Hermeneutical injustice does not prompt any didactic revolutions

Abstract

Philosopher Miranda Fricker argues in her groundbreaking Epistemic Injustice that access to concepts is unevenly distributed among groups in society. Moreover, the uneven distribution is due to unjustified differences in socio-economic influence and power. This means that the uneven distribution constitutes an injustice and Fricker calls it “Hermeneutic injustice”.  The injustice has negative consequences for all who suffer from it, including students. Students suffering from hermeneutic injustice may have difficulties describing certain experiences in a comprehensible way, making them appear irrational. As a result, the teacher might have difficulties in providing the right sort of feed-back to the student who also may be subject to derogatory comments from her peers leading to poor self-esteem and even health issues. This, in turn has negative effects on the student's knowledge development. The injustice also affects other students who cannot learn from the affected student's experiences and thus miss out on valuable knowledge. Moreover, those who suffer hermeneutical injustice can be described as being disrespectfully treated. All in all, it is of great importance to combat hermeneutical injustice. Fricker believes that the injustice is best addressed with reference to the fostering and manifestations of virtues, but does not relate her reasoning to teaching. In this paper, I examine the didactic implications of Fricker's position and how reasonable the implications are. Virtues are taught and given the nature of the injustice and profound formulations in the curricula (Lgr22, Gy11) this is a very important task. Virtue theorists typically argue that virtuous actions can be specified. This, some influential critics have stressed, means that teachers who try to get their students to understand and apply rules of thumb (guidelines or principles) relating to, for example, text analysis, source criticism or critical thinking are working under a delusion. If there are no plausible rules of thumb of this kind, there is no point in trying to get students to understand and apply them. So, teachers should, given virtue theoretical assumptions, stop doing this. This implication is, according to the critics, enough to show that the theory is inadequate, which, in turn, means that the proper response to hermeneutical injustice cannot be virtue theoretical. With reference to a number of distinctions and with reference to a careful and charitable interpretation of Fricker’s reasoning I argue that it does not face the objection just stated. Fricker can admit that virtuous behavior, to some extent, can be summarized in rules of thumb and that they are relevant to the fostering of virtues. Her response to hermeneutical injustice cannot be ruled out on the basis that it has mistaken didactic implications. Her position does not imply that teachers should stop getting students to understand and apply various principles related to, for example, critical thinking. Teachers are justified in focusing on these “old” rules of thumb. However, her reasoning does not advice teachers to focus on new guidelines not already motivated by very plausible principles elaborated within the hermeneutical tradition. The guidelines Fricker claims to be associated with the virtue of hermeneutical justice are motivated by the most important hermeneutical principle, the principle of charity and its various sub-principles. This means that the rules of thumb Fricker refers to could be described as new for some teachers, but they are not new from a scientific point of view. Her reasoning regarding the existence, causes, and harmful effects of hermeneutical injustice is new and very important, but her proposal for how it should be combated do not motivate teachers to teach rules of thumb not already motivated by the principle of charity. In the end of the paper, I argue that Fricker’s reasoning might have indirect didactic significance and I speculate about what implications Fricker’s reasoning might have for the collegium, the principal, the curriculum and for politicians. The speculations can be understood as suggestions for future research.