The methodology of interpretation and selective abduction

Abstract

In this article, I discuss the foundations of interpretation considered as a methodological approach. Both social and educational research have a long tradition of ascribing the concept of interpretation a pivotal methodological and theoretical role. Many authors have argued for the centrality of the concept of interpretation in educational theory. Furthermore, several popular methodological approaches in educational research operate assuming the explicit aim to generate interpretations of human action.

In the article, I discuss the concept of interpretation from a methodological perspective, arguing for two main theses. According to the first thesis, every interpretation is, both in the everyday and scientific use of the term, the conclusion of an abductive inference. According to a common conceptualization, which originates in C.S. Peirce's work, abduction is a reasoning scheme involving two premises – consisting of a set of observations and a theory that is assumed to explain the observations – and a conclusion stating the theory is (tentatively) true. Several scholars have stressed the creative dimension of Peirce’s conception of abduction. The function of this inferential scheme is to discover new and innovative explanations, and not primarily to produce justified or credible theories. This creative dimension is still nowadays considered central by contemporary theoreticians of abduction.

The second thesis that I argue for is that when interpretation is used as a methodological tool, it must rest on a special form of abduction, i.e., selective abduction. Selective abduction entails that several hypothetical theories are compared and that the theory that best explains the observations is accepted. Selective abduction can, if considered as inference to the best explanation, be conceptualized as focusing on justification rather than on discovery.  From this perspective, the application of selective abduction is supposed to generate credible theories. In the more recent discussions about abduction selective and creative interpretations have been considered as describing two distinct and opposite inferential schemes.

In this part of the paper, I provide an argument that the reasoning that is typical of interpretive approaches in the social and educational sciences cannot avoid a contrastive, comparative and thus selective dimension. To interpret is in its essence to compare. I do not challenge that claim that the aim of interpretive research could be the discovery of new explanations. Instead, I argue that even if it is assumed that creativity is the general epistemic goal of interpretive theorizing, this process of theory building cannot avoid a selective dimension. Creative abduction, when applied to methodology of interpretive theorizing, is selective.

My argument has some methodological consequences that I discuss in the concluding part of the article. First, a consequence of my argument is that interpretive theorizing puts every interpretive theory in a theoretical context. Interpretations cannot exist in isolation but gets their content in relation to other concurring interpretations. Researchers using qualitative interpretive methods should make this context explicit, to make the content of their interpretative theories clearer and their methodology more transparent. Secondly, it is easy to interpret Peirce’s original inferential scheme for abduction as suggesting that, when creativity is the main aim of interpretive theorizing, justification and credibility are not important. My thesis that interpretive theorizing is an inherently selective process highlights the centrality of justification and credibility appraisals. The generation of interpretive theories involves an important testing dimension. In this way, the selective character of abduction in interpretive methodology expounds how justification and discovery are equally central in the process of theory construction.