Folk Conceptions of Free Will: A Systematic Review and Narrative Synthesis of Psychological Research

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Authors

  • Alison Lam Department of Psychology, University of Liverpool
  • Siu Kit Yeung

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15626/MP.2021.2829

Keywords:

free will, choice, folk concepts, lay beliefs, systematic review, open science

Abstract

The existence of free will has been a subject of fierce academic debate for millennia, still the meaning of the term “free will” remains nebulous. In the past two decades, psychologists have made considerable progress in defining lay concepts of free will. We present the first systematic review of primary psychological evidence on how ordinary folk conceptualise free will, encompassing folk concepts, beliefs, intuitions, and attitudes about free will. A total of 1,384 records were identified following a pre-registered protocol. After abstract and full-text screening, 18 articles were eligible for inclusion, comprised of 36 studies and 10,176 participants from regions including the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, and Germany. A narrative synthesis of results showed that for ordinary folk, especially the more educated population from the United States, free will is a dynamic construct centred on the ability to choose following one’s goals and desires, whilst being uncoerced and reasonably free from constraints. Results suggesting metaphysical considerations regarding consciousness, dualism, and determinism were inconclusive. Our findings provided preliminary support for a psychological model of folk conception of free will, and elucidated potential pathways mediating the effects of consciousness and dualism on free will attributions. Further research is needed to explicate the distinction between having free will and having the ability to exercise free will, as well as the cross-cultural validity of findings on folk conceptions of free will.

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2025-10-29

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