technology innovation, which first pilot in this project was inspired by similar systems I had developed in my previous works (Lind, 2009, 2011). The pilot innovation was also inspired by other composers as John Cage (e.g. Cage, 1991) and his methods of using a common clock to synchronize performers within an ensemble instead of a human traditional conductor. The idea at this point was to have a system, which would work as an electronic conductor leading the non-professional performers through the composition and having the ability to synchronize them with the electronic sounds for the composition. With the *We Speak Music!* composition I wanted to test, which types of musical material was best suited for the group of non-professional performers and the electronic conductor system. My thesis was that different musical textures as polytempo and various cluster and noise textures were better suited for the system than synchronized rhythmical structures and beats. The idea was also to test how much rehearsal time was needed, when using the electronic conductor system and the intended group of people for the performance. A mixed model between using the electronic conductor system and written notation on papers was finally used for the composition. The notation consisted of 37 blocks, with new musical instructions in each block. The length of each block was specified by a timeline (Lind, 2015). A mixture of text and graphical elements inspired by approximate graphic notation (e.g Penderecki, 1960) and the use of boxes to describe individual tempo performance (e.g Lutoslawski, 1964) were used in the notation.

4

13 0 ------------------------- 20 -------------------------

M | RANDOM T-CLICK SOUNDS   T |
| T   T   T   T |
| T |

| RANDOM TOUNGE CLICKS   Click |
| Click |
| Clock   Click   Clock   Click |

44 ------------------------- 60 ------------------- 88 ----------- 102

M | RANDOM TOUNGE-ROLLS AND P-LIPSOUNDS |
| P   P   Plllllpllpl   P   P |
| Plllllpllpl   P |

| RANDOM LIPPRESSURE-SOUNDS |
| Smack!   pppffpppf! Smack! |
| Smack! |

14 0 ----------------- 35 ---------------- 39 ----------------- 44

M   INHALE   (SHIOO... SOUND)

15 0 --- 16 --------- 20 -------- 24 ------------ 38 --------- 42 -------- 46 ---------

M   SCREAM!
A!   O!   E!   Å!   U!   E!

50 ------------- 52 ------------- 54 --------------- 56 --------------- 58 ------------- 60

M
A!   O!   Y!   E!   Ö!

16   **144 BPM**
0 ------------------- 16 --------------------------- 38 --------- 48

M | SCREAM!!! IN RANDOM PITCHES |
| A!   Y!   U!   O!   E! |
| O!   Ö!   Å!   Ä!   I! |

| SCREAM!!! IN RANDOM PITCHES (SLOWER) |
| A!   Y!   U!   O!   E! |
| O!   Ö!   Å!   Ä!   I! |

17 0 ------------ 3 --------------- 6 -------- 8 ------------

M   SCREAM!!!   AAAHHH
EY!   OU!   EY!

11 ------------- 14 ------------- 16 ------------- 19 -------------

M
OU!   AY!   EY!   OU!

22 ------------ 24 ------------- 27 ------------ 30 --------------- 32

M   AAAHHH
EY!   OU!   AY!

Score for We speak Music!

The musical material of the composition included sound textures of speaking voices, which was structured in different layers according to their individual pitch registers, polytempo textures, noise formation textures, rhythmical structures and rhythmical accents. Aspects of spatialization of sounds, were also considered in the performance using a 16-channel speaker system.

Step 2: Action. The premiere of *Voices of Umeå Part I: We Speak Music!* was performed at Ljusgården, Umeå University by 40 students and electronic preprocessed sounds of voices through a multichannel speaker system. The concert was a collaboration with the MADE festival of Norrlandsoperan and it was broadcasted in selected parts by the Swedish Radio P2. The composition had a total duration of 19 minutes and was conducted by an electronic conductor system developed in Max/MSP as a pedagogical tool.

Step 3: Analysis of results. The audio recording of the concert and my experiences participating as a workshop leader, composer and researcher in the action process were used as the main data for the analyzing process. Four workshop/ rehearsal sessions of 90 minutes each, were preceding the performance. The group of students was able to perform the musical ideas as intended, but some questions were raised. Two major problems were formulated: *(1) Hard for the students to remember the musical instructions explained in the written notation,* and *(2) Too much rehearsal time needed for preparing the performance."* (Lind, 2015)

The analysis of result was taken into consideration for the composition process of the third composition and the development process of a new pedagogical tool.

Part II: Singing Instruments!! - Everyday objects becomes novel music instruments to encourage participatory art

The second artistic composition within the project was an exhibition with a series of novel music technology innovations as interactive music instruments. *Voices of Umeå Part II: Singing Instruments!!* was created to explore the concept of participatory art adopted both in a composition and performance situation. The idea was to develop an intuitive platform, by using new technology and knowledge from the fields of artistic and educational practices, where people regardless their musical backgrounds could compose and perform advanced musical structures. From the pedagogical perspective the instruments were developed to encourage workshop sessions with schoolchildren, learning about fundamental musical parameters and concepts of composition and performance practices by performing advanced musical textures together, and from the artistic perspective the instruments were developed to enable new musical expressions and to visualize the electronic sounds in a performance. The ambition was to create a series of instruments, which anybody regardless their musical background could master at first sight. In contrary to acoustical music instruments used in traditional ensemble and orchestra settings, which demands years of training before you can get to the point of what musical performance is about: - Musical interaction (Myllykoski et al. 2015). The main research question for the development of *Singing Instruments!!* was: *How can an intuitive music instrument be developed that: first-time users can quickly master, encourages new musical expressions, and facilitates participatory art?*

Step 1: Planning. The ideas for the exhibition were initially based on my experiences as a composer within the field of contemporary art music. I wanted to develop a series of interactive instruments, which would be intuitive and playful but at the same time a relevant tool for professional exploration of new musical expressions. The initial idea was to work with everyday objects, which we interact with in our everyday life and connect the natural behaviors and the symbolic meanings of these objects to musical parameters. My thesis was by using everyday objects as new physical controllers for musical sounds the main research question could be answered. From the pedagogical perspective the use of everyday objects as interactive instruments would enable everybody regardless musical background to use them and make way for practice-based workshop sessions to educate about aspects of musical performances, and from the artistic perspective the absence of performance tradition routed in these interactive instruments probably would inspire and contribute to the development of new musical expressions (Lind, Nylén, 2016). Furthermore I decided to work with four fundamental musical parameters and connect one or two of these for each of the three instruments: Pitch, Rhythm, Amplitude and Timbre. By limiting the control of each instrument to one or two musical parameters the idea was to better serve the artistic and pedagogical aims for the instruments. From the artistic perspective the limitation would probably inspire and make way for innovative use of the few parameters available with new artistic expressions as a possible result, and from the pedagogical perspective the limitation would enlighten these musical parameters with an aim to educate about fundamental elements of music.

Four washbasins with taps, four bicycle wheels with a skateboard and a dresser with seven drawers were the final selection for the everyday objects to use for the instruments. Next in

the process I examined which types of sensors and electronic components was suitable for transforming the natural movements of the objects into electronic data. The sensors and components I finally ended up with were: analog distance sensors for the dresser with seven drawers, digital reed sensors and magnets for the five bicycle wheels and ordinary potentiometers for the washbasins with taps. The everyday objects were the main controller interfaces for the instruments together with an additional control panel with some buttons and potentiometers to change sounds and for extra sound adjustments. To make the sensors communicate with the computer an arduino[9] board was connected as a bridge between the sensors and the computer. The output signals of the sensors and the electronic components went through the arduino board and into a preprogrammed standalone application made in Max/MSP, which transformed the signals into actions controlling the sounds of the instruments. All the sounds of the instruments were taken from the electronic sound bank of voices collected by the two voice recording instruments within the project. The three instruments were supposed to encourage collaborative musical composition and performance processes and were structured and named after different ensemble setting definitions. The four bicycle wheels with the skateboard became *the Wheel Quintet*, the four washbasins with taps became *the Tap Quartet* and the dresser with seven drawers became *the Drawer Septet.*

'The Wheel Quintet' (photo: Elin Berge)

The Wheel Quintet
1-5 performers, musical parameters in focus: Rhythm/ Tempo

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9 Arduino is an open-source electronics platform based on easy-to-use hardware and software. It's intended for anyone making interactive projects. < https://www.arduino.cc>

Perform with the instrument by spinning the wheels and mix the sounds with the control panels. Create different rhythms and rhythmic patterns by spinning the wheels at different speeds. Spin several wheels simultaneously to create advanced rhythmic patterns. Rhythms can also be created manually if the performer first locates the point on the wheel where the sounds are triggered and then pull the wheel back and forth in a rhythm. Communicate with each other during the performance and explore the musical possibilities of THE WHEEL QUINTET.[10]

'The Tap Quartet' (photo: Elin Berge)

The Tap Quartet

1-4 performers, musical parameters in focus: Pitch/ Amplitude

Perform with the instrument by turning on the water taps and mix the sounds with the control panels. Create different harmonic sounds by mixing together the sounds of the four instruments and then change them to create a musical movement. Communicate with each other during the performance and explore the musical possibilities of THE TAP QUARTET.[11]

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10 Information text for *The Wheel Quintet* taken from the exhibition *Singing Instruments!!*
11 Information text for *The Tap Quartet* taken from the exhibition *Singing Instruments!!*

'The Drawer Septet' (photo: Elin Berge)

The Drawer Septet

1-7 performers, musical parameters in focus: Amplitude/ Timbre

Perform with the instrument by pulling the seven drawers out and in to the chest. Replace the fundamental sounds and adjust the pitches of the sounds by mixing with the control panel on each drawer. Create different timbre formations and dynamic changes by mixing and changing the sounds from the chest. Make a dynamic crescendo by slowly pulling out different boxes, or makes an abrupt change of the overall timbre by suddenly closing a drawer. Communicate with each other during the performance and explore the musical possibilities of THE DRAWER SEPTET.[12]

Step 2: Action. *Voices of Umeå part II: Singing Instruments!!* was exhibited from 29th September to 24th November in 2013 at Västerbottens Museum in Umeå, Sweden. The exhibition with the three instruments of everyday objects also included the two voice recording instruments; *The Voice Harvester* and *U-Paint!,* which were continuing collecting voices from the citizens for the third and final composition within the project. From a composer point of view I tested different artistic possibilities with the instruments during the exhibition period. The action process also included workshop sessions where schoolchildren were invited to participate in exercises involving the instruments and graphic scores.[13] The workshop sessions were executed with four different school classes together with music teacher students from Umeå University and myself as a supervisor. The length of each

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12 Information text for *The Drawer Septet* taken from the exhibition *Singing Instruments!!*

13 Graphic notation is the representation of music through the use of visual symbols instead of traditional music notation. Famous example of a graphic score is *December 1952* by Earl Brown. < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WlGkaP4u2cw>

workshop was 50 minutes and the participating school classes were two classes from the 3rd grade and one class each from the 6th grade and the 9th grade. The ambition with the workshop sessions was primarily to explore the possibility of performing advanced musical structures with school children by using *the Singing Instruments!!*. Specific musical structures used in the workshop sessions were; poly-tempic textures and different timbre and pitch cluster formations. The exercises were specially designed to work with the three instruments. Each instrument got a specific graphic score, which was conducted by a student or myself.

The Wheel Quintet exercise example:
One or two pupils were situated in front of one station including one wheel or the skateboard of the instruments total of five stations forming a quintet – The Wheel Quintet. A graphic score in five individual parts were the written instructions of the musical exercises to be performed together. Four exercises were designed for each instrument and the complexity factor was increasing for each exercise. The musical content within each exercise were divided into separate numbered actions, which the school children should trigger by following directions from the conductor. The conductor (student or myself) was triggering the separate actions by holding up the number of fingers, depending on which action he or she wished to trigger. The actions could be: spin the wheel fast, stop the wheel or spin the wheel slow and increase the volume at the same time. By having the five performers spinning the wheels in different tempos and instructing them to spin at various speeds, changing sounds and volume in different combinations various advanced rhythmic patterns and poly-tempo textures could be performed.

Exercise for the Wheel Quintet

Step 3: Analysis of Results. The experiences of myself participating as a workshop leader and composer were the main data to be analyzed. The Singing instruments first meeting with the general public made me realize that some of the construction needed to be stabilized. Already on the opening vernissage the interactions caused some damages on some of the instruments, especially on *The Tap Quartet*. The issues were adjusted with help from Interactive Institute. The exhibition seemed to be appreciated by the general public, especially among families with children. Different behaviors among the people interacting with the instruments was noticed, which I organized into three categories. (1) Playful interactions where the behaviors of the instruments were explored as a game, with no reflection of being part of a musical process. (2) Playful interactions where the behaviors of the instruments were explored as a game but also as musical instruments. (3) Playful interactions where the behaviors of the instruments were explored as primarily musical instruments.

The experiences of participating in the workshop sessions were analyzed and even if the amount of data collected not was enough to point out any absolute results they indicates that these types of interactive instruments are relevant both from an artistic and pedagogical perspective. With only 50 minutes of actions with the instruments the schoolchildren in all of the grades could perform quite advanced musical textures, which would be hard to perform with traditional ensemble or orchestral instruments. By using these types of intuitive interactive instruments the school children could immediately get to the point of musical interaction and collaboration, which would be impossible if using traditional ensemble or orchestral instruments.

As a composer, the ability to test and explore different theoretical composition ideas by physically interacting with the instruments and hearing the sounding results was very rewarding from an artistic point of view. The possibilities of creating different advanced musical textures with the instruments were taken into the planning process of the third and final composition within the project.

Part III: Everybody Scream!!! - A large scale music composition with animated music notation

The third and final composition within the project was a concert involving elements from all of the other cycles within the project. The concert was seen as the grand finale of the project and was scheduled to be a 45-minutes composition involving three hundred and fifty non-professional singers, three interactive instruments, a novel music technology innovation as a conductor and thousands of pre-processed voices from the citizens of Umeå. The idea was to further explore the concept of participatory art in the performance situation. The major research questions to be solved, which had been processed through the whole project, to accomplish the artistic vision were: *(1) How to enable non-professionals to perform advanced musical structures in sync with an electronic music part?*, and *(2) How to conduct and instruct a large crowd of non-professional performers through a 45-minutes composition but with very limited rehearsal time?*

The Max Maestro – an animated music notation system

Step 1: Planning. The idea of developing an animated music notation system was grown as a result of the analyses of the previous cycles within the project. Especially from the cycle of *We Speak Music!* and the workshop sessions, which were executed with school children within the project. The development of the system was also a result of my experiences as a composer and influenced by other animated notation system created by other composers (Smith, 2012, Pálsson, 2012, Hope, Vickery, 2011 et al.). The idea, which had grown within the project was to create a system more inspired by intuitive music video games as Sing Star (2004) or Guitar Hero (2005) than traditional or extended music notation systems. Mainly because of my thesis that the target group of non-professional performers including school children in general are more familiar with videogames than musical notated scores and as Rui Rolo (2011) puts it: *"... fun games increase learners motivation and foster collaboration, crucial issues in music practice."*. Based on the experiences from the cycles within the project I made a pilot version of an animated music notation system, which first was tested in workshop sessions with music students at Umeå University.

This version was organized into four rows in different colors, which made it possible to divide the crowd of performers into four sections. Each section should follow the animated graphics presented on their row, which symbolized specific musical performance instructions.

The performance instructions included which fundamental sound to produce with their voices and approximate pitch and amplitude for the sound. Furthermore the duration of the sound was also included in the instructions.[14] The performance instructions in terms of pitch and amplitude was approximate, were the defined frame was the capacity of each performers individual voice.

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14 More information about The Max Maestro could be found in the videoclip:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4iePLi5uQzU and in the article/exposition: *New artistic possibilities with The Max Maestro – an animated music notation system for non-professional performers:* (Lind, 2015)

Screenshot of the Max Maestro

Step 2: Action. Two workshop sessions were held involving tests of some musical ideas in the form of exercises with the animated music notation. The students were instructed to make sounds with their voices by following instructions from the animated music notation, which was projected on a screen in a standard classroom. Some of the exercises included electronic sounds and some was without. The exercises included musical material as: Polytempo textures, Static and moving approximate pitch cluster textures, Noise formation textures, Rhythmical text canon and Rhythmical accents.

Step 3: Analysis of Results. Audio recordings of the workshop sessions were used as the main data to be analyzed. The people involved in the workshop sessions were music students dedicated to the popular music field, meaning that they in general were used to play together by ear and not by reading instructions from a traditional notated score. Furthermore they had no or very modest experiences of following instructions from a traditional music conductor. Those were two reasons why I used them as a reference group for the aimed target group of performers for the composition. The pilot animated music notation system seemed to be very intuitive to follow. All of the texture-based musical materials were performed with interesting results. The rhythmical musical materials seemed to be more difficult to perform. Some minor changes for the visual output of the system were made as a consequence of the analysis. Furthermore, the final version to be used for the performance of Everybody Scream!!! included performance instructions for eight individual parts.

Everybody Scream!!! – The grand finale composition
Step 1: Planning. The composition process had been going on along with the different cycles within the project and the analysis of results from the other cycles had affected the composition process in different directions. The fundamental music material was taken from the collected electronic sound bank, which now had reached over ten thousand files of voices

from the citizens of Umeå. I used the same selective process for the electronic sounds as in the earlier processes for *We Speak Music!* and *Singing Instruments!!*. In this composition I decided to include traditional singing techniques as well to get contrasting sections to the abstract sound textures conducted by *The Max Maestro*. The idea was to explore a wide range of aspects using the human voice and electronic processed sounds of the human voice as musical expressions. The three interactive *Singing Instruments!!* were also included in the performance.

The composition was finally structured in eight movements dealing with different aspects of the human voice and electronically processed sounds of the human voice as musical instruments. The rehearsals were performed in groups, since it was impossible to gather all the hundreds of participants before the concert. Approximately two hours of rehearsal was made with each group. The grand rehearsal took place the same day as the concert and was the first time when all participants performed the composition together.

Step 2: Action. The premiere of *Voices of Umeå Part III: Everybody Scream!!!* was performed at Norrlandsoperan, Umeå by approximately two hundred non-professional singers, *the Singing Instruments!!* and electronic preprocessed sounds of voices through a multichannel speaker system. The two hundred non-professional singers were divided in eight individual parts. The composition had a total duration of 45 minutes and was conducted by *the Max Maestro* - an animated music notation system and Tomas Pleje.[15]

Step 3: Analysis of Results. The audio recording of the performance was used as the main data to be analyzed. From an artistic point of view, the performance was satisfying. Even if the scheduled three hundred and fifty participants had gone down to approximately two hundred participants, due to unexpected cancellations the artistic expression was unique. The crowd was able to perform polytempo textures, static and moving approximate pitch cluster textures, noise formation textures and rhythmical accents and text canons as intended. Especially the texture-based musical material was interesting to hear. The Max Maestro was shown to successfully conduct the two hundred participants divided in eight individual parts. Since the animated notation was showing approximate performance instructions in terms of pitch and dynamics the actual sounds generated by each individual performer was unique and with all combined together contributing to an advanced musical texture. According to my own reflections one of the key factors of why the intentions with the Max Maestro were shown to be successful was related to the choice of instrument. Using the human voice instead of a physical instrument made it possible for the performers to have their full attention to the visual output of the Max Maestro instead of the need to visually concentrate on a physical instruments. (Lind, 2015)

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15 Swedish Conductor and Director Musices at Umeå University.

Everybody Scream!!! live Norrlandsoperan 2014.

Reflections and future plans

This article has described selected parts of the process and the findings of the Voices of Umeå project. The findings reported have shown a process, which evolved in cycles inspired by an action research method to seek new answers to the fields of animated music notation and participatory art. More specifically, - How to enable non-professional performers to participate in advanced composition and performance practices to enhance an artistic expression?. The project was conducted with an interdisciplinary approach guided by an artistic and pedagogical perspective, which sought to contribute to innovatory solutions of the defined research questions.

Artistic research

I started this project with some questions about the differences between artistic research and artistic practice. For me they still have a lot in common, but the main difference I would say is the aim of artistic research to develop new knowledge back to the field of artistic practice and/or artistic research. Furthermore, the documentation part is important in an artistic research project, which not necessary would be the case in a straight artistic project. Obviously, the documentation has to be there to strengthen the credibility of the new knowledge explored and presented within an artistic research project. However, it´s hard to say to what extent the documentation should be made and how it should be presented, since it has to be dependent on the aim and process of the particular project. In terms of the *Voices of Umeå* project the new knowledge to be explored and presented back to the field was how non-professional performers regardless musical background could participate in contemporary art music processes to enhance the artistic expression. For me the three artistic compositions were a significant part of the project, both as stand alone artistic explorations and as a vital part of the methodology in the research process to answer the defined

knowledge gap. The artistic compositions needed to be put into action to search for new answers, and in the contrary: The answers would affect the further composition process within the project.

The open process of the project with some formulated aims to start from evolving in multiple cycles and affected by the interdisciplinary approach, lead in many different directions with interesting analysis of results during the project. From a negative perspective the project could be accused of lacking focus, due to this huge amount of data, experiences and impressions the project have generated. Still, I believe this open process was one of the most interesting parts of the project. If I had considered narrowing the aims and the framework of the project, I am not sure if that as a consequence had given me as much interesting results. *The Max Maestro* – an animated music notation system was definitely a result of the open process, the methodology chosen and the interdisciplinary approach of the project.

Artistic perspective

From the artistic perspective the point of departure for this project was: -what would happen to the artistic result if non-professional performers regardless musical background would be able to participate in a composition written within the field of contemporary art music?. As a composer it was rewarding to work with voices of non-professional performers in this project. (1), to work with the voices recorded by the two voice recording instruments in the composition process, and (2), to work with the crowd of voices in the live performances of the compositions. The voice recording instruments were shown to inspire the citizens of Umeå to make expressive, naïve and unique sounds with their voices, which definitely would have had another expression if made by professional singers. Furthermore, the citizens had in this voice collecting process a deep impact on the artistic expression for the project, which were an interesting approach to participatory art and a challenge for me as a composer. Since the fundamental sounds were created intuitively by the citizens and not as a result of me as a composer instructing a performer, the composition process were guided by the actual expressions of the recorded sounds. As a composer I needed to have my full attention to the created sounds and to let them guide the composition process, instead of focusing on creating advanced performance notation instructions to a professional musician. This approach really inspired me as a composer.

Working with non-professional performers using their voices in a performance situation has in my previous works been complicated. The main issue has been to get the performers organized as wanted for an artistic expression without the use of traditional notation or a traditional conductor. Another issue has been to engage the performers using their voices in an expressive way, since our voice is very personal and it could be seen as uncomfortable using it in an unusual way in public. The use of *the Max Maestro* – an animated music notation system has in this project shown to overcome these issues. One factor could have been the use of a system more inspired by videogames than traditional music notation. *The Max Maestro* has shown to both give performance instructions for eight individual parts and to engage the performers to make expressive sounds with their voices. Furthermore, I found the artistic expression as a result of having a crowd of non-professional performers using their voices conducted by the Max Maestro as rich and unique. Especially the polytempo- and

various noise- and cluster textures were shown to suit the approach perfectly. As an example the screaming cluster textures could be mentioned, which I doubt that professional singers had accomplished with such expressiveness. Also moving cluster textures accomplished by various glissandi movements and polytempo textures using various individual sounds on vowels in different pitches are examples of interesting artistic expressions.

The results of integrating *the Max Maestro* as performance instructor/ conductor in this project, opens up new exciting artistic possibilities within the concept of participatory art. With the use of *the Max Maestro* a large crowd of non-professional performers could perform a large-scale compositions involving advanced musical textures and electronics. The system has also shown to enable conducting performances of long duration compositions with very limited rehearsal time needed for the performers, which removes a lot of practical issues for these large-scale performances. As a result of this project the ambition is now to further develop *the Max Maestro* to enable new artistic explorations. In this project the human voice was in focus as performing instrument, but possibilities of having optional instruments could also be explored. How would it sound if the crowd was set to perform percussion instruments conducted by *the Max Maestro*? or specially designed Laptop instruments/ Computer tablets as instruments triggering electronic sounds?. Furthermore, unique orchestra settings combining a professional chamber/symphony orchestra with a crowd of for instance, school children or the audience could be created to explore new artistic expressions. As previously said, having a crowd of non-professionals, as performers have been artistically stimulating in this project. The artistic expressions created within the project could be described as both unique and complex. However, using high-skilled professional performers with all their knowledge, backgrounds and skills is still invaluable for an artistic exploration of new artistic expressions. Nevertheless, I argue that the expression created by a crowd of non-professional performers could serve as a fascinating artistic complement to the expressions of a professional orchestra. Combining the unique artistic qualities of the both two worlds into one musical body could be a new and interesting approach to seek for new musical expressions.

From an artistic perspective it was also rewarding working with the interactive instruments in *the Singing Instruments!!* exhibition created as the second composition within the project. By connecting the everyday objects to musical parameters, as a composer I could in real-time test my musical ideas by physically interacting and moving the everyday objects. As an example it was inspiring to physically test ideas for polytempo textures by spinning the wheels of *the Wheel Quintet* in different tempos. Furthermore, *the Drawer Septet* was an intuitive tool for me to test various ideas for cluster textures, opening and closing different combinations of drawers at various speeds. The exhibition made it possible for me to work with novel interactive instruments as an artistic tool and having the unique behaviors of the instruments to affect my artistic process for a composition. Furthermore, it was fascinating to connect the electronically processed sounds to a physical body, with an aim to visualize the sounds. Thus the instruments became physical bodies for the electronic sounds instead of a pair of speakers in the concert situation. Working with *the Singing Instruments!!* have given me lots of ideas to develop new interactive instruments, which should stimulate the creation of new artistic outputs. *The Singing Instruments!!* is a good example within the project where the pedagogical perspective was important for the artistic outcome.

Pedagogical perspective

Having a pedagogical perspective to influence the artistic processes was rewarding for the final artistic expressions within the project. In the contrary, having the artistic processes to influence the pedagogical perspective led to the development of *the Max Maestro* and the three interactive instruments in *the Singing Instruments!!* exhibition within the project. These novel technology innovations both have artistic and pedagogical advantages. Since both *The Max Maestro* and the three interactive instruments were shown to enable non-professional performers including schoolchildren to perform advanced musical structures, they are interesting from a pedagogical perspective. With the use of *the Max Maestro* as a pedagogical tool the non-professionals could perform musical textures as polytempo textures, static and moving approximate pitch cluster textures, noise formation textures, rhythmical text canon and rhythmical accents. Consequently, these results gives me new ideas including putting *the Max Maestro* in the classroom, having school children to learn about music and musical structures by performing advanced musical textures within the genre of contemporary art music. Since the schoolchildren participating in *the Voices of Umeå* project managed to perform advanced musical textures with limited rehearsal time, *the Max Maestro* has shown to be an intuitive pedagogical tool, which probably could be used in an educational environment. However, more research has to be done within the domain of having animated music notation in an educational environment to point out any definite results.

The interactive instruments for *the Singing Instruments!!* exhibition were also summarized as interesting novel pedagogical tools to enable schoolchildren performing advanced musical structures. The results from the workshop sessions with the children were interesting and the instruments were shown to be intuitive, playful and inspiring. My experiences participating in these workshop sessions indicate that these types of new technology innovations as new musical instruments and pedagogical tools could be a complement to the traditional acoustical instruments we use in our educational environment. It was exciting to test the pedagogical ideas with the school children, but of course new more practical instruments needs to be developed if they should have the purpose of being part of a school environment.

Coda

As a final conclusion the participatory aspect of the project was shown to be satisfactory. More than ten thousand sound files were collected from the citizens of Umeå and the performances included hundreds of performers, which normally don´t participate in these types of experimental musical processes. The large amount of participators in the project was according to my own reflections dependent on a variety of different aspects: Collaboration with several music institutions, organizations and others outside the sphere of the university, an interesting and engaging artistic idea, lots of exposure in various media[16], the use of playful interactive instruments and the project was being a part of the Umeå municipality´s European Capital of Culture program in 2014.

In addition to the actions and activities mentioned in this article different parts of *Voices of Umeå* have been presented, exhibited and performed internationally in venues/ universities/

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16 The project included a strategy to get media writing about events within the project to reach out to potential new participators.

conferences such as: CHI´13/Paris[17], Ircam Institute/Paris[18], Felleshus/Berlin[19], UCSB/Santa Barbara/California[20], Waterloo Innovation Summit/Waterloo/Canada[21], CNMAT/Berkeley/California[22], Center for New Music/San Francisco[23] and NIME 2016/Brisbane/Australia[24].

The results reported in this artistic research project contributes with new knowledge on how to enable non-professional performers to participate in composition and performance practices to enhance an artistic expression within contemporary art music. I encourage new research especially in the domains of animated music notation and participatory art to further explore these approaches seeking for new artistic possibilities.

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17 Human Computer Interaction <http://chi2013.acm.org>
18 Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique <http://www.ircam.fr>
19 Felleshus is a public space for cultural events at the Nordic embassies, run by the five Nordic countries. <http://www.nordicembassies.org>
20 University of California/ Santa Barbara
21 https://waterlooinnovationsummit.com
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Historieläromedel – en forskningsöversikt

Niklas Ammert

För att göra en tämligen kort historia ännu kortare kan man beskriva de grova dragen i historien om svensk forskning om historieläromedel på följande sätt: som en utveckling från 1960-talets innehållsbeskrivningar, via 1980- och 90-talens orientering mot historiedidaktiska och historiekulturella analyser till de senaste dryga decenniets mer teoretiska studier av historiebruk och berättelser och hur dessa förmedlas. Utöver forskning förekommer det också att journalister "granskar" läromedel, vilket ofta innebär att de letar efter enskilda felaktigheter och att de låter personliga tyckanden mynna ut i slutomdömen. I denna översikt är det dock forskning om läromedel som avhandlas. Den numera vedertagna benämningen är *läromedel*. Dock avser huvuddelen av den forskning som finns att tillgå läroböcker. När jag refererar till forskning om *läroböcker* använder jag den benämningen, medan jag i mer allmänna ordalag använder benämningen läromedel.

Forskning om läromedel är en viktig källa till kunskap om deras innehåll, fokus, framställningsansats, förmedlingsperspektiv, form och tänkta funktion. Denna kunskap är av flera skäl nödvändig för lärare. Läromedel utgör i flera avseenden en verkan av eller en spegling av samtidens samhällsklimat. De frågor, problem, värden och uppfattningar som råder inom politik, kultur och ekonomi avspeglas i läromedlens urval och perspektiv. I den utredning som utgjorde förarbete till 1990-talets läro- och kursplaner uttrycks det enligt följande: "Varje skolsystem och varje läroplan bygger på föreställningar om vad kunskap är och hur lärande sker." (SOU 1992:94, s. 59) Då läromedel i olika grad utformas i enlighet med skolans styrdokument, behöver lärare kunskap om såväl politisk som pedagogisk föränderlighet och i vilken kontext man ska läsa och förstå läromedlen. Ett annat skäl är att läromedlen har betydelse för lärarens pedagogiska och didaktiska verksamhet och att elevernas och undervisningens resultat påverkas till följd av läromedlen. Ett tredje skäl är att inköp av läromedel är en förhållandevis stor investering för en skola. Lärare som är ämnesansvariga eller har motsvarande uppdrag har att fatta välgrundade beslut som får konsekvenser över flera år, eftersom skolorna sällan har resurser att köpa nya läromedel varje år. Förlagen är mycket aktiva i relationen till lärare och skolor i syfte att attrahera potentiella köpare. De är av förståeliga skäl mån om att presentera material som är producerat i enlighet med de senaste styrdokumenten och de senaste pedagogiska, och numera i allt högre grad också i enlighet med de ämnesdidaktiska, rönen.

En naturlig fråga att ställa är om läromedel, och i synnerhet läroböcker, spelar någon roll i skolans undervisning. Används de? Har de ersatts av datorer och mobiltelefoner? Om vi först närmar oss frågorna genom att studera hur läromedelsbranschens försäljningsstatistik presenterar uppgifter för åren 2000-2012 framgår det att försäljningen av läromedel har minskat. Minskningen gäller såväl total försäljningsvolym som de summor skolhuvudmännen anslår för varje elev. Beräknat på det senare har satsningen på läromedel, beräknat per elev, minskat med 18 % mellan 2000 och 2012. Den totala försäljningen har under samma tid minskat med 30 %. Minskningen av den totala försäljningen kan till del förklaras med att

under mätperioden minskade ungdomskullarna på grundskolans högstadium med 15 % och på gymnasiet något mindre, men skolornas inköp har de facto minskat.[1] Minskad försäljning behöver dock inte betyda att användningen av förlagsproducerade läromedel har minskat. Många skolor köper klassuppsättningar med böcker som eleverna lånar under lektionerna.

Enligt den forskning som finns tillgänglig har det under lång tid varit ett faktum att läroboken dominerar undervisningen i flera ämnen och att den har en central position i skolans undervisning i allmänhet. Detta påvisar bland annat resultaten från den senaste nationella utvärderingen av den svenska skolan, NU03 (Skolverket 2004: 6, Skolverket 2005: 35) och den stora europeiska surveyundersökningen *Youth and History* (Angvik & von Borries 1997 A: 57-60). I den sistnämnda besvarade 31 000 ungdomar från 27 stater i Europa frågor om historia och historieundervisnin.[2] Undervisningen påverkas av elevgruppen, dess sammansättning och tidigare kunskaper och erfarenheter, av läraren och hennes kunskaper, intressen och förutsättningar samt en lång rad resursmässiga variabler, men vad som genom alla olikheter ändå utgör någon form av gemensamt drag är läroböcker. Även om boken används som referens snarare än som rättesnöre eller om läraren hämtar material ur olika typer av medier, står läroboken ändå centralt. Det stora genomslaget stannar emellertid inte vid att böckerna används mycket. Till och med när elever och lärare tar avstånd från en lärobok är diskussionen och beslutet att ta avstånd från läroboken ett sätt att förhålla sig till läroboken och därmed något som påverkar undervisningen. Monica Reichenberg och Dagun Skjellbred (2009) menar att läroböckerna har en paratextuell betydelse, vilket innebär att de har format elevers och lärares uppfattningar om vilket innehåll och vilken typ av kunskap som är viktig.

De svenska elevernas svar i *Youth and History* visar att Sverige representerar ett genomsnitt när det gäller läroboksanvändning i ämnet historia. Island använder som enskilt land läroboken mest och Israel som enskilt land minst. Av Europas stater ligger Kroatien lägst. Om resultaten beräknas på regioner, använder Storbritannien och de nordiska länderna läroböcker mest (Angvik & von Borries 1997 A: 57-58). Det förefaller här finnas ett samband mellan stater med en tämligen stabil historia och en hög grad av läroboksanvändning. Norden, med Island i spetsen, och Storbritannien är exempel på detta. Samtidigt använder Israel, som har en turbulent historia, och Kroatien, som under 1990-talet upplevde ett krig, läroböcker i mindre utsträckning. I en stat präglad av en lugn samhällsutveckling utan stark polarisering och politisk-ideologisk splittring litar man på sina läroböcker. Samtidigt pekar tydliga tecken åt rakt motsatt håll. I flera av de stater som blev självständiga efter kommunismens fall spelar läroböcker en viktig roll för statsbygget och för folkets identitet på så sätt att man vill lyfta fram *sin* historia. Läroböcker är ofta ett prioriterat instrument för regimer i stater som genomlevt en turbulent period och som vill styra bilden av densamma (Ahonen 2012: 138-145).

Några ord bör också sägas om elevernas uppfattningar om och attityder till olika typer av läromedel. *Youth and History* redovisar att läroböcker, trots den dominerande ställningen,

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[1] http://svenskalaromedel.se/laeromedel/hur-mycket-laeromedel-faar-en-elev-i-grundskolan.aspx (Avläst 2014-03-04)

[2] Materialinsamlingen till *Youth and History* genomfördes för 20 år sedan och resultaten har i flera avseenden förlorat sin aktualitet. En internationell forskargrupp förbereder en ny och modifierad version av *Youth and History* som man planerar att genomföra under de kommande åren.

inte är den faktakälla som åtnjuter störst förtroende hos eleverna när det gäller historieundervisning. Eleverna litar istället på museer och historiska platser. Förtroendet för läroböcker bland svenska ungdomar är dock högre än genomsnittet bland europeiska elever. Det läromedel som eleverna i Europa har minst förtroende för är historiska romaner (Angvik & von Borries, 1997 B: 44–45).

I den av Skolverket 2003 genomförda utvärderingen av grundskolan, menar eleverna att läroboken dominerar när det gäller arbetet i klassrummet, oavsett om man arbetar med utgångspunkt direkt i lärobokens texter eller om boken används som referens (Skolverket 2004: 61 och Skolverket 2005: 35). En förändring har dock skett från den nationella utvärderingen 1992 när det gäller lärarnas svar på frågan vad som påverkar och styr undervisningen i exempelvis samhällsorienterande ämnen. Läroböckernas betydelse tonas ned till näst intill obefintlighet. Lärarna uppger istället att egna intressen och idéer styr i större utsträckning. Därefter rangordnas ämnesstudierna från lärarutbildningen respektive läroböckernas uppläggning. Det går att fråga sig om läroböckernas inflytande över urval och planering har minskat och vad det i så fall beror på. I diskussioner om skolan och undervisning har läroboksanvändning ibland inte ansetts vara kreativt och progressivt (se exempelvis Maltén, 1995: 150-155) och möjligen tonar lärare i intervjuer just därför ned lärobokens betydelse för den egna undervisningen (Skolverket, 2005, s. 55). Lärobokens dominerande ställning diskuteras också i en tidigare studie av pedagogen Nanny Hartsmar. Hon låter utifrån sina elevintervjuer bilden av en strikt kronologisk och läroboksstyrd historieundervisning tona fram. För lärare som inte är formellt behöriga att undervisa i ämnet, är detta än tydligare (Hartsmar, 2001: 94–96). Denna grupp lärare uppgick 2015 till mellan 20 och 25 procent i grundskolans senare år (Skolverket 2015: 5).

Skolans historieundervisning har dock förändrats under perioden efter 2003. Enligt en studie som genomfördes under 2011 är det vanligare att elever lyssnar till och deltar i lärarnas genomgångar än att de löser uppgifter och arbetar självständigt. Vad som i än högre grad har förändrats är användandet av film i undervisningen. I en enkätundersökning bland svenska niondeklassare besvarar de frågan om hur de oftast arbetar på historielektionerna i följande rangordning: 1. läraren har genomgång, 2. vi löser uppgifter, 3. vi ser film, 4. vi läser, 5. vi gör egna arbeten och 6. vi arbetar i grupper (Ammert 2013: 51). Av svaren att döma torde läroböcker av traditionellt snitt användas främst när det gäller att lösa uppgifter och läsa. Möjligen används de också när eleverna gör egna arbeten och arbetar i grupp.

En annan aspekt av diskussionen om hur läromedel används och vilken roll de spelar i undervisningen aktualiserades 2011, då skollag och kursplaner skrevs om och skärptes. Lärarnas uppdrag och ansvar för undervisningen har förändrats genom Skollagens formuleringar om "strukturerad undervisning" (Skolförordningen SFS 2011:185, kap 5 § 2). Genomgångar och sammanhållen undervisning som ett komplement till den situation då eleverna självständigt – i praktiken ofta isolerat – förväntades utveckla kunskaper, är därmed åter möjligt att tala om. Detta torde innebära minskat utrymme för läromedel som är utformade för att eleverna ska arbeta helt på egen hand. Det kan samtidigt förväntas innebära en ökad efterfrågan på läromedel som kan utgöra ett komplement och stöd till lärarens undervisning och som därtill innehåller underlag för arbete med historiebruk och historiska begrepp, vilket är centrala delar i kursplanerna från 2011.

I en tidigare översikt av läromedelsforskning i allmänhet har jag gjort en indelning i rubrikerna *process, struktur* och *funktion,* Det förstnämnda syftar på var i det didaktiska flödet mellan statsmakterna och samhälleligt klimat å den ena sidan och skolarbetet och elevens värld å den andra som forskningen har sitt sökarljus. Struktur innebär att forskaren studerar läromedlets strukturella utformning medan funktion behandlar hur läromedlet används i skolan och vilken funktion det fyller för elevens inlärning och kunskapsutveckling (Ammert 2011b: 18-19). När jag nu tydligt riktar blicken mot forskning om läromedel i historia är det lämpligt att göra en mer finmaskig indelning i enlighet med rubrikerna nedan. Denna översikt gör inte anspråk på att vara komplett eller fullödig. Den behandlar dock bärande delar av forskning om historieläromedel.[3] Syftet är att ge lärare, studenter och forskare en bild av vilka frågor som behandlas i forskningen om historieläromedel och också presentera några resultat.

Läromedel och den politiska kontexten

Läromedel, i synnerhet läroböcker, har traditionellt haft och har alltjämt en dubbelriktad funktion i relationen till skola, stat och samhälle. Å ena sidan är läroboken ett resultat och en verkan av samhälleliga förhållanden och av ett officiellt bruk av historia, i vilket man medvetet vill återge berättelser om nationen eller folket. Å andra sidan är läroboken budskapet och "orsaken" till vad eleverna ska lära sig. Elever möter lärobokens budskap, som utgör en offentlig historia. Budskapet var mer påtagligt i böcker från början av det förra seklet då nationalism och statsidealism genomsyrade böckerna. Herbert Tingsten beskriver i sin läroboksstudie *Gud och fosterlandet* från 1969, hur läroböckerna berättar att Sverige genom århundradena har agerat kraftfullt och korrekt. Stormaktstiden lyfts fram medan andra perioder hanteras rapsodiskt eller inte alls. De svenska kungarnas storhet har tillsammans med bondefriheten varit ett koncept som givit landet en stark identitet och ett fungerande folkstyre. Patriotism och moralisk nit var de vägledande principerna i läroböckerna in på 1900-talet. Enligt Tingsten mildrades inte "nationalskrytet" förrän under 1940-talet, då det ersattes av tanken att eleven ska fostras till att bli demokrat, vilket sedan 1900-talets mitt också varit tydligt framskrivet i styrdokumenten för den svenska skolan (Tingsten 1969: 129 och 277-280). Framställningar som målar Sverige och svenskt agerande i ljusa färger förekommer tydligt också under 1900-talets senare hälft. De huvudsakliga budskapen var dock förändrade och innebar att betona Sveriges unika demokratiska traditioner, det kloka agerandet i och med alliansfrihet och neutralitet samt den svenska modellens framgångar under efterkrigstiden. Förutom att urvalet av stoff och perspektiven på detsamma förändrades, tonades också efterhand den episka framställningen ned till förmån för en mer strukturellt förklarande. Den senare behandlar mer statiska förutsättningar, medan den episka är en berättande form som främst för den historiska utvecklingen framåt genom att koncentreras på förändring (Andolf 1972: 274, Behre & Lindqvist 1990).

Den danske historiedidaktikern Sven Sødring Jensen presenterade 1978 en kategorisering av hur undervisningsplaner och läroböcker uppvisar avtryck av det omgivande samhället. Jensens forskning, inspirerad av Wolfgang Klafki, har tillämpats av senare forskare. I Klas-

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[3] Delar av framställningen bygger på Ammert (2011c).

Göran Karlssons forskning om historieundervisning och läroböcker i rysk och sovjetisk skola bidrar han med en större kontextuell förståelse utöver själva böckerna. Karlsson beskriver skolplanernas målformuleringar och läroböckernas utformning som effekter av och uttryck för den politiska stämning som rådde i landet under olika perioder (Karlsson 1987: 97-110, 168-171 och 184-201. Se också Foster & Crawford 2006). Resultatet visar att staten var en central aktör som använde historieundervisningen till att driva utvecklingen i önskvärd riktning genom att låta lämpliga historiska berättelser och perspektiv utgöra klangbotten för människosyn och politiska mål (Karlsson 1987: 243). Karlsson återkommer i senare forskning till detta, då han jämför den sovjetiska strävan att införa samhällsorientering på historieämnets bekostnad med en liknande strävan i Sverige under 1970-och 1980-talen (Karlsson, 2004: 301-308).

Mönstret i Ryssland följdes också efter Sovjetunionens sammanbrott 1991. Under Vladimir Putins tid vid makten har vissa historieläroböcker förbjudits och Putin har själv tagit initiativ till att en ny och mer nationalistisk lärobok framställs, vilket har vållat stor rysk och internationell debatt.[4] Karlsson beskriver hur statligt dikterad likriktning av historieämnet genomförs i och med införandet av en bok för alla historielärare. Syftet med boken är att ryska historielärare ska bibringa eleverna ett "[s]tabilt historiskt tolkningsmönster, efter glasnostperiodens kritiska uppgörelse med den hävdvunna sovjethistorien […]" (Karlsson 2011: 55)

Historieläroböckernas betydelse och genomslag, också över tid, betonas i Henrik Åström Elmersjös avhandling om försök till samnordisk revision av historieläroböcker mellan 1919 och 1972. I syfte att minska nationalism och chauvinism sökte föreningarna Norden skriva fram en gemensam nordisk historia och lägga grunden för Norden som en framtida fredlig del av Europa. Åström Elmersjö låter begreppet historiekultur rama in de olika nationella uppfattningar som utgjorde hinder för nordisk samsyn i fråga om historieläroböcker. Historien var djupt rotad i de respektive nationella identiteterna och någon gemensam revision var svår att genomföra. Av vikt är dock att konstatera att för det första såg man i de nordiska länderna historieläroböckerna som så viktiga för den framtida utvecklingen, såväl nationellt som internationellt, att man genom att revidera dem ansåg sig kunna möjliggöra en fredlig framtid. För det andra redovisar Åström Elmersjö att de historiker, lärare och lärarutbildare som deltog i revisionsarbetena inte var beredda att dagtinga med nationellt förankrade uppfattningar och tolkningar av historiska händelser. Således såg man även bland historiens producenter och utövare historieläroböckerna som centrala för nationell identitet och säkerhet (Åström Elmesjö 2013: 13 och 304).

Traditionell analys av innehåll och omfång

I en ofta refererad studie från 1972 beskriver Göran Andolf den förändring som skedde avseende historieläroböckernas innehåll och form från det tidiga 1800-talet och till 1900-talets mitt. Läroboksförfattarna gick från en encyklopedisk ansats i vilken man strävade efter att omfatta så mycket möjligt, till ett innehåll som styrdes av bestämda urval. Den tidigare episka formen med stora och detaljrika berättelser ersattes av mer deskriptiva redogörelser

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[4] Se exempelvis www.themoscowtimes.com 26 april 2013, www.eurasiareview.com 3 oktober 2013, www.rbth.ru 22 mars 2013, www.bloomberg.com 18 juni 2013 (Samtliga adresser avlästa 2014-01-25).

(Andolf 1972: 201 och 231). Beskrivningarna breddades efterhand från att behandla politisk historia till att innefatta kulturhistoria och så småningom också sociala aspekter av historien (Andolf 1972: 280-283).

I en tematiskt- och tidsmässigt snävare studie – perioden under det kalla kriget – beskriver Janne Holmén bilden av USA respektive Sovjetunionen i finska, norska och svenska läroböcker. Framställningen följer hur olika parametrar som bland annat personer och ekonomi beskrivs. Därtill studerar han hur läroböckerna förändrats, och möjligen påverkats, av den storpolitiska situationen i de respektive staternas geografiska närhet. Holmén pekar på hur läroböcker snabbt förändras i samband med politiska förändringar och att sentida och ideologiskt laddade händelser framställs på nya sätt medan beskrivningen av äldre historia sällan förändras (Holmén 2006: 333-335).

Forskningen om läroboken som sådan tillförs av historiedidaktikern Jan Bjarne Bøe en översikt av olika metoder och analyskategorier. Dessa belyser främst hur läroböckerna speglar det omgivande samhället, liksom hur läroplanernas intentioner följs. Kategoriseringen möjliggör enligt Bøe också en analys av typografi, pedagogisk svårighetsgrad, systematik och litterär tradition (Bøe 1995: 113-129). Sådan forskning har också bedrivits i Sverige av bland andra Staffan Selander, vars utgångspunkter är texttekniska och pedagogiska, det senare med avseende på tillgängligheten för läsaren. Utgångspunkten är inte främst innehållet utan formen. Selander visar hur böckernas texter, bilder och förklaringar kan analyseras och en teoretisk grund för en analys har utvecklats under flera deccennier. Selander har bland annat i en kvantitativ studie visat hur en historisk epok behandlas med avseende på sidutrymme, innehåll, bilder och meningarnas längd. En generell trend under perioden 1920-tal till 1980-tal i svenska läroböcker är att årtalen blir färre, bilderna fler, sidutrymmet minskar och meningarna blir kortare (Selander 1988: 136). Böckerna kan uppfattas som tråkiga och sakna meningsfulla sammanhang, vilket vore naturligt med tanke på att korthuggna meningar utan förklarande bisatser dominerar (Selander 1989: 54).

Selander har under senare år i flera explorativa studier och projekt arbetat med multimodal analys och perspektivet "Didaktisk design". Det sistnämnda är ett perspektiv som utvecklats för att studera lärande som en aktivitet där information transformeras och omformas till nya representationer, vilket ses som ett tecken på lärande (Selander 2011: 67).

Författarna och deras gärning

Läroböcker skrivs av läroboksförfattare i en given situation och skrivandet påverkas från olika håll. Även om läroböcker anpassas efter elevers och lärares krav och efter läro- och kursplanernas riktlinjer, är det författare – enskilt eller i grupp – som håller i pennan. Med tanke på att läroböcker har förändrats över tid är det av intresse att studera hur författare har resonerat kring urval, framställning och följsamhet mot styrdokument, pedagogiska trender och samtida samhällsfrågor. Dessutom är läroböcker, inte minst i historia, ofta ideologiskt laddade och kunskap om författarens uppfattningar och bevekelsegrunder är därmed av intresse för läraren.

Sture Långström har analyserat kopplingen mellan de senaste årtiondenas läroboksförfattare i historia och deras läroböcker. Den typiske läroboksförfattaren är man, snarare lärare än forskare och med huvudsakligen icke-borgerliga värderingar. När det gäller

påverkan och eventuell styrning vid skrivandet anser författarna själva att statliga anvisningar i form av läroplaner, kursplaner och läromedelsgranskning har varit styrande för dem (Långström, 1997: 216 och 221-224).

Förmedlingsansats

En helt central aspekt av ett läromedel och dess funktion är hur innehållet förmedlas och kommuniceras. I mer analytiska termer kan förmedling och förklaring beskrivas som olika framställningsansatser eller framställningstyper. Niklas Ammert (2011a: 260-263) har formulerat en typologi som kan användas som ett strukturerande verktyg då den innehållsligt didaktiska sidan av ett läromedel ska analyseras.

Typologin består av fyra framställningsansatser: En *konstaterande* ansats innebär att bokens författare kortfattat slår fast att en specifik händelse ägde rum eller att något förhöll sig på ett visst sätt. Framställningen är bekräftande och icke förklarande. Den förefaller ibland också ryckt ur sitt sammanhang. En mening eller en utsaga kan emellertid väcka frågor och funderingar hos läsaren, men om det inte i texten explicit uttrycks något annan än att ett förhållande eller en händelse slås fast, benämns det konstaterande. Den *förklarande* ansatsen förklarar, beskriver och kan sägas svara på frågan *hur* något förhöll sig och vad det i själva verket betyder. Det innebär att man förklarar företeelsen med hjälp av ett inre sammanhang och att händelseförloppet förklaras. Resonemang kring orsak och verkan är tydliga exempel på förklarande framställningar. En *reflekterande och analyserande* ansats sätter företeelser eller handlingar under lupp och belyser frågan ur flera perspektiv eller resonerar kring den. Detta kan ske på två sätt. Det första innebär att textens innehåll knyter an till läsaren, till läsarens tid eller till förhållanden som är kända för läsaren. Det andra handlar om analys med hjälp av yttre sammanhang och referenser, vilket innebär jämförelser med andra exempel. Det reflekterande och analyserande sättet att presentera något kan också innebära att teoretiska förklaringar eller modeller tillämpas för att ge innehållet en extra dimension. Den *normativa* ansatsen, slutligen, innebär att boken implicit eller explicit förmedlar ett värderande budskap. Författarna har tagit ställning och vill förmedla en viss tolkning av det som har skett. Redan urvalet är en värdering i sig, men inte lika tydligt normativ som ett bokstavligt uttryck. En normativ framställning går på en annan ledd än de övriga tre och en normativ ansats kan samtidigt vara konstaterande, förklarande eller analyserande.

Typologin är användbar för att analysera olika typer av läromedel och har tillämpats i några studier (Ammert 2009).

Berättelser och meningsskapande

Ett grundläggande drag i ett läromedel i historia är att händelseförlopp presenteras i ett tidssammanhang (Ricœur 2005: 311). Ofta sker det i form av berättelser som innehåller en början, en mitt och ett slut. Centralt i definitionen av berättelsen är att den innehåller en rad händelser som är kopplade till varandra. Berättelsen är mer än summan av de enskilda händelser som ingår i den. Den har en innebörd som inte kan reduceras till dess enskilda beståndsdelar, utan får sin mening just genom helheten (Alm 2002: 308 och Kristensson Uggla 1994: 424).

Ingmarie Danielsson Malmros har studerat identitetsskapande och identitetslegitimerande berättelser i svenska historieläroböcker från 1930-tal till och med 2000-talets första decennium. Gymnasieelever har i sina läroböcker mött berättelser om a) svensk neutralitet och fredlighet, b) välstånd och välfärd, c) demokrati, d) "främlingen" i form av duktig yrkesman, arbetskraftsinvandrare och sedermera flykting samt e) jämställdhet. Genomgående drag är att berättelserna utgår från en föreställt gemensam svensk horisont och att Sverige och svenskar agerar. Eleverna möter främst goda berättelser som handlar om svenska framgångar inom olika områden medan motsatserna inte synliggörs (Malmros Danielsson 2012: 389).

Som ett komplement till analysen av berättelsernas konkreta innehållsliga budskap har Niklas Ammert undersökt hur läroböckernas berättelser relateras till läsarens, elevens, samtid och erfarenheter. På så sätt beskrivs och problematiseras hur berättelserna kan stimulera till tänkande över tid, och därmed bidra till att eleverna utvecklar sitt historiemedvetande. I en longitudinell studie av läroböcker från 1905 till 2005 urskiljer Ammert (2008: 82-114) tre huvudsakliga berättelsetyper. Den första dominerar under det förra seklets första hälft och innebär att samtidens samhälleliga och politiska frågor, implicit eller explicit, skrivs in i berättelserna om det förflutna. De klassiska berättelserna utgör stundom liknelser för samtida frågor såsom rösträtt eller diskussionen om huruvida revolutioner kan rättfärdigas. Från 1960-talet tar böckernas berättelser sin utgångspunkt i läsarens nutid och nuet ramar in det förflutna genom förklaringar och liknelser som inte alltid följer kronologin. Under perioden från 1994 och framåt återkommer kronologiska berättelser, men nu i viss utsträckning i form av fiktiva berättelser med inslag av historiska fakta. Berättelserna har ett filmiskt bildspråk med snabba klipp och en rad referenser till elevernas samtid.

Genusperspektiv

Det faktum att kvinnor är osynliggjorda i historieläroböcker har uppmärksammats i den offentliga debatten vid flera tillfällen. I januari 2015 presenterade Dagens Nyheter en genomgång som visade att endast 13 % av de personer som finns med i ett urval av historieläroböcker är kvinnor. Dessutom blev kvinnornas andel lägre i den moderna historien. Såväl förlag som författare är medvetna om problemet, men menar att stoffträngseln är besvärlig och att det traditionella innehållet är vad som efterfrågas av lärarna (DN 2015-01-15).

Forskning om genusrelaterade perspektiv i läromedel kan behandla dels hur läromedlets framställning överensstämmer med de normer och värden som skolans undervisning ska förmedla, dels hur genusteoretiska aspekter presenteras eller tillämpas på innehållet. I det första fallet förekommer några svenska studier som främst bygger på att läroböcker granskas med utgångspunkt i styrdokument och likabehandlingslagar. Britt-Marie Berge redogör för tillvägagångssätt och resultat i sitt kapitel i antologin *Att spegla världen: Läromedelsstudier i teori och praktik*. I det andra fallet presenteras analyser med hjälp av genusteoretiska perspektiv. Skolverket har initierat granskningar medan analyser på genusteoretisk grund är mer sällsynta i läromedelsforskningssammanhang.

En grundläggande analys genomfördes av Britt-Marie Berge 2011. Hon belyser här kvinnors och mäns representationer i läroböcker, hur verksamhet som utförs av kvinnor respektive män värderas och hur grupper beskrivs (Berge 2011: 162-164). I

historieläroböcker är sammanhangen huvudsakligen könsneutrala, men aktörerna ges ofta traditionellt manliga konnotationer som mod, handlingskraft och tapperhet. Kvinnor och kvinnliga perspektiv förekommer, men främst i form av kompletteringsläsning eller som extrauppgifter (Berge 2011: 162-169).

Interkulturella perspektiv

Kenneth Nordgrens forskning om historiens betydelse för medvetande, kultur och identitet i det mångkulturella Sverige behandlar också historieläromedel för gymnasiet. Böckerna från åren kring 2000 hade ett tydligt geografiskt fokus på Västeuropa, Sverige och Norden, medan andra världsdelar gavs mindre utrymme. Dessutom gav läroboksförfattarna omvärlden relevans endast genom dess relation till västvärlden och således inte för dess egen skull (Nordgren 2006: 189-191).

Då fenomenet och begreppet "migration" behandlas i böckerna osynliggörs aktörsperspektivet hos människor och själva processerna ges föga utrymme. I stället framställer man migranter och invandrare som "de", eller snarare i objektsform som "dem". Läroböckerna förklarar migration med hjälp av stater som strukturell ram och industrialisering som drivkraft (Nordgren 2006: 200-201). Migrationsprocesser får tämligen litet utrymme och berättelser med nationalstaten i centrum dominerar. Nordgren når slutsatsen att läroböckerna inte präglas av interkulturella perspektiv (Nordgren 2011: 149-154).

I ytterligare en studie av historieundervisning i det mångkulturella Sverige diskuteras bland annat historieämnet och elevers identifikation relaterat till migrationsprocessen. För den mer konkreta studien använde Vanja Lozic diskursanalytisk teori, i vilken specifika maktperspektiv står i fokus. Lozic bekräftar Nordgrens resultat, men finner också att beskrivningar av migration får ett visst utrymme i historieläroböckerna. Han menar att migrationsprocesser beskrivs, men att framställningen av migranternas liv inte förekommer (Lozic 2010: 202 och 301).

Bildens funktion och betydelse

Historieläroböckernas form och layout har sedan 1920-talet förändrats från att totalt dominerats av text till att innehålla alltmer bilder (Selander 1988: 136). Bild definieras i det här sammanhanget brett som "[v]isuella representationer som kan ha olika utformning och vara utförda i olika tekniker, och som utgör tvådimensionella återgivningar av föremål, fenomen, tankar eller förlopp" (Wallin Wictorin 2011: 219).

Margareta Wallin Wictorin presenterar en modell att använda för att analysera historieläroböcker utifrån bildperspektiv (Se också Pettersson 1991: 69-70). Med utgångspunkt i ett antal frågor kategoriserar Wallin Wictorin (2011: 226) bland annat vad bilden förmedlar, samspelet mellan bild och text, vilka värden som förmedlas samt vilka förklaringar och beskrivningar som bilden kan ge utöver texten. Dock saknas inom historiedidaktiken analysmodeller och forskning när det gäller hur bilder de facto används i historieundervisningen och hur läromedelsbrukare i form av elever och lärare uppfattar och inlemmar bilden då de utvecklar kunskap.

Film som läromedel

Människor möter historia främst genom film (Vidal 1992: 5) och elever i skolan vill helst möta historia genom film. Utsagan bygger generellt på den europeiska undersökningen *Youth and History* från 1997 och specifikt på en undersökning av svenska elevers möten med historia från 2013 (Ammert 2013: 44). Film har sedan ett helt sekel varit det medium som haft större genomslag än något annat i samhället. Historiska teman är vanliga i filmer och just relationen mellan historia och film har under de senaste 20 åren beforskats av främst Ulf Zander, David Ludvigsson och Tommy Gustafsson. Gustafsson har i sin forskning också studerat hur TV-serier med historiskt tema förmedlat historia till barn under 1970-talet. Han visar hur politiskt färgade framställningar som också innehöll tydliga skildringar av sex och våld förekom och hur TV-serierna debatterades i samtiden (Gustafsson 2012: 3).

I undervisningssammanhang är en av filmens viktigaste funktioner att utgöra underlag för en diskussion om hur det förflutna framställs och hur nuet och det förflutna relateras till varandra. Nuet är synligt i filmen om det förflutna och filmen ger ett gott underlag för att analysera historiebruk. Däremot har en spelfilm inte som syfte att återge något som i traditionell historievetenskaplig mening är otvetydigt korrekt och att i undervisningen låta eleverna leta efter sakhistoriska fel i en film är enligt Zander (2008: 142-152) därför en tämligen poänglös övning.

En annan genre är dokumentärfilm som är framställd i syfte att presentera och diskutera fakta, källor och argument, ofta med anspråk på att dokumentera en aspekt av verkligheten. David Ludvigsson visar hur de svenska dokumentärfilmmakarna Hans Villius och Olle Hägers historiska dokumentärfilmer hade som reellt syfte att förmedla kunskap. För att nå ut med budskapet jämkade de samman olika ideal och krav såsom kognitiva, moraliska, estetiska och legitimerande för att nå tittarna (Ludvigsson 2003: 356-358).

I en studie av filmens funktion i den direkta historieundervisningen, har Steven Dahl gjort en receptionsstudie av hur gymnasieelever uppfattar och skapar mening i mötet med filmen *Hotel Rwanda*. Eleverna uppvisar i sina resonemang ett reflexivt perspektiv i relation till filmen, vilket innebär att de förhåller sig till händelser i det förflutna genetiskt och genealogiskt samtidigt. Frågor och tolkningar görs med utgångspunkt i nuet och förklaringar hämtas ur kronologiska och kontextuellt förankrade perspektiv (Dahl 2013: 232-233). Filmen har således stor potential när det gäller att utveckla elevernas möten med historia i historieundervisningen.

Webben som läromedel

Datorer och sedermera så kallade smarta telefoner och läsplattor har i ökande utsträckning förekommit i skolans undervisning sedan tidigt 1990-tal. Viss forskning om hur detta har förändrat – eller har potential att förändra – elevers och lärares arbete liksom hur eleverna kan tillgodogöra sig kunskap har genomförts (Lantz-Andersson 2009, Selander & Kress 2010). Maria Estling Vannestål har med språk- och allmändidaktiska utgångspunkter studerat digitala läromedel och deras funktion och då tillämpat en kategorisering som kan vara användbar även för en grovmaskig analys av digitala läromedel i historia. En typ av läromedel är i form av en automat. Digitala program som ger omedelbar feedback då eleven besvarar frågor eller löser uppgifter. En andra typ är IT som verktyg, vilket torde vara

användbart för historieämnet. Med hjälp av digitala guider, källmaterial, länksamlingar, faktasidor, kartor och filmsekvenser kan eleven använda sig av olika referenser i sina studier. Den tredje kategorin är IT som arena. Här möjliggörs interaktivitet genom lärplattformar, forum, chatt-miljöer med mera (Estling Vannestål 2011: 241-249). Under senare år har utvecklingen närmast explosionsartat gett ständigt nya möjligheter när det gäller IT som verktyg och IT som arena.

Det har länge varit sparsmakat med forskning om digitala läromedel i historia vad avser stoffurval, framställning, perspektiv etcetera. Inom forskarskolan *Historiska medier: Forskarskola i historia med didaktisk inriktning* vid Umeå universitet har en rad licentiandprojekt som avhandlar olika medier i historieundervisningen såsom digitala läromedel, bloggar, digitala arkiv, databaser och film genomförts. Arbetena har publicerats under 2014 och 2015. Se bland annat antologin *Medier i undervisningen: Historiedidaktisk forskning i praktiken* med Anna Larsson som redaktör (Larsson 2016).

Thomas Nygren har i flera studier behandlat digitaliserade källor som redskap i historieundervisningen. Resultaten pekar bland annat på att det mer tillgängliga digitala källmaterialet möjliggör att elever de facto arbetar med källor och att intresset ökar. Samtidigt stimuleras elevernas kritiska hållning och deras tilltro till historiska källor minskar, eftersom de ser komplexiteten och att det kan finnas brister i källmaterialet. En viktig slutsats är att eleverna får möjlighet att öva historiskt tänkande och historisk empati, då de i källmaterialet möter människor ur det förflutna (Nygren, Sandberg & Vikström, 2014, s. 229-232).

Michael Schoenhals och Ulf Zander för en diskussion om Wikipedia som läromedel. Det torde vara känt att Wikipedia innebär interaktivitet i sin prydno, på gott och på ont. Användare kan ändra information och innehållet förändras ständigt. Det förekommer att artiklar granskas och man markerar emellanåt att en fråga är omdiskuterad, men i grunden är Wikipedia en"öppen" kanal för användarna. Även om faktadelar är korrekta, kan de historiska sammanhangen uppvisa en tydlig tendens, vilket elever kan ha svårt att identifiera och värdera. En reell möjlighet är emellertid att elever och lärare använder Wikipedia för att studera och öva sig i att analysera hur historia används och har använts – historiebruk (Schoenhals & Zander 2008: 94-100). Med tanke på att kurs- och ämnesplanerna för historia i Läroplanerna från 2011 betonar att eleverna kan reflektera över sin egen och andras användning av historia är detta en möjlighet. Många lärare har svårt att hantera frågor om historiebruk och då är wikipedia ett material som möjliggör övning. Det förutsätter dock att läraren har teoretiska kunskaper om historiebruk, vilket inte Wikipedia kan bidra med!

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Forskningen om historieläromedel har fortfarande sin tyngdpunkt på historieläroböcker, även om antalet studier av andra typer av läromedel har ökat under senare år. Den ökade bredden och mångfalden ifråga om både forskningsobjekt och analysperspektiv är styrkor som successivt kan bidra till att öka forskares och lärares kunskaper om läromedel.

Den hittillsvarande forskningen har satt fingret på några svagheter och problem. Det främsta är den mycket begränsade representationen av kvinnor i läroböckerna i historia. Ett annat rör att epoker beskrivs kortfattat och i många fall ytligt som en följd av att mycket innehåll ska beredas utrymme. Fortfarande saknas studier av hur elever uppfattar

historieläromedlen, deras innehåll och budskap samt de olika perspektiv som anläggs och förmedlas. Det finns fortfarande en hel del luckor som behöver fyllas i forskningen om läromedel.

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Nyheter från Fakulteten för konst och humaniora

Under det senaste dryga året har flera avhandlingar lagts fram av doktorander vid Fakulteten för konst och humaniora (Linnéuniversitetet), eller av personer knutna till denna fakultet.

Linnéuniversitetet har fått sin första doktorsavhandling i ortnamnsforskning. Den 23 oktober 2015 försvarade Ola Svensson sin avhandling *Nämnda ting men glömda. Ortnamn, landskap och rättsutövning*. Opponent var docent Per Vikstrand, Institutet för språk och folkminnen. Avhandlingen syftar dels till att samla in, avgränsa och beskriva de ortnamn i Skåne som är förknippade med rättsutövning, dels att beskriva de platser som dessa namnger samt de rättskretsar – oftast härader – vilkas centra rättplatserna har varit. Ola Svensson har för övrigt fått ett stipendium från Kungl. Gustav Adolfs Akademien för svensk folkkultur för sitt arbete. Den intresserade kan ladda ned det direkt från Diva, se: http://lnu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:858241/FULLTEXT06.pdf.

Emilie Wellfelt lade fram sin avhandling i historia 23 september 2016, med titeln *Historyscapes in Alor: Approaching indigenous histories in Eastern Indonesia*. Opponent var professor Timo Kaartinen, Helsingfors. Avhandlingen söker nya vägar för att närma sig lokala kulturers historia och fokuserar på ön Alor i östra Indonesien. Alor kom under full nederländsk kolonial kontroll på ett sent stadium i början av 1900-talet. Traditionellt var ön uppdelad i flera olika småriken respektive språkområden. I sin analys av av inhemskt historieanvändande använder sig Wellfelt av begreppet historyscape vilket ger tillfälle att diskutera bevarandet, skapandet och kommunicerandet av historia, samt att se hur historia förstås och förmedlas på olika komplexa sätt. Avhandlingen bygger på en omfattande insamling av muntliga traditioner på Alor och går i detalj igenom historyscapes i fyra regioner: Östalor, Centralbryggan, Abuiområdet samt Fågelhuvudet/Västalor. Materialet diskuteras ingående och jämförs med externa, framför allt koloniala historiska data. Undersökningen visar på den vikt som människor lägger vid historier om det förgångna, även i småskaliga och icke-skriftliga kulturer, och det överflöd av berättelser med historiska anspråk som framkommer så snart forskaren börjar lyssna. För mer information om avhandlingen, se http://lnu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A971262&dswid=-3646.

Samma datum, den 23 september 2016, försvarade Hanna Gladh sin avhandling i engelska, *Keep V-ing: Aspectuality and event structure*. Opponent var professor Östen Dahl, Stockholms universitet. Syftet med hennes studie är att tillhandahålla en utförlig redogörelse för meningen i "keep V-ing"-konstruktioner. Till exempel: (a.) "Mary kept winning (again and again)". (b.) "John kept running (for another ten minutes)". På basis av en systematisk studie av kombinationer av "keep" med predikat i olika aktionsarter påvisas att "keep" kan ge upphov till två olika läsningar vilka delar den övergripande meningen "continued activity". Genom att jämföra "keep V-ing" med den progressiva konstruktionen "be V-ing" (som "John was building the house") samt med två andra kontinuitiva konstruktioner, "continue V-ing" (som "John continued building the house") och "V on" (som "John ran on") visas att "keep"

kan ändra ett teliskt predikat till en ateliskt läsning genom att täcka hela händelsen, men ej kan täcka en intern del av en telisk händelse. Dessutom, i motsats till "continue V-ing" och "V on" så beskriver "keep V-ing" inte nödvändigtvis en händelse som redan initierats. Avhandlingen kan läsas på länken

http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:954250/FULLTEXT02.pdf.

Pia Bygdéus är universitetslektor i musikpedagogik vid Linnéuniversitetet och därtill är hon aktiv frilansande musiker, pianist, dirigent, repetitör och musikproducent på P2Live. Hon försvarade 2015 sin avhandling *Medierande verktyg i körledarpraktik – en studie av arbetssätt och handling i körledning med barn och unga* vid Lunds universitet. Alla vet vad körsång är och vad körledaren gör – men vad gör körledaren och hur gör körledaren? Körledning innebär en stor variation av inre/yttre förhandlingar respektive omförhandlingar av arbetssätt och medierande verktyg. Studien är longitudinell och av kvalitativ karaktär. Det empiriska materialet består av observationer, halvstrukturerade intervjuer, fokussamtal, enskilda eftersamtal, reflekterat skrivande för körledare såväl som forskare. Relationell förmåga återspeglas i psykologiska aspekter av använda verktyg, hur kördirigering sker, vad som förmedlas och hur. Pedagogik och konstnärlighet är sammanflätat, människan tolkar musikaliska signaler utan prat, och när inre och yttre kulturella verktyg samverkar kan en konstnärlig upplevelse inträffa. Kören som instrument är och blir till ett medierande verktyg för körledarens musikaliska intentioner. Med reflektion som verktyg är varje stund i en musikalisk praktik ett pågående arbete för körledaren, såväl före, under som efter en gemensam aktivitet. Reflektionen blir på så vis ett verktyg som driver arbetet framåt. Avhandlingen finns att läsa på länken

https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication?q=%22bygdéus%22.

Andreas Johansson, lärare i religionsvetenskap vid Linnéuniversitetet, lade fram sin avhandling, *Pragmatic Muslim politics. The case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress* vid Lunds universitet 2016. Opponent var professor Susanne Olsson, Stockholms universitet. Här diskuteras och analyseras användandet av islamska termer och symboler i det politiska partiet Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Idag är de invecklade, överlappande och motsägelsefulla relationerna mellan religion och politik ett dynamiskt forskarfält. Forskningen lider dock av två stor brister. Den forskningen som utförs inom statsvetenskapen saknar ofta djupare förståelse för religionens kraft och verkan i såväl individens liv som i samhällets funktion. Forskningen har koncentrerat sig på frågor som berört varför partiet blivit så framgångsrikt. Religionen nämns som en faktor, men de har inte gått djupare in på vilka begrepp som används och varför. Johansson har därför valt att delvis analysera samma material som tidigare forskning har använt för att påvisa att olika religiösa attribut (språk och symboler) är närvarade i SLMC diskurs. Andreas Johansson avhandling om det ledande muslimska partiet på Sri Lanka är i detta sammanhang viktig inte bara eftersom Johanssons intervjuer av partiets centrala politiker och studier av partiets officiella texter ger oss ny kunskap om det religiösa och politiska läget på Sri Lanka, utan även eftersom den ger en djupare förståelse för en religiös (därtill muslimsk) rörelse vars politiska agenda ingalunda är fundamentalistisk, utan "pragmatisk". Avhandlingen nås via länken

https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/7528313/Andreas_Johansson_Pramatic_Muslim_Politics_the_Case_of_Sri_Lanka_Muslim_Congress.pdf.

Förutom avhandlingar kan ett par andra aktuella publikationer nämnas. Magnus Eriksson, lektor i kreativt skrivande vid Fakulteten för konst och humaniora, har redigerat antologin *Den befriade människan* (Stockholm: Trolltrumma förlag 2016) som utgör Pär Lagerkvist-samfundets årsskrift. Boken innehåller sju artiklar och en recension skrivna av akademiker, journalister, dramatiker och skönlitterära författare. Ämnena spänner över olika aspekter av Lagerkvists livs- och människosyn, och även hans egendomliga frånvaro från dagens svenska teaterscener. Därtill har Christer Knutsson sammanställt en Lagerkvistbibliografi för åren 1990-1999.

Från Fakulteten för konst och humaniora kommer också antologin *Möten med mening. Ämnesdidaktiska fallstudier i konst och humaniora* (2016, red. Karin L. Eriksson). Den består av femton ämnesdidaktiska fallstudier som alla kretsar runt frågor om möten, mening och meningsskapande. I antologins första del – "Att erfara mening" – ligger fokus på elevers och studenters möten med olika ämnen och discipliner. I den andra delen – Att iscensätta mening – får läsaren exempel på hur meningsfulla möten kan gestaltas i undervisningen. Artiklarna är skrivna av forskare inom Centrum för ämnesdidaktisk forskning inom konst och humaniora vid Linnéuniversitetet (CÄHL), en centrumbildning vars syfte är bland annat att stärka den ämnesdidaktiska forskningsmiljön inom Fakulteten för konst och humaniora. Antologin är en del i detta arbete, och med fallstudier från flera humanistiska och estetiska ämnesområden, ger den exempel på hur olika frågeställningar och problemområden kan överföras mellan olika ämnesområden och därigenom berika varandra. Antologin vänder sig både till ämneslärarstudenter och lärarutbildare som till ett vidare forskningsfält.

Tommy Gustafsson, historiker och professor i filmvetenskap vid fakulteten, har tagit initiativ till en podcast, Humpodd. Den nya serien av poddar innehåller samtal med forskarpersonligheter vid Linnéuniversitetet, i första hand Fakulteten för konst och humaniora. Tanken med podden är att visa på den rika flora av intressanta forskningsområden som idag finns inom humanistiska och konstnärliga ämnen på universitetet. Hittills har sex poddar publicerats på nätet om så skiftande ämnen som barnfilm, postkolonialitet och språkbruk vid toalettbesök. Humpodd kan nås på webbadressen https://humpodd.wordpress.com/.

Hans Hägerdal

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Ynglingatal och den nya användningen av verbet äga.

Vårnumret 2004   för oss på spännande litterära vägar.

Höstnumret 2003   rör sig fritt över horisonten, från Färöarna till Lund, från tingsrätter till tautologier.

Vårnumret 2003   är ett blandat nummer där vi bl.a. bevistar en internationell konferens om sexualitet som klassfråga och möter idrottshjälten Gunder Hägg.

Höstnumret 2002   behandlar etniska relationer.

Vårnumret 2002   ägnas helt och hållet åt temat genus.

Höstnumret 2001   domineras av texter från årets Humanistdagar och från ett seminarium om historieämnets legitimitet.

Vårnumret 2001   försöker svara på frågan: "Where did all the flowers go?"

Höstnumret 2000   gör oss bekanta med en filosof, en överrabbin och en sagoberätterska.

Vårnumret 2000   diskuterar frågor kring historiens slut, litteraturvetenskapens mening, översättningar och den moderna irländska romanen.

Höstnumret 1999   speglar årets Humanistdagar vid Växjö universitet.

Vårnumret 1999   rör sig såsom på vingar och berättar om nyss timade konferenser i Paris och Växjö.

Höstnumret 1998   Här går det utför! Såväl med svenskan i Amerika och den tyska litteraturen i Sverige som med Vilhelm Mobergs sedebetyg.

Vårnumret 1998   bjuder på en 'lycklig humanistisk röra' av europeiska författare, svenska lingon i fransk tappning och stavfel(!).

Höstnumret 1997   speglar årets Humanistdagar som hade temat Möten Mellan Människor.