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### **INTRODUCTION**

A wide variety of countermeasures have been introduced in every Japanese nuclear power plant (NPP) in order to meet regulatory requirements issued after the severe accident at Fukushima-Daiichi NPP.





Maintaining the Cooling of Reactors under any Circumstance





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
Installation of Redundant and Diversified Power Supply











































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
#### 3. Revised RAG


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


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### **Concluding Remarks**

- The brittleness-oriented RAG questions were well accepted, and were found to be useful for raising consciousness concerning possible weak points of the NPP even after large-scale renovations after the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
- After raising the consciousness, we can use the restrictive RAG and cross-divisional RAG to obtain more detailed insight into the organizational resilience.
- This approach will eventually lead to enhanced resilience potential within the organization.