

SUPPORT FOR SICK AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS IN SWEDEN: ON CLASS, UNIONS, AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

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Abstract: We aim to explore the citizens' attitudes toward sick insurances and unemployment insurances with Survey 2020. For methods we use descriptive statistics (including geo-statistics), correspondence analysis, and loglinear analysis. The exploration suggests that citizens favor an increased sick insurance more than an increased unemployment insurance. We find differences with regards to social class, union membership, and anti-immigration attitudes. Finally, we outline implications for theories. Regional (i.e., county) differences in the average support for unemployment and sickness benefits exist depending on left vote share and immigration. However, the differences seem unreliable.

Keywords: sociology of welfare politics; sick benefits; unemployment benefits; anti-immigration; unions

Introduction

Social insurances such as sick benefits and unemployment benefits constitute the foundation of the Social Democratic welfare state. However, citizens differ in their support (i.e. attitudes) for social insurances. Critics worry that generous social insurances undermine work ethics, but cultivates percipient unemployment and latent poverty (i.e. "welfare traps") (Pierson and Castles, 2006). Advocates counter that generous social insurances can reduce poverty, inequality (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Korpi and Palme, 1998), job insecurity (Kalleberg, 2018), and health without undermining employment (Kenworthy, 2019).

The scope of the welfare state vary across countries depending on citizens' support (i.e. "public opinion"). Support can be measured by citizens' attitudes, i.e. opinion. For example, citizens' support for the welfare policies tend to differ regarding welfare regimes (Svallfors, 1997), age (Busemeyer and Iversen, 2020), social class (Svallfors, 2004), gender, religion (VanHeuvelen, 2014; Stegmueller et al., 2012), and immigration status (Diermeier et al., 2020). Nevertheless, differences in support for social insurances between social categories needs to be explained (Tilly, 2000). Although, we cannot identify the cause, we can still need a hypothetical explanation to guide the analysis. To hypothetically explain differences, we also need to consider the social relations.

The support for the social democratic welfare state tends to be strongest in the Nordic countries. However, non-Nordic welfare states have adopted elements of the social democratic welfare state. For example, the USA has a liberal welfare state; but has adopted policies the social democratic welfare state (Kenworthy, 2019). Consequently, the scope of the welfare state continues to be contested.

Recently, the contention of social insurances has become prominent due to the rise of xenophobic and populist parties in Europe and the North America (e.g., the Sweden democrats in Sweden, Danish People's Party (DPP), The National Rally in France, Trumpism in the USA). The xenophobic parties and rights populists claim that immigration undermines the efficiency of social insurances should thus be restrictive to natives (Elgenius and Rydgren, 2019; Elgenius and Wennerhag, 2018).

In the current study, we make a theoretical contribution by proposing that anti-immigration attitudes undermine the support for social insurances, but that union mobilization cultivates solidarity and thus counteracts anti-immigration attitudes. By union mobilization, we refer to the mechanisms of cultivating workers' solidarity. While previous studies have theorized unions and anti-immigration attitudes as separate, we contend that the two help us to explain why support for the social welfare policies has not vanished in the Nordic countries.

We will argue that differences in class and ethnicity can be traced to union mobilization and anti-immigration attitudes. Anti-immigration attitudes undermine the support for social insurances. Whereas union mobilization cultivates support.

Purpose

We aim to *explore* citizens' attitudes toward an increased (a) unemployment benefits or (b) sick benefits in Sweden with Survey 2020 (Hagevi, 2020).

How do citizens respond to an (a) increased unemployment benefits or (b) sick benefits?

How do (a) increased unemployment benefits or (b) sick benefits vary by region (i.e. county)?

What citizens determinants contribute to differences in (a) increased unemployment benefits or (b) sick benefits?

Our analysis is exploratory in the spirit of Wickham (2016). However, we consider theory and prior knowledge as pivotal to the guide the analysis (Gelman et al., 2002). Thus, we will review the Swedish context and previous research, and theory below. Second, we briefly describe data and strategies for analysis. Third, we report the results of the exploratory analysis. Fourth, we outline the conclusions and outline the theoretical implication of the study.

The Swedish Context: Labor Market and Social Policy

Historically, labor unions, the Social Democrats and the Left party have supported social insurances policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Swedish citizens have also supported social insurance policies as part of the welfare state.

Despite a higher support for social insurances in the Nordic countries, the policies have been criticized by liberal conservative parties in Sweden. Liberal conservatives worry that social insurance policies undermine citizens' work ethic. If welfare becomes too generous, liberal conservatives argued, then work will not pay. Thus, liberal conservative parties have cut social insurance policies. The cut came as part of a transition from "welfare" to "workfare" (i.e., work based compensation) (Bengtsson and Berglund, 2012; Bengtsson and Jacobsson, 2018).

Next the liberal conservatives cut the subvention on the unemployment insurance and the tax subvention for union members. The liberal conservatives argued that the subvention made unions too powerful (Kjellberg, 2006).

Beyond liberal conservative parties, xenophobic parties have mobilized support for welfare chauvinism. Welfare chauvinism means that the xenophobic parties support welfare for natives but wants to cut support for immigrants. The xenophobic parties claim that welfare cannot support any more than natives (Elgenius and Rydgren, 2019; Elgenius and Wennerhag, 2018).

By contrast, the left has been increasingly worried about the falling rate of citizens who pay membership fees to the employment insurances. Although, the rate of members in the unemployment insurance has risen due to the pandemic, we do not know how if citizens will discontinue after the pandemic. Regarding sick insurance, the left has been increasingly worried about the administration of the sick insurance. The rate of entailment has been lower than expected.

Recently, jobs have become more flexible and insecure. Thus, the number of insecure employments has risen. (e.g. substitutes, seasonal workers, self-rated insecure workers) (Kalleberg, 2018). The implication has been a greater flexibility and job insecurity among workers. Thus, social insurances for unemployment and sickness have increased in importance.

Such insecurities seem to correlate with support for xenophobic parties. Specifically, exposure to immigrants correlates with higher xenophobic vote share depending on the level of unemployment and education at the district level (Strömblad and Malmberg, 2016). Likewise, population share of immigrants, correlates with support for Sweden Democrats.

Previous Research and Theories

Below, we will discuss previous research and theories. We expand on previous research and theories.

Ethnic origin and anti-immigration attitudes

Recently, researchers have increasingly focused on the consequences of ethnicity (in the US) and immigration (in Europe). Researchers have suggested that welfare attitudes including social insurances, has been divided as a response to immigration. According to the theories, citizens worry that the welfare state cannot support everyone.

Two different hypotheses exist. One hypothesis suggests that the increase in immigrant population share reduces the support for welfare policies such as social insurances (Eger and Breznau, 2017; Eger, 2010). Thus, the **H1** emphasizes the size of the immigrant population as a proxy for native-immigrant contacts (Blalock, 1957, 1970; Tajfel, 1978). The growth in the size of the immigrant population triggers competition over entitlements. Competition, triggers fears and thus resentment of natives toward immigrants.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): On regional average, greater share of immigrants corresponds to less support for social insurances.

For example, in Germany researchers claim a "Goodbye Lenin effect" when the support for the welfare state diminishes as immigration laws become more deregulated. Critiques contend that the correlation between population share of immigrants (**H1**) can be spurious. Specifically, evidence for the "Goodbye Lenin effect" falsely assumes that regions have the same development of welfare state (Auspurg et al., 2019). Nevertheless, proponents can also be found in Sweden who claim that even Sweden has fallen victim to fear of immigration, and that the refugee crisis reinforced these fears (Eger and Bohman, 2016; Eger and Breznau, 2017). Although, Eger and Breznau (2017) have noted that population share of immigrants may correlates with fears and interpretations. Eger and Bohman (2016) noted that immigrant population share correlates with anti-immigration attitudes and thus population share either indirectly measures anti-immigration attitudes or proximate it.

Before continuing, we note that research inspired by psychologist claims that population share of immigrants might have the opposite sign. Such research proposes that exposure reduces prejudice, i.e., the "contact hypothesis". However, we will not consider this hypothesis further.

A second hypothesis suggests that citizens respond to fear of immigrants. Inspired by interactionism, the second hypothesis emphasizes citizens' interpretations or fears inspired (Hjerm, 2007; Bobo, 1999; Blumer, 1958). Bobo (1999) suggested that citizens react to economic threats of immigrants and minorities (emotionally and cognitively) rather than the true population share of immigrants. Thus, Blumer (1958) did not emphasize the share of immigrants (Hjerm, 2007). Although accepting Blumer (1958), Bobo (1999) urged that natives fears and interpretations in turn depend on economic facets.¹

Citizens' fear of immigrants reduce support for specific social welfare policies (social insurances), but not others (e.g. elder care). As citizens fear that the social insurances may benefit immigrants more than natives (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2015). Importantly, the third hypothesis emphasizes the rise of welfare chauvinism (Burgoon and Rooduijn, 2021; Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2015). Welfare chauvinism refers to ethnic welfare nationalist convictions to support for welfare policies. One prefers to anti-immigration policies and prefers to restrict the distribution of welfare entitlements to natives only.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): On average, anti-immigration attitudes correspond to less support for social insurances.

In agreement with recent theorizing of welfare chauvinism, we suggest that "ethnic threats" origin in competition over welfare entitlements. Agreeing with Bobo (1999), we suspect that the contribution of Blumer (1958) centers on the fear or interpretation as opposed to the share of immigrants, i.e. visibility as proposed by Blalock (1957, 1970) and later Eger and Breznau (2017).

People do not (necessarily) need to have contact with or exposure to immigrants. Instead, we suggest people, on average, interpret and account for other people's behavior (Weber, 1978). For example, will our support for unemployment benefits lead to fraud or job-seeking (or re-employment). Natives that prefer anti-immigration attitudes do not know the outcome or its consequences (i.e., distribution of welfare) of welfare support. Thus, natives that prefer anti-immigration attitudes they should prefer to restrict the distribution of welfare entitlements to natives. Restricting welfare entitlement to natives reduces the competition of welfare entitlements with immigrants. Thus, welfare chauvinism implies a correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and support for welfare.

Nevertheless, relations may as (Eger and Bohman, 2016) noted depend on previous exposure to immigrants in the streets (i.e., an indirect association). The problem of the claim concerns the high correlation between regional (or country) predictors (Brady and Finnigan, 2014).

Empirically, H2 can be measured by attitudes toward immigration. Whereas the H1 can be measured by country or regional share of immigrants.

Class and unions

Beyond ethnicity, social class has been most widely studied as an expression of democratic class struggle (Svallfors, 2004). Although, the issue of immigration has attracted attention along class and country differences, a few scholars have turned their attention toward unions (Yang and Kwon, 2019). Labor unions occupy a pivotal position in the power-resource theory of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1989). Thus, the prevailing explanation suggest that: unions cultivate norms of fairness that promote welfare attitudes (Yang and Kwon, 2019; Bledow and Busemeyer, 2020; Mosimann and Pontusson, 2017). Nevertheless, researchers seldom study differences in welfare attitudes by union membership.

However, we emphasize the claims for solidarity emerge from union activists' contacts with members. Unions often organize by occupation (Tilly and Tilly, 2019; Manza and Brooks, 2008; Kalleberg et al., 1987). Thus, union membership have a high correspondence with social class. Union membership promote workers' bargaining capacity (Tilly and Tilly, 2019; Kalleberg et al., 1987).

Union activists mobilize via magazines, meetings, and campaigning to target solidarity for all workers. Beyond the workplace, unions also cultivate political claims (Tilly and Tilly, 2019; Manza and Brooks, 2008). Unions participate in elections, party conventions campaigning, fund labor parties, and issue political statements on social policy. Above all, such activism indicate solidarity.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Compared to the average non- member, the average union member corresponds more with greater support for social insurances.

In the Nordic countries, unions administer the unemployment insurance to establish solidarity among workers (Hechter, 1988). Thus, unions use insurances as a complement to other strategies such as strikes, lock-downs, wage-bargaining, boycotts, sabotage, collective agreements, and so forth. Where administrating insurances increases in importance in democratic countries as unions will clam labor rights as opposed to citizens' rights (Korpi, 2001; Tilly and Tilly, 2019). To ensure solidarity, unions monitor their member and sanction their members, e.g., withdraw membership (Hechter, 1988). Consequently, one might suspect that union membership (or union mobilization in general) varies with greater support for social insurances.

Finally, we include regions (i.e., counties) to explore the importance of regional politics such as conventions that evolve over longer periods of time (Tilly, 1997; Weakliem, 2020). Previous research has overlooked the importance of regions in public opinion (Weakliem, 2020). However, regions have social and political significance.

Regions condition support due to conventions that emerge from democratic power struggles over time (Korpi, 2001; Tilly, 2004; Weakliem, 2020). Examples include how ethnic nationalists or labor movement struggle over political representation. Thus, we emphasize how political representation in regions condition attitudes and behaviors.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): On regional average, larger left vote share corresponds to greater support for social insurances.

Data, Variables, and Strategy of Analysis

For data we use Survey 2020 (Hagevi, 2020). The data set uses a national simple random sample of 1360 citizens in Sweden above 18 and below or equal to 85 years of age.

Response variables

We will analyze two statements as response variables. First, *the support for an increased unemployment insurance*. Second the *support for an increased sick insurance*. The variables range from a 1-to-5 scale with response options: "Very Good "(=5), "Good", "Neutral", "Bad", and "Very Bad"(=1).

Explanatory variables

Our explanatory variables allow us to explore several of the hypothesis in previous research and theory. The explanatory variables include:

For *region* we used the *vote share for left parties* and *share of immigrants* based on official statistics, i.e.: Swedish Election Authority and Statistics Sweden. To avoid spurious correlations, we also checked for the importance of share of unemployment, share of low educated, and share of low income. However, none of the adjusting regional measures mattered. One problem begins low regional variance and correlated predictors which agrees with Brady and Finnigan (2014) findings.

To simplify the presentation *class*, we collapsed occupational class categories into: employers, intermediate (non-manual, self-employed, superiors), never worked, and workers. This also reduces sparseness in the subsequent analysis.

Ethnic origin consists of a four response: native, Nordic, European, or non-European origin.

Union membership consists of LO (blue collar), TCO (lower white collar) SACO (upper white collar), other (e.g., syndicalists, pilots, dock workers), and non-union member.

For *attitudes toward immigration*. Where we re-coded attitudes toward immigration (1-to-5 scale) as anti-immigration attitudes including response options.

Strategy of analysis

We engage in an exploratory data analysis in the spirit of Tukey (1980) and Wickham (2016). The analysis was conducted in R (Team, 2013). R is a statistical programming language that is free to download with powerful graphical capabilities. In R with packages such as: *dplyr* (Wickham and Grolemund, 2016), *ggplot2* (Wickham, 2016), *tmap* (Tennekes, 2018), *ca* (Greenacre, 2017), and *FactoMineR* (Le et al., 2008).

The latter two packages use correspondence analysis (CA) which indicates the degree of correspondence between qualitative variables based on the chi-squared distance. Correspondence analysis simplifies the exploration between variables with several response options (Greenacre, 2017). We also add a measure for the percentage (%) of dispersion (i.e., spread or variation) explained. Simplified, we compute Singular Value Decomposition on a table of Pearson's Residuals (i.e., deviation between observed and expected frequencies).

Note that we graph the symmetric correspondence plot, i.e., principal coordinates (Greenacre, 2017). Principal coordinates have the same scale. The distance can be interpreted in a chi-square and where symmetry implies a more aesthetic graph (unlike asymmetric ones).

Importantly, the distance between row points must be interpreted "row wise", and column points have to be interpreted "column wise". Rows and columns cannot be interpreted jointly (as in asymmetric plots with principal and standard coordinates, Greenacre, 2017). Thus, we can also interpret "dimension wise" (Greenacre, 2017; Le et al., 2008; Husson et al., 2017; Friendly and Meyer, 2015). However, we can make general statements about the pattern of rows and columns even though such interpretation is not strictly accurate (Greenacre, 2017; Mair, 2018).

Correspondence analysis offers several advantages. First, we can quantify qualitative variables while preserving qualitative information. Thus, CA qualifies as common approach to visualizing discrete or qualitative data (Friendly and Meyer, 2015). Second, we can visualize patterns in the data that cannot be observed from summary statistics. Third, CA offers a geometric interpretation that will approximate Multiple Dimensional Scaling (as both use Singular Value Decomposition). Thus, one can interpret the data as relational. Fourth, correspondence analysis redirects our attention from "significance testing" to visual patterns of practical significance. However, a disadvantage of correspondence analysis occurs when analyzing more than three variables (Greenacre, 2017).

Graphical exploratory analysis offers us a powerful and important strategy in data analysis (Gelman et al., 2002). We also consider graphs as more informative compared to tables. Compared to tables, graphs also support visual communication for novice and experts alike.

Readers may care about the uncertainty of our estimates. The analysis of contingency tables often includes the Chi-square test (Agresti, 2013; Kateri, 2014; Friendly and Meyer, 2015). Some authors advocate to always report the Chi-square test and correspondence together (Husson, 2017). However, we find the test insufficient as it ignore the magnitude, and fails to address pairwise associations of cells for larger tables (Agresti, 2013; Kateri, 2014).

Thus, instead of computing the Chi-square, we report loglinear models for two-way tables (Agresti, 2013; Kateri, 2014; Friendly and Meyer, 2015). Readers can assess the uncertainty with 95% confidence intervals (CI). The loglinear model has a mathematical connection to the correspondence analysis for a table with two variables (Agresti, 2013; Kateri, 2014; Friendly and Meyer, 2015).

Next, loglinear analysis provides us with parameter estimates of the log odds ratio. For example, we can see the strength and sign of the association. If the CI of the estimates includes a zero, then we consider it less reliable. However, we do also consider very large CI:s with caution.

The log odds ratio can be interpreted as multiplicative if we “exponentiate it” i.e., with Euler’s number. In other words, the tendency to respond to both X and Y by some factor (i.e., multiple) in odds. Odds ratios close to 1 implies no association, below 1 a negative association, and above one a positive association.

For simplicity we focused on Maximum Likelihood Estimates with ordinal models. Whenever possible, we prefer ordinal log linear models. Assuming ordinal variables, allows us to gain more information and thus gain precision in the analysis (Agresti, 2013).

Results

We organized the sections as follows. First, we report descriptive statistics for each social insurance variable. Second, we describe regional differences in each social insurance variable. Third, we report descriptive association including a simple correspondence analysis at the citizen level based on class and union membership. Fourth, we report descriptive association including a simple correspondence analysis at the citizen level based on ethnic origin and attitudes to migration. Finally, we report a loglinear analysis to estimate the sign, magnitudes, and uncertainties.

Citizen toward increased social insurances: Sick and unemployment benefits

In Figure 1, we graph the two statements about support for an increased sick or unemployment insurance. Each of the bars represent the percentage of responses. The scale ranges from ”Very bad”=1 to ”Very good”=5.


To simplify the interpretation, we added a reference line at 20% for an equal distribution. Clearly, the equal distribution fails to match the data. As expected, the citizens tend to support an increase in unemployment insurance and sick insurance. However, citizens signal a stronger support for an increased sick insurance, than an increase in unemployment insurance. Thus, citizens indicate greater solidarity with the sick than the unemployed. Although, difference can either be due to sampling uncertainty, we should expect the pattern our hypothesis.

Regional differences in attitudes toward increased social insurances: Sick and unemployment benefits

Next, we consider regions (i.e., counties). Figure 2 indicates the strength of the support by region. We chose region as the data does not allow us to divide the sample by municipality due to sparseness. The maps indicate the average fully agree.

Binned regional averages range from 3 to 3.8 for unemployment assistance, whereas sick insurance ranges from 3.2 to 4.2. Color shading indicate the degree of support.

Figure 1: Support for social insurances in percentages.



Most supporters of social insurance policies can be found in the North of Sweden. The North has historically been supportive of the policies of Social Democrats and the Left party, thus the support ought to be expected. However, the North of Sweden does not uniformly respond with a high support. Some Northern regions diverge from the pattern suggestion that dispersion exists.

The lowest support comes from the South of Sweden. South has historically supported the liberal conservative party. The xenophobic parties have also had their greatest support in the South. While maps can be informative, they can also be deceiving as we demonstrate next.

In Figure 3 consider the importance of the share of immigrants (based on Statistics Sweden). Again, the map indicates the binned support for unemployment and sick insurance by blue shading. However, we added dots for share of immigrants. As seen in Figure 3, we see some correspondence but far from perfect. The hypothesis of share of immigrants as the demographic force fits in Northern and Southern Sweden, but not in the middle of Sweden. Again, the pattern expresses an association with high uncertainty.

Figure 2: Region (i.e., county) support. Average support binned.




Figure 3: Immigrant share in percentage binned. Region (i.e., county). Average support binned.




Figure 4: Left vote share in percentages binned. Region (i.e., county).Average support binned.




Figure 5: Unemployment and sick insurance support by class




Figure 6: Unemployment and sick insurance support by union





Figure 7: Correspondence with social class and support unemployment and sick benefits

In Figure 4 we also graphed the left vote share instead (based on Statistics Sweden). Again, the pattern fits to Northern and Southern Sweden but reduces at the middle. For instance, Blekinge, Kronoberg, and Västra Götaland have a weak left and indicates lower support. For regional averages we can infer a weak association, but with to high uncertainty.

Social class and union differences in attitudes toward increased social insurances: Sick and unemployment benefits

We begin by graphing the conditional proportions for sick and unemployment insurance social class (Figure 5) and union membership (Figure 6). The working classes and the those that never worked seem favor more supportive than the other classes.

We note the strong support among union members in the blue-collar union. To avoid data sparseness, we collapsed social classes into the following: employers, worker, never worker, intermediate (self-employed, non-manual, and supervisors). Workers of the labor market tend to be very supportive. The intermediate class shares the support to a greater extent than employers. Employers cluster with unemployment insurance option bad or very bad.

Next, we turn to the correspondence analysis. Recall that we can only interpret the patterns of the correspondence analysis row- or column-wise. Then again, we can make general statements (even though technical not precise).

Figure 7 suggests that social class differences can be heterogeneous, as social class comprises distinct occupations. Here, workers have a greater correspondence with supportive responses for social insurance. The intermediate class and those outside of the labor market have a greater correspondence with neutral responses. The employers have greater correspondence with the bad or very bad responses. Thus, the correspondence analysis recovers a pattern that could not be easily inferred from the bar plots alone.

Union membership (blue collar vs white collar) indicates class organization. Here, union membership has a greater correspondence to support for social insurance. In Figure 8 we observe a greater correspondence between the blue collar union (LO) and support for sick and unemployment insurance. By contrast, the union for the lower white collar workers (TCO) have a greater correspondence with "good" or "neutral" response. The upper white collar union (SACO) indicates a negative response, i.e., "bad" or "very bad".


Note that "other unions" have greater correspondence with "good" or "very good" compared to the white collar unions. Other unions remain a heterogeneous category, i.e., contains a quite dispersed union. Examples of other unions include dock workers unions, fire fighters' union, and the pilot union.

Finally, in Table 1 we summarize the relationships with Cramer's V. Cramer's V ranges from 0-to-1 and indicates the strength of the relationship. For example, union membership accounts for 12% of the variation (or better: "inertia") in the association to unemployment benefits. Social class has a 14% of the variation (or better: "inertia") in sick benefits.

Table 1: Correlation between unemployment benefits/Sick benefits and Union membership/Social Class (Cramer's V) V (range: 0 to 1) with 95% confidence intervals (CI)., i.e., upper(UCI) and lower(LCI)

	Union Membership	LCI	UCI	Social Class	LCI	UCI
Unemployment benefits	0.11	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.07	0.13
Sick benefits	0.13	0.11	0.17	0.11	0.09	0.15

Figure 8: Correspondence with union and support unemployment and sick benefits



Differences in attitudes toward increased social insurances due to anti-immigration attitudes and ethnic origin

We begin by graphing the conditional proportions for sick and unemployment insurance support by support by ethnic origin (Figure 9) and anti-immigration attitudes (Figure 10). Although uncertain, citizens born outside of Europe seem more supportive than natives. Next, we observe a weak support among those citizens that hold anti-immigration attitudes.

Figure 9: Unemployment and sick insurance support by ethnic origin





Figure 10: Unemployment and sick insurance support by anti-immigration attitudes



We visualize the correspondence between ethnic origin (Figure 11) and anti-immigration attitudes (Figure 12). However, recall that we can only interpret the correspondence: (a) row(column) wise, (b) dimension wise, or (c) make general statements.

Figure 11 indicates the distance between the support for social insurances and ethnic origin. We observe a weak correspondence between ethnic origin and support for an increased sick insurance. In either case natives have a greater correspondence with neutral or negative. Whereas citizens of immigrant origin have a greater correspondence with support for social insurance. However, the correspondence between sick insurance and ethnic origin seems less clear than in the unemployment case.

In Figure 12 we turn to anti-immigration attitudes. We interpret the citizens anti-immigration attitudes correspond to lower support for sick benefits. Likewise, anti-immigration attitudes correspond to a lower support for unemployment benefits. Thus, we find preliminary support for our expectations.

Figure 11: Correspondence with ethnic origin and support unemployment and sick benefits





Figure 12: Correspondence with anti-immigration attitudes and support unemployment and sick benefits.



Finally, in Table 2 we summarize the relationships with Cramer’s V. Again, Cramer’s V ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates the strength of the relationship. Here, anti-immigration attitudes accounts for 12% of the dispersion in the association to unemployment benefits.

Table 2: Correlation between unemployment benefits/Sick benefits and Union membership/Social Class (Cramer’s V) (range: 0 to 1) with 95% confidence intervals (CI), i.e., upper(UCi) and lower(LCI)

	Anti-immigration attitudes	LCI	UCI	Ethnic Origin	LCI	UCI
Unemployment benefits	0.12	0.11	0.16	0.10	0.09	0.14
Sick benefits	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.10	0.15

Exploring the strength and uncertainty with Loglinear Analysis

To estimate the uncertainty, we conducted loglinear Analysis in Table 3. We assume a Poisson sampling of the (marginal) frequencies. A Poisson sampling approximates the multinomial sampling assumption (Agresti, 2013; Kateri, 2014). Thus, we can estimate the (marginal) frequencies as log counts as dependent on the association between rows and columns (i.e., two-way).

The loglinear analysis estimates (a) lower order terms (the log odds ratio of a response) and (b) higher order terms (the log odds ratio of an association or interaction). For simplicity, we focus only on the higher order terms, i.e., the association (Agresti, 2013). The loglinear analysis makes no difference between the explanatory and response variable. Thus, the loglinear analysis represents the joint dependence, i.e., one implies the other.

For social class and social insurance, we fitted a nominal-ordinal model, i.e., it treats the column as ordinal (social insurances). For union membership, we fitted a nominal-ordinal model. We favored nominal-ordinal models because the nominal-nominal model did not fit well with data. For attitudes to immigration and union membership, we noted no reliable association under the standard loglinear model for sick insurance. We ignore ethnic origin as it did not seem as reliable as attitude to migration.

Consider social class. We focus on the comparison between employers and workers. The average employers’ had a 85% lower odds of responding “Very Good” to employment benefits than workers. Compared to workers, we expect employers to have 82% lower odds of responding “Very Good” (instead of “Very Bad”) to sickness benefits.

Next, consider the support for social insurances by union membership. Compared to non-members, blue collar union members had roughly 10 times the odds of responding “Very Good” (instead of “Very Bad”) to unemployment insurance, on average. Likewise, blue collar union members have more than 8 times the odds of responding “Very good “ to sickness insurance compared to non-members, on average. Although, we should expect extreme odds for higher

levels, the model overestimates the odds. Nevertheless, we get a clearer indication of the pattern with the model.

Finally, consider attitudes to immigration and social insurances. For attitudes to immigration and social insurances, we fitted an ordinal-ordinal model as it fitted better with the data than other loglinear models. What we do is to fit the lower terms with a linear term for the scores (1-to-5) for higher order. We focus on the relationships between “Very Good” for social insurances and “Very Bad” for immigration, a.k.a. “corners” of a contingency table. On average, citizens had 85% lower odds of responding “Very Bad” (instead of “Very Good”) to immigration and “Very Good” to unemployment benefits. Likewise, citizens had 72% lower odds of responding “Very Bad” (instead of “Very Good”) to immigration and “Very Good” (instead of “Very Bad”) to sickness benefits, on average.

Table 3. Loglinear analysis of two-way associations. Estimates in log odds ratios with 95% Confidence Intervals under a Poisson distribution. R=Row score; C=Column Score. CI =confidence interval; ‘*’=product

Model Number	Predicted combination of variables	Estimate	LCI	UCI
Model 1	Nominal-Ordinal			
	Social Class: Employer*C.Unemployment	-0.48	-0.62	-0.34
	Social Class: Intermediate*C.Unemployment	-0.21	-0.34	-0.09
	Social Class: Neverworked.*C.Unemployment	-0.01	-0.22	0.19
Model 2	Nominal-Ordinal			
	Social Class: Employer*C.Sickness	-0.43	-0.58	-0.29
	Social Class: Intermediate*C.Sickness	-0.24	-0.38	-0.11
	Social Class: Neverworked* C. Sickness	0.05	-0.17	0.28
Model 3	Nominal-Ordinal			
	Union: LO* C. Unemployment	0.58	0.40	0.76
	Union: TCO*C. Unemployment	0.13	-0.06	0.31
	Union: SACO*C. Unemployment	-0.12	-0.30	0.06
	Union: Other*C.Unemployment	0.14	0.02	0.27
Model 4	Nominal-Ordinal			
	Union: LO*C.Sickness	0.47	0.28	0.68
	Union: TCO*C.Sickness	0.07	-0.13	0.27
	Union: SACO*C.Sickness	-0.08	-0.27	0.11
	Union: Other*C.Sickness	0.13	-0.01	0.27
Model 5	Ordinal-Ordinal			
	R.Immigration*C.Unemployment	-0.12	-0.16	-0.08
Model 6	Ordinal-Ordinal			
	R.Immigration*C.Sickness	-0.08	-0.13	-0.04

Discussion

The social democratic welfare state has shown that low unemployment can be combined with lower economic poverty, inequality, job insecurity, and health disparities (Kenworthy, 2019; Kalleberg, 2018). However, the policies of social democratic welfare state depend on the support for social insurances (Svallfors, 1997). The present study explores the support for social insurances such as unemployment and sick insurances based on the Swedish Survey 2020 (Hagevi, 2020). We conclude the following.

1. Citizens exhibit greater support for increased sick insurance than for the unemployment insurance on average.
2. Regional differences in support for social insurances tend to be weak and unreliable (H1, H4).
3. Class, union, and migration attitudes divide citizens on support for social insurances. The differences can be more accurately interpreted as differences due to union mobilization 3 and anti-immigration attitudes H2.

First, the exploration supports previous research regarding social class, union, and migration. Second, the exploration supports recent arguments about welfare chauvinism (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2015; Brady and Finnigan, 2014) and union mobilization (Yang and Kwon, 2019).

We suggest that the current study contributes to our understanding of the support for distribution of welfare entitlements. As noted, the welfare state depends on the support from the citizens (Svallfors, 2011).

We note that citizens' attitudes to immigration matter more than the population share of immigrants (Hjerm, 2007; Bobo, 1999). "Visibility" of immigrants as proposed by (Blalock, 1957, 1970) and (Eger and Bohman, 2016) do not suffice.

Agreeing with (Brady and Finnigan, 2014), we emphasize that the interactionist prediction of Blumer (1958) and Bobo (1999) converge with the welfare chauvinism hypothesis and thus offers a hypothetical explanation. Xenophobic and populist parties have promoted welfare chauvinism, i.e., restricting welfare entitlements to natives. Welfare chauvinism implies a correlation between anti-immigration and welfare attitudes. Thus, people's attitudes to migration have a higher correspondence with support for social insurances rather than the population share of immigrants (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2015; Brady and Finnigan, 2014).

A related explanation includes the rising insecurities on the labor market such as employment (Kalleberg, 2018). Rising insecurities on the labor market can contribute to explain the rise of xenophobic parties (Strömblad and Malmberg, 2016) and thus changes in support for social insurances.

Next, we hypothesize that unions have the capacity to counteract "threat of immigrant competition" over entitlements. Unions cultivate solidarity among workers against management (Yang and Kwon, 2019). As unions indicate solidarity by supporting insurances (Kalleberg, 2018; Tilly and Tilly, 2019).

In compared to other countries, social insurances matter more in the Nordic countries as unions can claim labor rights and thus welfare entitlements (Kalleberg et al., 1987; Tilly and Tilly, 2019). As opposed to liberal welfare states (e.g., UK, USA, Australia, or Ireland), unions have an occupational organization that mobilizes a solidarity among all workers (Kalleberg et al., 1987; Tilly and Tilly, 2019). In Sweden, the unions prefer contractual agreement and expanding the social protection of workers over strikes (Tilly and Tilly, 2019; Kalleberg et al., 1987). Consequently, we suspect that the scope of the exploration depends on the historical events that created the social democratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and its inclusive labor market (Gallie, 2009; Kalleberg, 2018). Unlike conservative welfare states with exclusive labor markets, Nordic unions do not need to engage in general strikes (e.g., France) or militancy (e.g., South Korea). Rather, the power of Nordic unions allows them to engage in what power-resource theory terms "democratic class struggle" (Korpi, 2001).

The conclusion needs to be appreciated in the context of the study. First, the study provides an exploratory and not a confirmatory analysis. Confirmatory analysis refers to predictive or causal testing of theories. Second, the study during the pandemic which might influence the support for sick insurance. Third, we make no claims about the importance of residential segregation and anti-immigration attitudes. Our data disallows us to estimate the residential (e.g., vote district or neighborhood) association with anti-immigration attitudes and support for social insurances (i.e., varying slopes).

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Notes

¹ Bobo (1999) added economic condition in response to Marxist's Bonacich (1972), who claimed that labor markets caused ethnic antagonism rather than cognitive or emotional facets.

² Analogous to a squared correlation coefficient

³ In econometric and psychometric jargon we can consider the differences as "endogenous" and "exogenous".

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